Savion comments on Queue Cap Proposal –

• MISO’s queue cap proposal - Savion is opposed to stand-alone GI queue caps and believes the adoption of stand-alone regional queue caps will alter Interconnection Customer (IC) behavior, such that most ICs will reconfigure their development plans to rush the opening of the application window to secure MW before the queue cap is achieved. A greater concern is that one or more well-funded ICs may crash the GI queue with large volumes of GI requests in a bid to control study and/or Decision Point outcomes later in the GI study process. Even if MISO advances with its queue cap proposal, Savion strongly feels that a flat cap of 50% of MISO Peak Load per study region may not serve as a good measure for defining the cap amount. MISO should consider regional congestion and perform analyses to understand how much injection in each region is permissible. There may be scenarios where a certain region can allow higher injection levels than 50% whereas a 50% increase in some regions may not work. Further, if MISO pursues the hard cap, we request MISO to set up a formal process to entertain stakeholder’s feedback for deriving solutions to come up with an injection level per study region. One solution would be to perform a voltage analysis on a stressed regional case from the previous year DPP cycle to understand the permissible injection levels before the regional voltages dip below allowable levels. This can give good insights on which areas are getting stressed and what the injection level should be for a certain region.

• VPE Proposal / RERRA exemptions – The Volumetric Price Escalation (VPE) proposal was developed by several members of the IPP community who spent months crafting an effective market-based and non-discriminatory approach to GI queue size management. Savion strongly urges MISO to revisit the VPE proposal in its original form. The Volumetric Price Escalation proposal is far superior to a hard queue cap due to its ability to alter GI customers’ decision-making behavior by forcing GI customers to prioritize project submittals, whereas MISO’s hard queue cap proposal simply reinforces existing bad behaviors that reward GI customers who exercise their ability to crash the application window early and often until the queue cap is reached. Further, MISO’s proposal to alter the original VPE Tranche 1 cost of $4k/MW to $8k/MW, then pairing with MISO’s hard queue cap and RERRA exemptions, is not acceptable. The intent of the $4k/MW lower cost VPE Tranche 1 was to provide a nondiscriminatory mechanism that everyone could participate in while also giving small load serving entities the chance to submit their smaller GI requests at the lowest cost available. This is a market-based design that eliminates the need for RERRA exemptions. MISO’s most recent proposal to redesign the VPE Tranche 1 pricing, combined with MISO’s hard queue cap and continued pursuit of RERRA exemptions, is unfair, unjust, overly harsh to GI customers and undermines the market-based, behavior-changing, -design of the VPE. Savion strongly opposes MISO’s latest proposal.

• MISO’s GI substitution proposal - MISO’s proposal states that GI requests submitted after the cap is attained will be used to replace withdrawn GI requests during the validation process and others will be included in the following cycle. Savion agrees with MISO’s proposal to replace GI requests withdrawn during the validation process with the additional requests in the queue after the MW cap is met. We want to ensure that MISO agrees that this addition will be done prior to distributing the “Screened Study results” and there will be no changes once the DPP process has been officially started. In other words, MISO needs to ensure that the screening results are not altered since the ICs are making financial decisions based on these results. The insertion of additional GI requests after the screening results would mean that the previous screening results are no longer valid as the constraints and cost allocation will be impacted due to new additions.

Savion strongly opposes MISO’s proposal to transfer excess GI requests above the queue cap limit to subsequent queue cycles. There is no upside to this proposal and will likely undermine the goal of un-clogging the queues, resulting in more harm than good. By adopting this process, MISO may run into scenarios where the queues are clogged for 2-3 years in advance as ICs jostle for entry in the near-term study cycle to gain an advantage in later cycles. Savion suggests closing the queue portal to prevent ICs from submitting more applications once 110% of the cap-amount is met. The additional 10% may be used to replace for withdrawals as discussed above. Once, the DPP kicks-off and screening results are distributed, MISO should cancel the remaining applications and request the ICs to resubmit in the next cycle with updated data. This process would ensure that everyone gets a fair chance at future DPP cycle entry without the risk of clogging queues. Savion also urges MISO to make changes to the tariff language to ensure that the projects cannot be transferred to the next cycle since it will create a backlog of projects in future cycles and will defeat the purpose of having a MW queue cap.

We also strongly feel that MISO’s proposal to transfer excess GI requests to future cycles is detrimental to the ICs. From cycle to cycle, the injection patterns on a Point of Interconnection (POI) changes. A POI which might have looked appealing in a certain DPP cycle may not be a good option in future DPP cycles due to system flow/dispatch changes. Hence, if MISO transfers the projects into future cycles after the present cycle queue cap is reached, the ICs have zero insights on model changes/ network upgrades from prior DPP cycles which may cause the project to withdraw after Phase 1 or after obtaining screening results.

Lastly, transferring projects into future cycles requires MISO to hold financial securities for a much longer period. Is MISO going to pay GI customers the FERC interest rate between when they submit their application and when the future cycle begins? Not only does this increase MISO’s cost of doing business, but this would also increase MISO’s administration efforts and potentially delay the DPP process even further. A fresh start to each cycle solves this entire issue. Hence, we strongly urge MISO to eliminate this process of transferring projects into future cycles.

Duke Energy Indiana appreciates MISO efforts to make the queue process more efficient. For utilities planning to serve new load with additional resources, like Duke Energy Indiana, the current timelines are simply not workable and more needs to be done.  While this proposal is a start in the right direction, we don’t believe it goes far enough. It’s become clear that the process is broken and radical change is needed. What is really needed is a fast track queue process for utilities that have an obligation to serve load, where projects could be evaluated and GIAs concluded in 12 months.  And, we need MISO to be willing to file such a proposal in the next couple of months. Our understanding is that PJM has mentioned a similar concept of “queue jumping”, and we encourage MISO to talk with OMS, PJM and OPSI about these concepts and potentially make similar FERC filings demonstrating a larger group of utilities and regulators believe a fast track process for incumbent utilities is needed.

As to the details of the current proposal we also believe that three RERRA exemptions for each state may not be a fair way to allocate the exemptions throughout the MISO footprint. For example, a utility in a Zone where there is one RERRA with 8 generation owning utilities with an obligation to serve does not have the same chance of receiving one of the three exemptions as a utility in a Zone of 5 or fewer generation owning utilities with an obligation to serve. This leaves the potential for utilities with obligations to serve no exemption opportunities.  Without a fast track process, being able to ensure a utility gets into the queue becomes more critical when it needs to add additional load.  Perhaps there is a way to allocate based on load obligation or a process where a utility/state can request additional exemptions for good cause.

1.     Introduction

Clearway[1] appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback in response to MISO’s proposed interconnection queue reforms as presented at the July 23, 2024 meeting of the Interconnection Process Working Group. As discussed below, we:

• Agree with MISO that the status quo in the queue is unsustainable, but believe that the current debate misses the opportunity to address the root cause of the queue problem: cost and schedule uncertainty (section 2);
• Urge MISO to refocus on reforms―like an entry fee model―that will mitigate this uncertainty (section 3); and
• Encourage MISO to choose either the MW cap or the Volumetric Price Escalator (not both), time-limit that measure to three study cycles, and abandon any exemptions to the MW cap (section 4).

Clearway also generally supports the comments filed separately by Advanced Energy United, Clean Grid Alliance, and the IPP Sector.

2.     The current debate misses the opportunity to address the root cause of the queue problem: cost and schedule uncertainty

Clearway agrees with MISO that the status quo is unsustainable. The unprecedented volume of projects being studied in each queue cycle leads to unrealistic study results reflecting outsized costs for network upgrades that will never be built, while protracting the time to complete the study process, as inevitable withdrawals trigger restudies.

However, as we expressed in our comments on MISO’s efforts last year to develop a MW cap, the volume of projects is not the problem itself.[2] Rather, the problem is uncertainty regarding what it will cost to interconnect and how long it will take to receive those study results. This uncertainty is a symptom of how the study process currently works against the backdrop of a fundamentally changed market for new resources.

In the current interconnection study paradigm, entering the queue is the only way that developers can obtain actionable information about what it will cost to interconnect. This worked well when relatively few projects entered the queue in each study cycle―when the generation mix largely consisted of a smaller number of large generating facilities. The relatively small queue volume produced more realistic study results leading to a more stable queue.

But market conditions have fundamentally shifted, rendering yesterday’s paradigm obsolete. Driven by changes in consumer demand and public policies, the queue now mainly consists of smaller resources. All else equal, this increases the volume of projects that must be studied in the next decade. Meanwhile, because entering the queue is the only meaningful cost-discovery tool available to developers―and because interconnection costs are now a primary determinant of project success―multiples of the volume of commercially viable projects (i.e., those that will ultimately be built) will continue to seek queue entry.

In sum, attempts to bluntly ration the queue will not address the root cause of speculative queue activity. Thus, under its proposal MISO will be left with a queue of projects that simply managed to submit an application fastest, irrespective of commercial viability.

3.     To fix the queue, MISO should develop an entry fee model

To fix the fundamental problems with the queue, MISO should work with stakeholders to develop an entry fee model. Such an approach would entail (1) making reasonable assumptions about new resources within a given queue cycle, (2) leveraging existing MISO planning models to determine expected network upgrades and costs to support that portfolio, (3) calculating an upfront interconnection cost that customers must pay to enter that queue cycle, and (4) where necessary, rationing entry to ensure the integrity of the entry fee calculation.

An entry fee would generate significant benefits for both MISO and interconnection customers:

• An entry fee will provide interconnection customers with actionable cost information needed to determine project viability before entering the queue. Posting such an upfront fee should also reduce queue volume to more manageable levels, since we believe much of the current volume is driven by interconnection cost discovery.
• This “right-sizing” of the queue, together with heightened withdrawal penalties―a risk that would be appropriate to impose in exchange for upfront cost certainty―should promote schedule certainty by minimizing the need for restudies.

Of course, implementation details matter. But we believe that an entry fee model holds sufficient promise to warrant a serious look by MISO and stakeholders. There is a growing body of work bringing attention to the entry fee concept upon which MISO can draw.[3] Meanwhile, SPP is slated to implement a similar framework starting with the 2025 DISIS queue cycle, which could provide valuable lessons learned.[4]

4.     If MISO proceeds with either a MW cap or a Volumetric Price Escalator, it should:

4.1.   Choose only one, not both

MISO’s proposal incorporates both a MW cap and a version of Savion’s proposed Volumetric Price Escalator. In doing so, MISO doubles down on an unsound approach that effectively asks developers to accept substantially increased financial risk without any assurance that study results will be returned in a timely manner. Clearway strongly urges MISO to rethink this duplicative proposal and instead focus on just one means of rationing queue entry.

4.2.   Time-limit such measures via a sunset provision

As discussed above, any reforms that perpetuate upfront cost and schedule uncertainty will not fix the fundamental flaws with MISO’s queue. Yet an entry fee concept will take time to fully develop, while in the interim MISO must continue operating its interconnection queue. Within these bounds, it would be appropriate for MISO to propose in the tariff a sunset provision that would automatically retire the MW cap or the Volumetric Price Escalator after three DPP study cycles. Unlike MISO’s proposal to require in the tariff an informational report to FERC―a requirement that carries little weight while risking inaction to fix the structural problems―a sunset provision provides a credible commitment by MISO to stakeholders that it intends to work collaboratively to own the future of its queue.

4.3.   Abandon the proposed exemptions from the MW cap

Finally, if MISO chooses to implement a MW cap, it should abandon the proposed exemptions. MISO’s revised approach fails to address the three fatal flaws FERC identified when rejecting MISO’s prior MW cap proposal:

1. Exemptions to the cap potentially undermine the reasons for imposing a cap;
2. The exemptions were not shown to be consistent with open access requirements; and
3. The exemptions were not shown to be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.

First, MISO maintains that the MW cap is necessary to ensure DPP study models can solve, yet the proposal contains no assurance that the integrity of the MW cap would be preserved. The lack of restrictions on exemptions means that exempted projects could flood the queue, eradicating any claimed benefit of solvability, process efficiency, or transparency.

Second, the unrestricted nature of the exemptions fails to satisfy open access requirements of providing access to transmission service on a generic, industrywide basis. Instead, MISO’s cap will limit grid access to certain customers while simultaneously allowing other customers to bypass the cap. MISO’s approach creates priority access to the generator interconnection process for the exempted classes of interconnection requests while failing to impose any “inherent practical limitations” as identified by FERC.

Third, MISO has not addressed FERC’s concerns regarding undue discrimination. MISO has not yet revealed to stakeholders how its proposed exemptions work together with the MW cap to ensure that the study process appropriately accounts for future resource adequacy needs―a key concern raised by the Commission. It also remains unclear how the RERRA exemption is not unduly discriminatory against other interconnection customers, particularly when some RERRAs (i.e., co-operatives and municipal utilities) are effectively developing generation to compete with projects built by independent power producers.

August 16, 2024

Ørsted Onshore North America’s (Ørsted) Feedback on July 23, 2024, Presentation on Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements to Interconnection Process Working Group

Please accept the following comments in response to the July 23, 2024 presentation on interconnection queue reforms in which MISO presents a revised queue cap proposal.  MISO proposes the following:

• sets the queue cap at 50% of MISO peak load per Study Region and states that the Indicative Cap based on the MTEP/DPP 2022 model would be ~68 GW;
• allows three exemptions per RERRA (Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority) entity;
• replace projects in the cycle that are withdrawn during validation process (e.g. site control review) with projects submitted after the cap is met, all others will be included in the following cycle;
• develop mechanism to re-evaluate the cap after three queue cycles from its effective date;
• not opposed to exploring a volumetric price escalator, starting at $8000, in conjunction with the hard cap.

Ørsted continues to believe that a queue cap is not necessary and that increased pre-queue due diligence requirements will help ensure that the projects in the queue are of increased quality which will help ensure that they remain in the queue.  However, recognizing that MISO would like to move forward with a queue cap, Ørsted is willing to work with MISO and stakeholders to develop a workable proposal.  As discussed below, Ørsted does not support the queue cap as currently proposed.

First, the proposal to set the queue cap based on 50% peak load from the MTEP models underestimates the renewable generation on the system as all technology types are not studied using the summer peak model (e.g wind is studied in the shoulder peak model).

Second, the proposal to allow exemptions for RERRA entities does not treat all resources the same and is unduly discriminatory.  While Orsted appreciates that MISO has limited the number of exemptions per RERRA, this limit does not address the underlying problem with exemptions.  The exemption would still allow RERRA entities to have automatic access to the queue and it is unclear if these MW would reduce the cap for other entrants.  MISO does not present a justification for this disparate treatment.   

Third, the proposal to include projects submitted after the queue cap is reached in the following cycle unfairly burdens those in following cycles by using the limited space in the cap.  The proposal also does not recognize that there are number of factors that go in to selecting a point of interconnection and acquiring land rights and other equipment.  Some of these contracts may be time sensitive and may not be available in a different cycle. 

Fourth, the proposed time frame, three queue cycles, after which the cap will be re-evaluated is too long.  Since the cap places all of the burden on the interconnection customers, the evaluation of whether the queue cap is actually speeding up study timeframes should happen sooner.  The study process timelines with the reforms are 373 days.  MISO should consider reviewing the cap at the end of this time period to see if the study timelines are being met.  If they are not, then the solution may not be a queue cap.

Fourth, the VPE proposal was developed by several stakeholder to present an alternative to a hard queue cap to MISO.  The VPE proposal sought to ensure that developer were evaluating and prioritizing project submittals rather than just racing to submit projects to meet a hard cap.  While Ørsted appreciates MISO’s willingness to continue to discuss the VPE.  Ørsted opposes the proposal to alter the original VPE Tranche 1 cost of $4k/MW to $8k/MW.  This proposal is essentially cherry picking of specific aspects of a cohesive proposal without discussion or explanation.  This increase in conjunction with the hard queue cap and RERRA exemptions, is not acceptable as the VPE was intended to be a market-based design that eliminated the need for the RERRA exemption.  The  MISO should explain and support why all three aspects of its proposal is needed to meet MISO’s goal. 

Ørsted appreciates the opportunity to submit comments in response to the proposal and will continue to engage with MISO as the proposal develops. 

Introduction

AES Clean Energy (AES CE) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the revised Queue Cap proposal. AES CE continues to strongly oppose the proposed queue cap of 50% of peak load per study region for interconnection requests in the MISO region. We believe that this cap is arbitrary, unjustified, and detrimental to the development of new resources and the achievement of resource adequacy goals.

Lack of justification for the 50% cap

The MISO queue cap proposal does not provide any rationale or evidence for why a 50% cap is necessary or appropriate. The proposal states that the cap is intended to "address the growing backlog of interconnection requests and the associated network upgrade costs", but it does not explain how the cap would achieve this objective or what the benefits and trade-offs are.

AES CE contends that the cap would not reduce the backlog or the costs, but rather shift them to future interconnection cycles and create more uncertainty and risk for developers and customers. By always keeping the queue window open but limiting each annual study to 50% of peak load, there is the very real possibility that the queue could be fully subscribed three years in advance. This would significantly limit the region’s ability to respond to new state policy goals, reforms to the capacity market (for instance, SPP just adopted a 20% increase in their Winter PRM that would be effective in two years), and electricity demand growth from economic development opportunities in the region. MISO has noted repeatedly that they face a reliability imperative and are concerned with the pace of retirements relative to the deployment of new resources. This queue cap would only further constrain the region’s ability to bring resources online and it remains to be seen if the cap would have any meaningful impact on the number of projects that come online as a results of the smaller study sizes.

Lack of data on resource adequacy impacts

The MISO queue cap proposal also does not provide any data or analysis on how the cap would affect the resource adequacy of the MISO region and how the selection of 50% would produce a sufficient throughput to meet the resource additions identified in the Futures used in LRTP. AES CE has presented in our prior FERC comments and in presentations to MISO, that 60-70 GWs per year will likely be insufficient to hit these targets given typical construction timelines and conversion rates. Table 1 below shows that MISO would likely need to study 105-79 GWs per year to achieve the resource addition target in Future 2A. Even this could be too low if future demand manifests at higher levels of data center, electrification, manufacturing load penetration than assumed in this scenario.

Table 1: Estimated Annual Cap by Conversion and Study Rates

It has never been the case (even when queue sizes were much smaller) that every project that enters the queue will or even should be built. The 2023/24 OMS survey shows that over the last 8 years the region has never added more than about 3.3 GWs per year. In this analysis, even when MISO doubles this to 6.1 GWs per year in new resource additions assumption, depending on potential load growth scenarios, this could leave the region 10s of GWs short of meeting demand. Therefore, it is likely that we may need to triple or even quadruple the number of resources that come online annually.

Unless every state passes significant permitting reforms, supply chains become more robust, and cost of capital declines, there will continue to be attrition from the queue even after GIA-execution. This is why a robust throughput in the interconnection process is necessary, to ensure that enough resources remain once 70-80% of projects withdraw to meet the 6-18 GWs of new resources needed every year to preserve reliability.

Prior reforms are sufficient

MISO passed significant reforms last year, by doubling the Milestone 2 payment, increasing site control, and adopting automatic withdrawal penalties that has already had a significant impact on queue volumes. At intake, these reforms led to a nearly 30% reduction in volume. Since an additional 15% usually drops out before the phase 1 study commence, this should put the 2023 queue cycle at about 104.5 GWs. This is well in line with what AES has projected as a reasonable queue volume to hit Futures 2A target. Therefore, it is unlikely that a queue cap is even necessary, and MISO should allow additional time for these reforms to take effect before deciding if additional reforms are needed.

Other Comments

AES CE request MISO to provide further justification on each of the proposed exemptions, and how exempted resources would be factored into the overall cap. If MISO moves forward with exemptions, these resources should not be counted against fulfilling the total cap.

AES CE opposes MISO adopting a queue cap as a permanent measure. Rather than the three year mark being an informational report to FERC on the impacts to the queue process, the three year mark should be a firm sunset date, and MISO should have to justify to FERC and to stakeholders why a continued queue cap is just and reasonable.

AES CE could become more supportive of the queue cap if MISO would process two study cycles per year. We do understand why having a smaller volume of projects in a cluster study could produce more reasonable upgrade costs but given that the clean energy transition will require a greater number of resources to be studied, if MISO were able to study two clusters per year this could get us to the volume of resources necessary to hit future growth targets and ensure future reliability and that capacity and energy market rates remain just, reasonable, and affordable for customers. We are supportive of MISO’s efforts to adopt automation of model builds and would encourage MISO to continue to look for innovative ways to study and process the queue. AES CE believes that AI and automation will be vital tools in the toolbox that are worth exploring further. MISO’s and stakeholders’ time would be better spent developing these solutions than arguing over the blunt instrument of a queue cap.

Volumetric Price Escalator

AES CE does not support the adoption of both an overall queue cap and the volumetric price escalator. AES CE does not support a volumetric price escalator that begins at the current $8k/MW and increases from there. AES CE could support the volumetric price escalator if it included a tranche below $8k/MW, such as Savion’s proposal of the first GW being priced at $4k/MW, and was implemented without an overall queue cap. If MISO moves forward with the queue cap, it should only adopt the VPE framework in the future if there is documented evidence that queue cap is not producing enough supplier diversity in the market.

AES CE remains open to considering the VPE framework as an alternative proposal. The VPE could produce more reasonable queue sizes, while also providing more flexibility for the queue to respond to market signals sent by state policies, customer demand, and utility IRPs. The VPE would provide a markets based solution and incentivize individual developers to be more thoughtful in their queue submissions.

To determine where MISO should cut off each tranche, AES CE requests that MISO release updated average queue submissions from 2020-2023 for the top 3, top 5, top 10, top 15, top 20, and top 50 companies, and average for all companies. It would also be helpful to provide information on whether the average queue submissions are statistically significantly different from one another.

AES CE recognizes that the VPE is more administratively burdensome, and there are difficulties in determining which entities constitute a corporate family. In this definition, it would be important to separate regulated vs unregulated entities- even if they share a common investor. For instance, the AES Corporation owns both AES Clean Energy and AES Indiana, but there are regulatory firewalls and NERC anti-trust rules that prevent these separate business units from coordinating in the MISO market and interconnection queue. Therefore, a final VPE policy should treat regulated and unregulated entities as separate entities when determining corporate family.

Conclusion

AES CE urges MISO to reject the queue cap proposal and instead pursue other measures to improve the interconnection process and address the queue backlog and the network upgrade costs, such as further adoption of automation and AI tools. To facilitate the energy transition, and enable economic development for the region, MISO should focus its efforts on ramping up its capabilities to process a higher queue volume, not arbitrarily limit its queue intake. These measures would better align with the MISO's vision of "delivering value to our customers and communities by working together to create a more reliable, resilient, and efficient electric grid".

EDP Renewables (EDPR) appreciates MISO’s goal to manage the number of projects in the interconnection queue and reduce study delays, however the relevant electric retail regulatory authority (RERRA) exemptions in the July queue cap proposal still unjustly allow certain RERRA entities to favor their own generation.  The three exemptions per RERRA, also do not align with FERC’s guidance that prohibit processes that unduly discriminate against projects subject to the queue cap while giving preferential treatment to RERRA entity projects without justification.

In January 2024, the Commission identified three reasons why MISO’s initial RERRA proposal was rejected.  First, the exemptions were unlimited and undermines the reasons for imposing a cap.  Second, the exemptions will result in undue discrimination, which is expressly prohibited under the open access requirements of Order No. 888.  Third, the exemptions have not otherwise been shown to be just and reasonable (FERC Queue Cap Order, Docket No. ER24-341-000, pgs. 76-79).  

MISO’s current proposal still provides no justification why each RERRA entity is given three exemptions nor how these exemptions equitably improve the generator interconnection process for all classes of participants.  While an independent power producer (IPP) is unable to qualify as a RERRA entity, municipals and cooperatives throughout MISO’s 15 States are eligible entities to automatically receive exemptions, as well as each state commission, who can seek exemptions on behalf of vertically integrated utilities.  This process, on its face, creates inconsistent rules in which only projects submitted by RERRA entities are able to benefit while placing projects developed by IPPs at a significant disadvantage.   

In addition, it is foreseeable that certain RERRA entities would engage in unduly discriminatory practices by selling their exempt queue positions of any megawatt size to other companies for profit.  Unlike state commissions, the primary directive of municipal and cooperatives are to serve their members and bring the most profit to their customers.  In this effort, any RERRA entity could easily capitalize on their exempt class of interconnection projects and will result in discriminatory practices by allowing the entity that purchases the queue position to bypass the queue.

EDPR requests MISO to eliminate the unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory RERRA exemptions to ensure all projects are subject to the same rules under the queue cap proposal, otherwise the refiling will risk being rejected again and result in further delays to queue reform.

Vistra Corp. (“Vistra”) appreciates the opportunity to submit feedback on MISO’s Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements proposal that was discussed during the July 23rd Interconnection Process Working Group (IPWG) meeting. Vistra is concerned with MISO’s proposed modifications to the FERC-rejected RERRA (Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority) exemption which, as currently written, would allow three exemptions per RERRA entity during a given queue cycle. MISO’s proposal does not include information on the process utilized for determining this ‘three exemptions’ figure, or why MISO believes it’s appropriate to implement a mechanism that would benefit certain interconnection customers at the expense of others. MISO has not articulated why this new proposal sufficiently addresses FERC’s prior concerns. 

MISO’s RERRA proposal would provide preferential access to the interconnection queue and transmission system for projects hand-picked by state regulatory authorities, and leaves MISO with no input or control over how each RERRA entity determines which generation projects merit receiving one of the cap exemptions- potentially at the expense of more beneficial projects that could be rejected by a RERRA. For example, some RERRAs may decide to only provide exemptions to vertically integrated utilities and reject the projects of independent power producers and developers who are required to have equal access to the transmission system through the interconnection queue and may be proposing projects that would result in improved resource adequacy compared to the projects the RERRA is approving. RERRAs in other states may, for various reasons, deny some or all of the exemption requests, which could then result in the RERRA exempted generation projects being heavily weighted towards a small group of MISO states who choose to use all of their allotted exemptions during each queue cycle. These concerns and potential scenarios require a deeper examination by MISO and additional stakeholder discussions.

Importantly, MISO’s latest RERRA exemption proposal fails to address the concerns expressed by FERC in their January 19, 2024, Order (ER24-340-000) which denied MISO’s RERRA exemption language. In that order, FERC found that “MISO’s proposal to include unbounded cap exemptions in its generator interconnection procedures is inconsistent with the requirement that MISO must offer access to the generator interconnection process on the same or comparable basis. This is because the cap proposed by MISO limits access to a queue cycle and exempted interconnection requests may enter this cycle regardless of the cap value.  In consequence, the cap exemptions create priority access to the generator interconnection process for the exempted classes of interconnection requests.” Vistra recommends that MISO provide stakeholders with additional information on how the latest RERRA exemption language addresses the concerns expressed by FERC. 

The IPP Sector thanks MISO for developing the Queue Cap Proposal, and accepting stakeholder feedback on the issue. The IPP Sector encourages MISO to change its focus regarding interconnection queue processing reform. We appreciate that there are no easy answers here. The delays in interconnection queue study processing pre-date the COVID-19 disruptions and are now rooted in labor challenges, technological gaps, and high study demand driven by macro-economic and legislative factors. And with all of those items, the IPP Sector is concerned that MISO’s focus on simply capping volume will fail to improve the functionality of the queue.

Rather, the IPP Sector encourages MISO to redraft the proposal in a manner that focuses on people, processes, and technology. The region will continue to need skilled engineers and the Sector encourages MISO to continue to focus on developing plans to attract and retain talent. Next, the processes and technology that MISO relies upon to build models and conduct studies continue to be in need of reassessment. The Sector applauds MISO for taking initiative and integrating Pearl Street’s SUGAR platform. Certainly this integration will take some time and is a step in the right direction, but continuing to think through how additional technologies can be integrated will help MISO adjust to the current environment and plan for the future.

The Coalition of Midwest Power Producers (“COMPP”) thanks MISO for soliciting stakeholder feedback on the Interconnection Queue Cap proposal and the related RERRA exemptions to that Queue Cap.

COMPP reminds MISO that the FERC addressed the issue of the Queue Cap and related exemptions earlier this year in rejecting MISO’s proposal over discrimination and Open Access concerns. The proposal MISO presented to the July 23, 2024 Interconnection Process Working Group fails to address the issues FERC raised in rejecting the 2023 Queue Cap proposal. COMPP encourages MISO to pause, develop a new proposal crafted around FERC’s concerns, and eliminate the proposed exemptions for RERRAs.

COMPP’s first concern rests with the development of a Queue Cap proposal that will cap the MW volume for DPP classes around 68 GWs. No evidence has been presented by MISO that indicates even a 68 GW queue class will be processed within the Tariff-prescribed timeline of approximately 375 days. Moreover, MISO has not provided any evidence that such a Queue Cap will not adversely affect MISO’s ability to satisfy Resource Adequacy objectives. COMPP encourages MISO to articulate how a 68 GW queue class will be able to be processed in a timely manner absent some form of queue backlog mitigation. COMPP also encourages MISO to develop some analysis around the Resource Adequacy issues.

Second, COMPP highlights that MISO’s RERRA exemption proposal that provides only RERRAs with 3 applications that will be exempt from the proposed Queue Cap is discriminatory. This proposal simply does not address any of the FERC’s concerns from the prior rejection. COMPP encourages MISO to abandon the idea of carving out any exemptions for specific business interests or industry sectors as these exemptions fail to advance any of MISO’s stated objectives in developing the Queue Cap proposal and have already been disposed of by the Commission. If some form of an exemption is absolutely necessary to advance MISO’s queue improvement initiative, COMPP asks MISO to only include exemptions for competitive resource procurements that have been appropriately vetted and are devoid of discrimination.

SREA Comments on MISO’s  Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements Proposal (PAC-2023-1)

Southern Renewable Energy Association (SREA) offers the following comments regarding MISO’s proposed Generator Interconnection Improvements presented at the July 23, 2024 IPWG. MISO’s proposal is in response to FERC’s issuance of a deficiency notice on Docket ER24-341 wherein MISO filed changes related to new commercial readiness deposits, changes in right of way and site control requirements, as well as stipulations on when it’s appropriate to issue the refund of deposits for interconnection customers withdrawing from interconnection clusters. While these elements were supported by FERC, FERC’s deficiency notice was issued to MISO in response to the additional proposal to include an administrative MW Cap for each interconnection cycle that would allow MISO models to converge more easily. In addition, MISO also proposed that there would be a Relevant Regulatory Electric Retail Authority (RERRA) exemption from the cap, which allowed interconnection customers to submit projects above the administrative cap, negating the purpose of the cap in aiding the convergence of models. 

In response to the deficiency notice, MISO has offered the following to remedy the administrative cap and RERRA exemption that FERC took issue with: 

• Limit collective equivalent interconnection customer submitted MW’s to 50% of peak per MISO DPP SubRegion (Study Region) in each interconnection cycle  

• Use 5 year out MTEP / DPP model

• Approximate actual or expected system conditions

• Limit RERRA exemptions to three per RERRA entity per cycle

• Additional exceptions for Provisional GIA, ERIS to NRIS conversions and Generator Replacement submissions

MISO MW Cap

SREA reiterates our position that an administrative cap like MISO proposes is not a good resolution to getting models to solve with large queue volumes. MISO has not been able to meet timelines even when queue sizes were smaller, and we continue to believe the issue of large queue volumes needs to be addressed with process improvements, some of which MISO is adopting for the 2023 cycle already. SREA encourages MISO to strive for internal improvements that increase the possibility to meet timelines.  

Rollover Provision

Additionally, we are concerned that site control reforms approved by FERC related to both site control for a generator site as well as the POI Right of Way, presents a potentially serious challenge for developers who are required to retain site control to join an administratively limited queue, but are deferred to the next queue because their submission comes in above the MW queue cap. 

Any leasing arrangement that a developer secures for site control has expectations attached to it about when a project might be operational and generating payments, but when projects are deferred to later cycles, investors or landowners for a project may pull out. In that event, not only is a project in jeopardy, but because of MISO’s rules pertaining to Automatic Withdrawal Penalties, the developer is on the hook for any payments submitted to MISO in order to be included in an interconnection cycle. MISO should modify their proposal at the very least to allow Penalty Free Withdrawal for developers who are rolled into another interconnection cycle because their submission came in over the administrative queue cap. 

In addition to this concern, any M2 payments made by interconnection customers are held for an indefinite amount of time under MISO’s current process while they are rolled over into another interconnection cycle, which at this current moment in time is even more uncertain, because MISO has not had a regular cadence in yearly interconnection cycles going on 2 years. This circumstance warrants the return of interconnection applications to give interconnection customers the agency to decide whether or not to submit them into the next cycle. 

Both of these circumstances have significant financial impacts on projects and interconnection customers and MISO must acknowledge these impacts in any proposal.  

RERRA Exemption

SREA believes that the RERRA exemption, while scaled back from the original proposal, is still too broad, and likely will not resolve FERC’s concerns that were raised in response to the November 3, 2023 filing by MISO. A core concern raised by FERC is the possibility that a RERRA exemption will undermine the benefits of MISO’s MW Cap proposal by allowing. As stated at Par. 173 of FERC’s January 19th 2024 response to MISO’s proposal, ‘Although MISO’s initial proposed formula includes a 5% margin to account for exemptions400 (which would have the effect of decreasing the cap value to be established), MISO proposes no limit on the exemptions that may enter a queue cycle beyond the established cap. The uncapped exemptions that MISO proposes here could diminish or erase any reductions in queue size, significantly diluting or erasing the efficiency, transparency, and other benefits MISO contends will result from imposing a cap.’ A blanket exemption for every RERRA entity throughout MISO could still add several, or even tens of GW’s into a given interconnection cycle without any kind of limit applied.  

Volumetric Cap

Some of SREA’s members support the approach offered by Savion of an escalating M2 payment correlated to MW’s offered by parent companies per interconnection cycle, as an alternative to MISO’s proposal. While we do share concerns that even this cap is unnecessary given MISO’s other reforms approved by FERC, it seems that this approach better balances the risk and burden of interconnection requests on submitters to a cycle, acknowledging that the more MW’s offered by a parent company, the more impact on DPP / MTEP models. We also believe strongly that this will reduce submissions to only the most ready projects in a more nuanced manner than the administrative cap which MISO seeks to implement. 

In answer to MISO’s questions raised on slide 7 of their presentation, we see it as a worthwhile effort to update the application intake process to accommodate the new milestone structure proposed by Savion in their June 4th presentation, as the change is somewhat minimal. Furthermore, we propose that MISO require information about parent companies on the interconnection submission application. This seems like a reasonable solution that places a limited burden on interconnection customers that are likely aware of the corporate structure of their organization. 

As it regards the number of tranches appropriate for the volumetric cap, SREA agrees with Savion’s structure proposed at the June 4th IPWG meeting starting at $4k/MW, with a total of 3 tranches, as this proposal received consensus from IPP’s that routinely submit projects into the interconnection queue. 

Future Queue Cycles

SREA continues to support internal process improvements at MISO that recognize the challenges of the current moment. The yearly cadence of MISO’s interconnection queue cycles are off with the 2023 cycle occurring in 2024, and the refiling of a slightly modified administrative MW queue Cap proposal already opposed by FERC is risking further delay. While we oppose MISO’s MW Cap proposal, if it were to go forward, we suggest at the very minimum, that MISO retain in the their MW Cap calculation the 15% Withdrawal Margin that was included in the original proposal, that provides an adjustment for projects withdrawing before DPP1 of a yearly cycle. This acknowledges that not all projects submitted will impact the model, because they will effectively drop out before the kickoff of a cycle. 

We encourage MISO to continue to explore internal improvements like utilization of automation, AI, and tools like SUGAR used to solve models, but to consider other process improvements to ensure that TO’s and interconnection customers are exchanging important information efficiently and transparently, and that, most importantly that MISO has enough interconnection staff to efficiently process results and avoid burnout. The recipe for success is not to resort to blunt instruments like a MW Cap. 

Queue Cap Proposal

The Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) appreciates the opportunity to comment on MISO’s proposal to install an Interconnection Queue Cap on the total MW amount of Interconnection Requests that can be submitted in an interconnection queue cycle (PAC-2023-1). SEIA remains opposed to the Queue Cap proposal for several reasons. First, MISO has not demonstrated that the implementation of a Queue Cap will result in improved interconnection study timelines. The issue of protracted study timelines predates the 2022 DPP class and should be resolved through the integration of more modern computing power and techniques.

Moreover, MISO’s proposal ignores the Commission’s determination in Docket No. ER24-341-000 that a Queue Cap that includes a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (RERRA) exemption violates Order 888’s open access requirements that were applied to the generator interconnection process through Order 2003. Allowing RERRA approved projects into the queue above any cap makes the proposal unduly discriminatory on its face by creating two different classes of interconnection customer. The RERRA class – which include state regulatory commissions, municipal and cooperative utilities, and joint action agencies – will be permitted to bypass the Queue Cap to submit interconnection requests for Integrated Resource Plan designated resources and utility-owned or contracted resources. Meanwhile, a second class of interconnection customers that includes Independent Power Producers will be subjected to hard queue caps that limit the available capacity per queue cycle.

The unduly discriminatory nature of the proposal is compounded by the fact that a RERRA will be able to avoid increased costs of financing for IPP projects that cannot enter a cluster cycle. MISO has stressed that under the new Queue Cap, interconnection customers will need to submit interconnection applications with milestone requirements at the time an application submission to secure a queue position or be included in a following cycle if the Queue Cap is reached. If a project is included in a later cycle, MISO will retain development payments associated with the interconnection request that will require customers to pay carrying costs associated with the capital. This will subject one class of interconnection customers to increased project costs that the RERRA class can avoid.

Finally, MISO has not explained how a Queue Cap will help enable efficient and timely interconnection processing and prevent speculative requests. In fact, MISO’s cap proposal continues to undermine the reasons for queue reform. MISO’s proposal will implement a serial “first come, first served” time-stamping approach for admitting projects into the capped queue. This will cause interconnection customers to race to submit interconnection requests regardless of whether the project is ready, and rewards behavior MISO is trying to deter, submission of speculative interconnection requests. If a queue cap is implemented, MISO will incentivize a frenzy of interconnection request submissions given the value assigned to higher queue positions and the proposal to roll projects over the cap in the next queue cycle. This will include interconnection requests that are speculative and risky as customers line up for subsequent queue clusters. MISO’s inability to articulate how the cap will help it process timely interconnection requests is troubling, especially since qualitative Queue Reform efforts have reduced application submissions by 30% for the 2023 study cycle since they were implemented.

Volumetric Price Escalation (VPE) Proposal

SEIA believes that implementing an independent VPE proposal (not tied to any queue cap) may help MISO complete interconnection studies in timely fashion and reduce congested queues without creating unduly discriminatory classes of interconnection customers. Imposition of a VPE that is administered at the corporate family level to prevent gaming but still allows carveouts for regulated affiliates and joint ventures. A VPE that increases based on the MW volume of generator interconnection requests would provide a market-based methodology to queue management by encouraging interconnection customers to self-regulate though prioritization of best interconnection projects. Moreover, the VPE proposal is non-discriminatory and provides equal queue access across all interconnection customer types who can submit projects based on their own risk tolerance. MISO also has evidence that qualitative reforms that rely on increased interconnection costs can reduce the volume of interconnection requests. As mentioned above, MISO saw a 30% decrease in application submissions after the 2023 study cycle since qualitative queue reforms were implemented in Docket ER24-340-000. Accordingly, SEIA strongly encourages MISO to develop a policy for an independent VPE that is not tied to a hard queue cap.

APEX CLEAN ENERGY FEEDBACK

Apex Clean Energy appreciates the opportunity to provide its feedback on the package of queue reforms MISO presented during the July 23, 2024, IPWG meeting.

Apex supports the idea of a MW cap and believes this is critical to ground future planning models to more realistic system levels, better planning standards, and results that help developers in decision making.  However, Apex believes that further refinement of the proposed queue reforms is needed to ensure just and reasonable treatment of all generation interconnection customers.

Apex's further comments are in the attached documents submitted to Stakeholder Relations.

TransAlta appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback on MISO's interconnection queue cap. However, at the previous IPWG meeting MISO committed to providing the Working Group with more recent data to update Savion's presentation and observations regarding queue "crashing". 

TransAlta agrees with the comments voiced by IPWG members during the meeting that updated data would better enable constructive feedback, and therefore it is premature to provide feedback until MISO fulfills this action item. Given FERC's concerns regarding equitable treatment of interconnection customers and resulting impact on power supply, Savion's proposal is deserving of further consideration once MISO has present the IPWG with its findings.

While TransAlta understands MISO's imperative to reduce the queue cycle timeline, it is not clear how pushing "excess" queue requests from one cycle into the next treats queue customers equitably or provides them with the transparency or predictability that they need to successfully develop their projects.

IPWG: Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements (PAC-2023-1)0240723)

In response to MISO’s request for feedback on the queue cap refiling approach and volumetric price escalation, Wabash Valley Power Association Inc. dba Wabash Valley Power Alliance and Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. provide these recommendations. Capping the number of total MW studied in each cycle and affording a limited exemption for Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authorities (“RERRAs”) is a good first step to expedite completion of the cycle studies by including a realistic number of potential resource additions.

Nevertheless, a “Fast-Track” Queue option is also needed to ensure Resource Adequacy (“RA”) is maintained in the meantime. MISO acknowledges RERRAs are responsible for Resource Adequacy, yet MISO’s processes do not enable timely actions to support RERRA’s needs to replace or build new generation and serve loads. Viable large load additions are expected soon, and we must act now to add the generation resources needed to accommodate this load growth. To support a RERRA’s ability to perform their role. MISO should enact a Fast-Track option.

To enable a Fast-Track Queue option, MISO should give priority to statutorily approved resource additions such as those that receive a Certificate of Need (“CON”) or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) from a RERRA. RERRA entities utilize proven frameworks to evaluate forecasted capacity and energy needs and resource options through Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs), statewide analyses, and regulatory proceedings to which MISO should defer. As an example, Indiana enacted legislation (HEA 1007) to include five pillars or attributes when assessing electric resource additions: reliability, affordability, resiliency, stability, and environmental sustainability. Discussion of these attributes is required to evaluate resources prior to RERRA approval.

This approach aligns with the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) comments filed in the MISO queue reform FERC dockets (ER24-340-000, ER24-341-000) which state: “Resource adequacy is paramount and the challenges to maintain reliability within our state and across the region have never been greater. More than any other stakeholder, it is the state that understands the resource needs within its own borders.” (Dated 12/4/2023 at page 6)

A Queue Fast Track for resources that provide capacity and energy would align with MISO’s Expedited Project Review (EPR) process for transmission expansion to deliver energy and capacity between the annual MTEP cycles. This concept supports the spirit MISO described in its November 3, 2023, Revisions to the Open Access Transmission, Energy and Operating Reserve Tariff Interconnection Queue Cap Filing, Docket No.ER24-341:

“Third, MISO proposed several exemptions that will ensure that Interconnection Requests involving existing generating facilities or service, or projects required to address confirmed needs of a RERRA are not delayed due to the cap.”

We suggest an entity may initiate the Fast-Track by requesting a CON or CPCN from their respective RERRA prior to entering the generator interconnection queue. That request would serve as the on-ramp to the Fast-Track process, which could then be modeled like the PJM Serial Service Request enacted in July 2023 in accordance with its Tariff Part VII, Subpart B, section 304.

To continue on the Fast-Track, we suggest issuance of the requested CPCN or CON would be a required milestone in a subsequent Definitive Planning Phase.

PJM plans to process over 300 projects totaling 26,000 MW in 2024 according to the report at this link: https://insidelines.pjm.com/transition-cycle-1-of-new-interconnection-process-begins-jan-22/.

See the status of PJM projects here: https://www.pjm.com/planning/service-requests/serial-service-request-status#:~:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20Tariff,Transition%20Cycle%201%20(TC1).

Qcells USA ("Qcells") appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on MISO's proposed Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements. Qcells understands MISO's need to make improvements to streamline its process in light of an unprecedented number of requests in its interconnection queue. However, Qcells generally opposes MISO's proposal to implement a cap on its interconnection queue and believes that a market driven approach will largely accomplish the same goals as MISO's proposal. However, if MISO does decide to pursue a queue cap, Qcells would like to raise some specific objections and seek clarifications to components of its proposal, as detailed below.

The queue cap proposed by MISO creates an undue burden on developers by adding another level of uncertainty in the interconnection process. It does nothing to dissuade speculative projects from entering the queue; in fact, it may incentivize a rush for developers to submit unvetted interconnection requests into the queue before a cap is met. In this manner, well-situated developers may flood the queue with requests, while other viable projects are pushed to the next cluster cycle once a cap is realized, putting those projects viability and investment at risk. For this reason, Qcells posits that MISO should consider Savion's Volumetric Price Escalator ("VPE") tranche proposal as a framework for a stand-alone, market driven substitute for a queue cap. The VPE process, in conjunction with MISO's Order 2023 reforms, should provide the outcomes that MISO seeks, without the need for a queue cap.

The VPE tranche concept provides a market-driven approach in which developers submit M2 security deposits in tranches based on MW volume submitted into MISO's queue. This method would incentivize Interconnection customers to prioritize their most viable projects based on the tranche allowance they are willing to finance. Qcells believes that these tranches should follow the Savion proposal, starting at $4,000/MW for developers who do not seek to put in a large number of GIRs. The VPE concept is financially sound for both developers and MISO. For developers, it requires up-front decision making and planning in interconnection request investments, rather than making a risky investment with the uncertainty of whether their project will be pushed into a subsequent queue cycle. For MISO, disregarding the queue cap in favor of the VPE process will reduce administrative time and money spent moving funds to future cycles and processing refunds for projects choose to withdraw and reapply at the next cycle. Additionally, adopting the VPE process would eliminate the FERC interest that MISO would be accountable for when holding onto securities for projects that opt to re-cycle into the next queue.

If MISO does decide to move forward with its queue cap, it should create a level playing field and eliminate exemptions from its proposal. MISO's exemptions are contrary to the open access principles of FERC Orders 888 and 2003, as stated in FERC's January 19, 2024 order on Docket numbers ER24-340-000 and ER24-341-000. Although FERC points to MISO's proposed "unbounded cap exemptions" as inconsistent with open access principles, the reason FERC gives is that "the cap proposed by MISO limits access to a queue cycle and exempted interconnection requests may enter this cycle regardless of the cap value.  In consequence, the cap exemptions create priority access to the generator interconnection process for the exempted classes of interconnection requests (186 FERC ¶ 61,054)." It is clear in FERC's explanation that the issue is with exemptions (in general) receiving priority access over other requests of a different "class", not that the unbounded nature of MISO's RERRA exemption was the primary issue. In this light, although MISO proposes to put limits on its RERRA exemption, it should instead eliminate these exemptions from its process entirely.

Further, if MISO chooses to move forward with its queue cap proposal, Qcells requests that MISO include in its stakeholder discussion ways to provide more certainty to developers entering its queue. Specifically, Qcells proposes that MISO allow all entities the opportunity to have their first project in a queue cycle studied, regardless of the cap. Unlike the exemptions in the preceding paragraph, this queue exemption would be afforded to all entities’ first projects, and therefore would not create different classes of requests nor conflict with open access principles. Allowing first projects to be studied will incentivize developers to prioritize their most promising projects first and give them certainty in their financial investments. Qcells thanks MISO for consideration on this matter.

Finally, Qcells requests clarification regarding a couple items in MISO's proposal. Qcells first issue is regarding MISO's proposal to set its cap at 50% of peak load per Study Region. MISO states that its indicative cap based on MTEP/DPP 2022 model would be approximately 68 MW. Qcells requests that MISO clarify if the 68 GW estimate is across all Study Regions; Qcells also requests that MISO identify precise Study Regions in its next stakeholder meeting. Second, in its July 23, 2024 IPWG meeting, MISO said that projects who do not meet the cap would be moved to the next cycle along with their deposits. Qcells would like confirmation that projects in that situation who wish to withdraw would be refunded 100% of all funds submitted to MISO, since they would not be able to be studied in that queue cycle at no fault of their own.

Cordelio appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on a queue cap and related policy proposals. Cordelio opposes a queue cap or other mechanisms to limit the size of the queue. Cordelio encourages MISO to allow Order 2023 improvements to take full effect before pursuing additional changes to the queue. Order 2023 was developed over many years with significant stakeholder involvement. There is insufficient evidence that hastier changes, such as a queue cap or fee escalator, will improve queue processing timelines.

MISO recently announced that it will delay DPP 2023 kickoff at least 6 months in order to use PearlStreet’s Sugar software. Cordelio encourages MISO to postpone any additional queue changes until the impacts of software updates and Order 2023 take full effect. It may be premature to make queue policy changes without observing the impacts of software updates and Order 2023.

Recent reforms are sufficient

MISO queue applications dropped nearly one third on a MW basis from DPP 2022 to DPP 2023.[i] It is also likely that additional MW will drop out before DPP kickoff. MISO and stakeholders have pursued numerous changes to the queue throughout the years to ensure that projects have achieved an appropriate and attainable level of “readiness” before applying for interconnection. These reforms are producing the desired outcomes.

Cordelio supports MISO’s efforts to improve its capabilities to process the queue and encourages MISO to work with stakeholders on these improvements rather than pursue the complications of a cap or fee escalator.

A queue cap is anti-competitive

The queue cap is an overreach of MISO’s authority and may violate the Federal Power Act. MISO does not have unlimited authority to limit the amount of generation in the region or tell resources they may not interconnect.

It may be anti-competitive to turn away an interconnection customer who has submitted a complete application by the deadline because a “queue cap” has already been filled. The queue cap will impose a “first come, first serve” construct on what is intended to be a cluster interconnection queue. Serial, first come first serve interconnection queues are demonstrably ineffective and in Order 2023 FERC eliminated this study approach. It contradicts Order 2023 to impose “first come, first serve” on a cluster process.

The RERRA exemption adds an additional layer of anti-competition to the queue cap proposal. The proposed RERRA exemption clearly gives utilities a benefit that Independent Power Producers do not enjoy and creates an opportunity for utilities to favor their own generation, in violation of FERC policy.

There is insufficient evidence that a queue cap or escalator will be effective

In its first queue cap filing, MISO’s stated intent was to prevent speculative and unready projects from entering the queue. Cordelio believes current MISO polices sufficiently ensure only “ready” projects are entering the queue. Even if that wasn’t the case, MISO’s proposal does not address any readiness issue. There is nothing in this proposal preventing “unready” projects from entering the queue as quickly as possible, filing up the cap, and preventing projects that are actually ready from entering the queue. In fact, MISO’s proposal encourages submitting projects as quickly as possible, not when projects are as prepared as possible. A queue cap could create even more delays for Interconnection Customers with good projects, who in addition to dealing with the current queue backlog, may also be locked out of future queues due to the cap.

Also, there is little evidence that smaller queues are faster to study. DPP 2021 had 75 GWs and DPP 2020 had 52 GWs.[ii] Both these queues have experienced significant, multi-year delays.

MISO said that a fee escalator could prevent late-stage queue dropouts. Recent reforms such as withdrawal penalties, at-risk milestone payments and site control requirements disincentivize submitting projects to the queue and keeping projects in the queue that do not have a chance of making it to commercial operation. Many late-stage dropouts can be explained by what appears to be a recent surge in the frequency of unexpected late-stage increases in network upgrade costs seemingly driven by mistakes in interconnection studies by MISO, or upgrade cost estimate changes well in excess of what is reasonable when moving from planning level to detailed estimates. Cordelio believes that there is little justification for introducing a queue cap or fee escalator fraught with these concerns before seeing the impacts of recent reforms on the queue, and while these other issues around dramatic changes to cost allocations persist.  

Recent capacity outcomes demonstrate the need for more resources 

PJM’s most recent capacity auction for the 2025/2026 delivery year cleared at 9X previous clearing prices. PJM says tightening supplies are a contributing cause, and FERC-approved generation interconnection reforms will facilitate entry of new resources. [iii] MISO said its queue cap filing will address how the cap will be consistent with future resource adequacy needs. Cordelio looks forward to seeing this essential analysis, since a queue cap runs the risk of dangerously backfiring and hindering future resource adequacy requirements. 

Increasing load projections indicate need for higher rate of generation additions

At the June 26, 2024, Advisory Committee meeting MISO shared that 8.36 GWs of load additions by 2030 have been announced in the footprint.[iv] Electrification, data centers and electric vehicles are driving load growth across markets. Earlier this year, PJM tripled its annual load growth forecast to 2.4%. [v] WECC forecasts a 17% increase in annual demand from 2023 – 2033. [vi]

Given rising load forecasts, Cordelio encourages MISO to work with stakeholders to ensure projects are studied and brought online expeditiously  to ensure new generation is available to meet new load growth.

Cordelio appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback on MISO’s queue cap proposal and would be happy to meet with MISO to discuss any of the matters above live. Cordelio encourages MISO to pursue improvements to tools and software, and potentially increase staff to accelerate interconnection timelines, rather than implement a queue cap.

IPWG: Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements (PAC-2023-1) 20240723)

Invenergy appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on MISO’s proposal as presented at the recent July IPWG.

MISO’s recent queue reform filing back in November introduced additional risk and restrictions on generator developers to limit the queue entry. MISO should demonstrate the impact from their recent filing on the 2023 queue cycle prior to implementing a queue cap. Invenergy provides the following feedback and encourage MISO to provide additional clarity as well on the following areas of their proposal:

Capping at 50% load is arbitrary

Capping the queue at 50% of MTEP/DPP model peak load is arbitrary and MISO has not provided supporting evidence that such a MW level would allow MISO to process study groups in line with expected tariff timeframes.

Process Transparency is Lacking

How would a market participant be confident the steps MISO used to determine which projects made the cap and which didn’t were followed?  Detailed process on steps MISO will take to ensure how this would work seem to be absent from the existing presentation proposal such as but not limited to:

1. 1. How requests make the cut under the cap acquire a valid project identification number, why some do not?  What steps are taken?
   2. How are requests that initially may make the cutoff but MISO later determines did not meet the criteria and are subsequently kicked out of the queue cycle, are they allowed a grace period to reconcile deficiencies and allowed back in the queue?
   3. How are requests that don’t make the initial cutoff included to backfill withdrawn and/or disqualified requests?  What if there are competing requests?
   4. MISO should provide a step-by-step example from submittal to approval or denial of making the cut, otherwise Stakeholders are left speculating what the exact process is.

RERRA Exemptions Invites Discrimination Against Fully Ready Projects

Invenergy agrees with comments provided by Clean Grid Alliance (CGA) opposing RERRA exemptions.

MISO has not explained how this exemption would not allow a transmission owning member or LSE to game the system and get a preference through the State. Will the State inform MISO that Project X should be allowed to proceed through the queue for Utility Y’s benefit? If so, this is no different than the pre-Order No. 888 days with utilities getting a preference. The State is simply being substituted for the utility, but the result is the same.

Should MISO move forward with this aspect, MISO should consider the following aspects:

1. 1. What level of transparency should RERRAs be required provide? 
   2. What are the specific criteria RERRA’s would be required to evaluate projects against?  Such as, why a RERRA selected project could not be met by another project that did make the cut?  Should MISO be responsible for proving otherwise?
   3. What direction would MISO provide to RERRAs should there be more than 3 projects vying for an exemption?

Details Pertaining to Resource Adequacy is Lacking

FERC specified in their rejection of the cap “any future section 205 filing to propose a study cycle cap must demonstrate how the cap ensures that MISO can study new generation seeking to interconnect in a manner that appropriately accounts for its future resource adequacy needs.” 

MISO’s July 23 PAC presentation lacks any detail on how that might be accomplished.  Further detail is warranted to be reviewed by impacted stakeholders prior to MISO filing.

Sunset Rather than Re-Evaluation

At a high level or conceptually, Invenergy supports evaluation on a tariff defined cyclical timeframe, however MISO provides no detail on the criteria MISO would evaluate against and use to determine if the cap rules should be adjusted.

Invenergy recommends MISO incorporate a sunset provision to a cap should they proceed with their cap proposal, we further recommend only reverting to a cap once MISO’s prior queue reforms prove successful in alleviating the backlog.

No Revalidation of Site Control

We disagree with stakeholder comments that site control re-validation would be necessary for projects that don’t make a queue cap cut.  This is an unnecessary administrative burden for both the developer and MISO.

Savion's Progressive Escalating M2 Milestones is Unnecessary

Invenergy does not support.  This would add administrative burden to MISO to an already onerously complicated interconnection process.  MISO should give time for their new reforms and Order 2023/2023A to play out.  The existing M2 milestone is inherently self-regulating because it’s based on megawatts, the more capacity one requests the more capital it takes to hold one’s positions.

Steelhead supports the IPP Sector comments that a queue cap is unwarranted and our effort should instead be focused on people, processes, and technology.

If MISO must pursue a limiter on submissions, we view the Savion volumetric price escalation proposal as a superior solution to a megawatt cap - especially when the cap is tied to an arbitrary percentage of load.

Advanced Energy United appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments in response to the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (MISO) request for stakeholder feedback on its proposed reforms for Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements (PAC-202301) following the July 23, 2024 Interconnection Process Working Group meeting.

Advanced Energy United is a national association of businesses making the energy we use secure, clean, and affordable. Advanced Energy United is the only industry association in the United States that represents the full range of advanced energy technologies and services, both grid-scale and distributed. Advanced energy includes energy efficiency, demand response, energy storage, wind, solar, hydro, nuclear, electric vehicles, and more. The comments expressed in this submission represent the position of Advanced Energy United but may not represent the views of any particular member. 

Advanced Energy United recognizes the current state of MISO’s queue challenges, including long wait times around 45 months from request to agreement, increasingly larger projects, and a growing backlog of 300 GW of projects, 40% of which have not started the interconnection study process¹. MISO initiated other queue reforms in fall 2023, both to remedy these issues and to begin Order 2023 compliance. Some of these reforms² were accepted by FERC, though MISO’s cap proposal³ was rejected.

MISO believes that capping interconnection queue entries could reduce the administrative burden to study these projects, make the studies more manageable, and ultimately speed up the queue. United disagrees with this approach and urges MISO to instead consider more robust reforms to its interconnection process that address the root causes of interconnection backlogs. In addition to failing to improve underlying structural challenges with the interconnection process, a cap may have counterproductive effects. A cap offers no real mechanisms to expedite the process or increase throughput, other than buying more time for MISO to progress through its backlog while preventing further queue growth. The proposed rollover mechanism will also encourage projects to apply earlier to get into the next cycle, also failing to address concerns with speculative projects entering the queue, as this provides no incentive for more developed projects to enter. MISO should also consider how artificially limiting the interconnection queue restricts the supply of new generation, which could lead to higher prices and costs for customers. It has failed to show how imposing a cap would lead to more just and reasonable rates. Instead of a temporary cap, MISO should pursue additional interconnection reforms to identify more durable solutions to overcome the current difficulties. The upcoming FERC staff-led workshops on interconnection reform in September are poised to focus discussion on a number of promising opportunities for interconnection process reforms, which MISO should be looking to before resorting to a blunt cap on queue entries.

In light of MISO's intention to nevertheless pursue a cap, United offers the following feedback on the current design elements⁴.

1. Simplified Cap Formula

FERC rejected MISO’s fairly complex original cap formula calculation. The new proposal would set the Cap at 50% of MISO peak load per Study Region, with the indicative calculation at 68 GW, though the formula will not include a 5% margin for exemptions as previously proposed. When asked at the Interconnection Process Working Group (IPWG) why the cap would be set at 50%, MISO said that prior to the exponential MW increase in queue sizes in the past couple years, the number of requests was around that total. This seems to suggest the cap is set at an administratively manageable amount for MISO based on the volume of queue entry at the last time they could produce study results on time.

This approach ignores other factors that have changed in the intervening years that contribute to slower interconnection processes and does not match commercial reality given the supply seeking to connect as well as the need for new projects on the demand side. Even with a reduction in queue volume, MISO has not explained how its proposed cap level would reduce project attrition, speed up the overall queue, or make interconnection studies more efficient. The cap proposal assumes that a smaller queue would lead to faster processing though there is no supporting evidence that the size of the queue is directly correlated with processing speed given other underlying inefficiencies.

Rather than limiting the volume to an amount MISO was historically able to review efficiently, MISO should adapt and plan for the future by developing a process to more rapidly review projects in the queue. For example, MISO could promote more developed projects entering the queue instead of instituting an artificial restriction that will arbitrarily permit the first projects to be submitted receiving consideration, despite the potential existence of other projects that could better serve the needs to the system. This proposal also fails to address how or whether remaining MW space in a subregional cap could be allocated to other regions.

2. Selection method to determine which projects will proceed to the study process under the cap.

MISO proposes to admit projects to the queue on a first come, first served basis. MISO will use timestamps on interconnection customer (IC) applications and admit those who submit an application first into the queue. MISO’s proposal to admit projects based on timestamp may incentivize speculative projects. Developers that submit many bids to the queue will have a greater chance that one of them makes it under the cap. If multiple projects are accepted, such developers can always withdraw redundant projects and lose only their application fee.

In addition to incentivizing speculative projects, MISO’s proposal to admit projects in order of application received is also practically challenging because of strain on servers. This mechanism also requires developers to submit multiple requests at the same time. Instead of timestamp-based admission, we urge MISO to consider other project selection methods. One option would be to conduct a simple screening analysis to assess expected adverse impacts to the grid and admit projects to minimize expected reliability violations. Specifically, MISO could conduct an N-0 load flow screening to determine expected network upgrades, and then advance the projects for study that are expected to trigger the least number of network upgrades. Projects that pass an N-0 screening would have a lower risk of causing reliability issues, which could be a more effective way to select projects than just considering the order of submission. Another alternative might be to run a lottery. This would ensure that every applicant has an equal chance of being selected and would decrease strain on servers. To discourage speculative submissions under a lottery system, we urge MISO to consider an increased deposit or a withdrawal penalty to mitigate this concern. None of these alternatives is ideal, but United urges their consideration if MISO continues to pursue an entry cap proposal because the timestamped approach has clear flaws with respect to both fairness and administration.

3. Greater Limits on Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (RERRA) Exemption

As with its original iteration, MISO proposes some exemptions from the cap for:

1. 1. Provisional Generator Interconnection Agreement (PGIA) – similar situation like the replacement facility and ERIS to NRIS conversion
   2. Requests to convert Energy Resource Interconnection Service (ERIS) to Network Resource Interconnection Service (NRIS)
   3. Approved Replacement Generating Facility requests seeking additional interconnection service

MISO still plans to exempt generation singled out as necessary by RERRAs but instead of unlimited exemptions there would be 3 per cycle per entity. United remains concerned that the proposed exemptions are discriminatory. MISO’s original cap exemptions created priority access for certain resources, which discriminates against non-exempt resources, a conflict with FERC’s open access requirements. United believes that the revised exemptions continue to violate the guidance offered by FERC in its Order earlier this year rejecting the queue cap proposal. FERC requires limits on exemption use to avoid undermining the intent of the cap, but more explanation is needed from MISO on their design proposals. Specifically:

• MISO needs to provide a supporting rationale for selecting 3 as the limit for RERRA exemptions and clarify whether there could be waivers to that limit.
• MISO should explain why it must provide exemptions for RERRA projects at all, and why these projects should receive preferential treatment by not having to gain entry to the queue through the standard process. Exempting RERRA projects allows these entities to gain a significant advantage over independent power producers, who must compete within the constraints of the cap. This preferential treatment distorts the competitive landscape, where ideally all participants should have equal access to grid resources. By exempting certain projects from the cap, MISO inadvertently amplifies the market power of these entities, potentially crowding out private developers.  The current design still fails to address the original issues FERC identified, such as exemptions potentially undermining the cap, inconsistencies with open access requirements, and a failure of the exemptions to be shown as just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.
• Converting ERIS to NRIS and approved generator replacements (GRs) seeking additional service should not be exempted. Exemptions for these types of requests will harm new projects seeking to access transmission capacity through the standard process. It would be non-discriminatory for ERIS to NRIS conversions and approved GRs seeking additional capability to participate in the standard process alongside all projects. MISO has not demonstrated why ERIS to NRIS conversions and GRs seeking additional capability are worthy of preferential treatment.

4. Clarity on how the Cap will Address Future Resource Adequacy (RA) Needs

FERC previously cited concerns over resource adequacy deficits stemming from limiting new generation onto the grid among its rationale for rejecting MISO’s initial cap proposal. This concern is not resolved by the revised proposal. MISO has stated their intent to incorporate data analysis regarding links to OMS MISO survey and cap impacts to detail how the cap formula will consider how new generation seeking to interconnect is studied and at a speed consistent with future resource adequacy needs. United supports sharing this information with stakeholders as soon as it is available; however, given that the cap is calculated at 50% of peak load per region, it is unclear how this will be incorporated into the formula. At this time, the proposal fails to show how MISO will ensure enough resources move expediently through the queue to meet future demands or how large new load additions may be captured. MISO’s 67 GW indicative cap appears insufficient in providing the necessary resources to meet Future 2A⁵. MISO has not explained how the proposed cap will address this deficiency, nor has it shown how resource adequacy will be accounted for in the calculation, if at all. Most likely, the cap would defer projects, regardless of viability, from one queue cycle to the next, rather than weeding out speculative projects. This will only exacerbate the rush to submit more applications to be either considered under the initial queue or deferred to the next cycle. MISO needs to provide evidence as to why a MW cap is reasonable and will still ensure the interconnection of resources required to meet resource adequacy standards.

5. Submission, Withdrawals, and Rollover

MISO proposes that projects submitted after the cap is met will be used to replace projects in the cycle that are withdrawn during validation process (e.g. site control review), while all others will be included in the following cycle. Upon application, all projects must provide all documentation, project specifics and application payments upon submission to ensure readiness and placement under cap. MISO also proposes a mechanism to re-evaluate the cap after three queue cycles from its effective date. MISO should consider how these design elements address late-stage withdrawals, if at all. MISO should not roll projects above the cap into the next cycle but should start a new application cycle each time. Rolling projects into the next cycle could result in more speculative behavior by potentially filling up multiple cycles at once and causing more requests to come in. This would cause a race to be first in line for the next cycle as the current cycle winds down. It could result in future cycles already being full far in advance of the actual cycle being initiated and before the current cycle has even concluded. Developers following the process and waiting for the next queue would end up already at the back of the line before the next cycle even begins. This process could harm smaller developers with more limited capital, particularly if they are required to post deposits very early on, with no options for refunds since MISO would hold the deposits until the next cycle. Projects may also change over time, leading to outdated information that would need to be re-validated if the roll-over provisions remain. MISO has not proposed such a process to re-evaluate components like site control, leading projects to enter or remain in the queue that otherwise would not have made it into a new cycle. MISO could consider accounting for post-screening analysis withdrawals before pre phase 1 kick-off in its determination for the cap. This could include review of recent queue cycle data and projects entering phase 1 compared with submitted applications. If MISO were to implement a lottery process, it may be reasonable to allow a project that is not selected to elect to be entered automatically in the subsequent lottery, in which case MISO could hold onto its study and readiness deposits.

Despite multiple rounds of discussion of how to design and implement a MW cap, it remains unclear how a cap would speed the interconnection process, address underlying inefficiencies, or provide any incentive for developers to put their “most ready” projects forward. A cap would, by definition, limit the overall volume of requests for MISO review, but does not contain elements to make the process faster. MISO already has high withdrawal penalties compared to other RTOs⁶ that should reduce the number of speculative requests. The cap fails to address issues with the current queue such as cost and schedule uncertainty that cause developers to rely on the interconnection process as a cost discovery tool, and that cause many projects that enter to ultimately withdraw. MISO needs to provide greater certainty for developers so they may make more informed decisions on which projects to apply to the queue. A cap fails to do so, and in fact is likely to incentivize developers to submit even projects that are less ready into the queue to avoid missing future windows to participate.

Advanced Energy United appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments and looks forward to continuing to work with MISO to explore options to further improve the generator interconnection process in MISO. Please reach out to Lisa Barrett with any questions.

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa Barrett

202.380.1950 x3177

lbarrett@advancedenergyunited.org

1. Aurora Energy Research “MISO Interconnection Queue Reform Updates and 2023 Cycle Results." 

2. https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/docketsheet?docket=er24-340-000

3. https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/docketsheet?docket=er24-341-000

4. https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20240723%20IPWG%20Item%2005%20Generator%20Interconnection%20Queue%20Improvements%20(PAC-2023-1)640073.pdf Presentation from July 23, 2024 Interconnection Process Working Group meeting.

5. https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20240604%20IPWG%20Item%2005b%20Volumetric%20Cap%20Design%20Idea%20(PAC-2023-1)_Savion633113.pdf

6. https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20240604%20IPWG%20Item%2005b%20Volumetric%20Cap%20Design%20Idea%20(PAC-2023-1)_Savion633113.pdf

RWE appreciates MISO’s dedication and focus on improving the queue timeline and study efficiency through the implementation of new readiness requirements in the recent queue reform, as well as for exploring opportunities to enhance tools. We also appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on the MISO proposed queue cap.

The implementation of a queue cap may have unintended negative consequences by limiting the number of projects. The number of projects is one of many issues, as evidenced by the 2020 central cycle, where the queue size was below the cap, yet interconnection studies still took over five years to complete. If delays are minimized or eliminated MISO would experience a natural reduction in the queue as interconnection customers would not see the queue process as a long lead or bottleneck item.

The current four-plus-year timeline for completing interconnection studies is contributing to an influx of unready projects. The number of projects indeed impacts the study timeline, as observed in ISOs with faster interconnection timelines like ERCOT. The queue cap creates a sense of urgency for developers, prompting them to submit more projects before the cap is reached that meet queue submittal requirements but are less vetted. This behavior creates artificial demand and filling each queue as it opens.

RWE suggests that MISO should consider options to accept only quality projects into the queue. This could involve requiring developers to submit a feasibility study demonstrating that the Point of Interconnection (POI) is feasible for the requested size and reviewing the due diligence performed by developers. Additionally, MISO could implement stepped M2 requirements based on the parent company’s MW submission, such as $8k per MW for the first 2 GW, $12k per MW between 2 – 6 GW, and $16k per MW beyond 6 GW (a modification to part of the Savion proposal).

Furthermore, MISO should address some root causes of delays, such as errors in DPP studies and study redo’s, TO mitigation feedback timelines, and cost estimation delays. As proposed by FERC in 2023, MISO should implement deadlines for Transmission Owners (TOs) to provide feedback within the allocated timeline and introduce penalties for TOs who fail to meet these deadlines. TOs should be required to provide regular progress reports to ensure transparency and allow for early identification of potential delays, enabling proactive management. Instead of relying on emails, automated tracking systems could be utilized to monitor the progress of interconnection requests, sending reminders and alerts to TOs as deadlines approach.

Finally, RWE would ask for more transparency and clarity in communication. The 2023 cycle was closed for a period and then reopened following the FERC queue reform approval. During that time, MISO communicated the cycle's open and close deadlines in stakeholder meetings. Based on language used in meetings, stakeholders anticipated that a similar approach would be taken for the 2024 cycle timeline with MISO cap proposal.

By implementing these strategies, MISO can enhance the efficiency and timeliness of its interconnection processes, ultimately benefiting all stakeholders involved.

NextEra Energy Resources
Feedback Response
Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements (PAC-2024-2) (20240723)
August 16, 2024

NextEra Energy Resources (NextEra) appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on MISO’s Generation Interconnection Queue Improvements proposal, specifically its proposed revised Queue Cap refiling approach and Volumetric Price Escalation proposal, both presented during the July 23, 2024 Interconnection Process Working Group meeting.

NextEra believes that immediate action is needed to address MISO’s slow interconnection process and continuing delays to enable much-needed generation to come online.  MISO is going to need as much generation as possible to meet anticipated load coming on the system, transition to a cleaner grid, and respond to extreme weather events.  MISO will need to implement effective solutions that fix the problems with the queue and allow constructible projects to be built to meet the customer demand for the resources seeking interconnection on the MISO system. NextEra does not believe that either the revised queue cap or the Volumetric Price Escalation approach, as proposed, achieves these goals and conversely presents the risk of preventing much needed generation from being built when needed most.  NextEra instead urges MISO to pursue strategies that address the core problems with the queue and will produce results, such as streamlining Phase 1 of the interconnection process and increasing use of automation.

Revised Queue Cap Proposal

MISO’s reintroduced proposal limits the queue size to 50% of peak load per Study Region, or approximately 68 GW. The proposal also permits three exemptions to the cap per Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (RERRA). When MISO’s originally-proposed queue cap was rejected by FERC in early 2024, FERC provided guidance on two aspects that MISO, if it sought to refile a cap, would need to better address: (1) the methodology MISO used to develop the cap; and (2) how any cap would impact Resource Adequacy in the region. MISO’s re-introduced cap proposal does not address the underlying causes of queue processing delays, nor does it address either of the issues identified by FERC.

MISO states that it will use the 5-year out peak load from the MTEP/DPP model and then apply a 50% rate to that model; for indicative year 2022, that results in a queue cap of approximately 68 GW. MISO does not provide any support for how it developed the 50% factor in the first instance. During the July discussion, MISO made general statements that this percentage would bring the queue back into a range that it was able to solve “four or five” years ago. However, these statements are not borne out by the data. In fact, this latest proposal still fails to address or explore the causes for the delays in the current queue cycles (DPP 2019 through DPP 2021) – all of which are less than 68 GW.  According to publicly-available data in MISO’s public GI Queue, even before the increased demand and the emergence of new incentives to build renewable generation in the Inflation Reduction Act and recent waves of data center loads, the MISO queue experienced significant delays.  The average time to complete each cycle has been over five years:

• The 2018 MISO DPP Application window closed in March 2018 with 39.7 GW
• GIAs were all completed on June 6, 2024, according to MISO’s public schedule (6 year totally cycle time)
• The 2019 MISO DPP Application window closed in April 2019 with 44.1 GW
• GIAs are not all complete yet. Scheduled to be complete in Q1 2025 (~5.5-6 year projected cycle time)
• The 2020 MISO DPP Application window closed on June 25, 2020, with 50 GW
• Many projects are still in DPP and have not started GIA negotiations; estimated completion of DPPs likely in 2025 (5 year projected cycle time)
• The 2021 MISO DPP application window closed on July 21, 2021, with 74.36 GW
• All projects are in Phase 1 or Phase 2 of the DPP
• No current estimate on when the cycle will be completed

NextEra wholly supports improving the efficiency of the generation interconnection process and believes it is critically important to address reliability and economic needs of customers throughout the United States and in MISO’s footprint. However, a queue cap is not the means to achieve those ends. MISO has provided no link between a smaller queue and more efficient queue processing; in fact, the analysis of the last six years shows the complete opposite. As noted above, for all but one of the queue cycles since 2018, each is significantly smaller than the proposed cap of ~68 GW. MISO’s proposal does not explain how MISO will be better positioned to administer the queue once a queue cap is in place; historical data show that MISO is unable to administer smaller queues right now.

Moreover, MISO has not provided any implementation details for its proposal, particularly with regard to the RERRA exemptions or the study region application. It is unclear whether these exemptions to the queue cap would be studied in addition to the 68 GW queue, and if that is the case, it begs the question for the need for a cap at all. Any exceptions to a cap would only add to the volumes MISO’s proposal is purportedly designed to minimize. Such exceptions would only facilitate what appears to be the opportunity for queue jumping for those entities that fall within RERRA jurisdiction.

MISO’s proposal does not address the impact of a queue cap on Resource Adequacy needs for the MISO region. MISO is facing unprecedented load growth, a transition to a cleaner grid, and increasingly the impacts of extreme weather.  This is the exact wrong time to cap the queue when MISO needs as much generation as possible to meet these needs. 

Volumetric Price Escalator Proposal

MISO indicated its “support” of a volumetric price escalator for milestone payments, but indicated the need for additional discussion around implementation. Not only do significant implementation issues exist with this proposal, but the fundamental element of the proposal – level of megawatts requested – is discriminatory. Developers of the Volumetric Price Escalator have self-described the proposal as a “progressive tax” on those entities who seek to add more viable megawatts to the queue. They argue that this structure is intended to prevent “queue crashers” from overloading the queue, but the real impact of this proposal would be to penalize larger entities and redistribute market share among developers. 

Not only is the volumetric price escalator proposal discriminatory, but it also creates a complex administrative burden that will divert valuable MISO staff resources to tracking corporate entities when they are sorely needed for other, valuable queue administration work. MISO has also not explained how a volumetric price escalator would enhance the administration of the queue (MISO’s purported goals of a queue cap), versus determine access to the queue in the first place. Furthermore, a megawatt volume determination is arbitrary and will result in penalizing companies with constructable projects because it does not consider how likely a project is to be built. Many small developers with speculative projects or whose business model is to sell queue positions will slip under the lowest MW threshold while larger developers pursuing buildable projects with a track record of constructing projects will be penalized. This combined with MISO’s queue cap creates significant barriers to getting constructible projects on the system that MISO badly needs for resource adequacy.  

NextEra Recommendations

To address the delays in the interconnection process, NextEra urges MISO to pursue its plans outlined in the Board presentation to the Technology Committee focused on streamlining the Phase 1 process and increasing use of technology and automation to improve queue processes. As discussed over a year ago in 2023, MISO confirmed that Phase 1 delays are caused by Transmission Owners assessing their own mitigations and cost mitigations on their systems. This has proved to be inefficient and time consuming.  The timeline for Phase 1 could be significantly reduced by use of the cost estimator guide with subsequent review by Transmission Owners.  These improvements have demonstrated success in other regions in shortening queue times and address the root problems facing the queue.

NextEra appreciates the work MISO is doing with Pearl Street to enhance model automation and voltage issues, though believes this work must be accelerated. NextEra urges MISO to be more explicit about its technology upgrade strategy and timeline for adoption. These technology enhancements are essential to clearing the current queue backlog and processing the queue more quickly going forward. MISO should not move forward with any type of queue cap without firm commitments on technology upgrades for queue processing functions or before it sees the results the SUGAR technology can bring to expediting queue processing. NextEra recognizes the necessary investment required for such technology upgrades and urges MISO to develop an investment plan using Interconnection Study deposits and the interest earned on those deposits to fund necessary investments for both staffing and technology. MISO’s June 2024 Investment Policy & Performance Report to its Audit and Finance Committee stated that MISO has $1,537MM in engineering deposits and while low rates impacted returns over the past few years, it projects that higher deposit balances should produce higher interest income going forward.[1] MISO should deploy those resources to improving the queue administration processes.

Similarly, NextEra encourages MISO to utilize study deposit funds and associated interest to staff as needed to process the queue, including:

1. More staff/consultants to review applications to ensure timely completion or more importantly, automation and data validation to reduce the reliance on staff review of information that is needed to perform application processing and model building;
2. Dedicated staff working on developing models in parallel with the applications – as soon as an application is approved, its modeling data would be added to Model On Demand; and
3. Additional reactive support can be replaced with base case network upgrades that can be identified with consultants or MISO staff. This type of mitigation is a reliable approach and is utilized by various RTOs and utilities throughout the United States.

NextEra appreciates the attention of MISO staff and leadership to the need to improve the queue and offer our support in developing and pursuing strategies to fix the queue. We also appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on the queue cap and volumetric price escalator proposals and to provide our views on alternatives that we believe would be more effective in fixing the queue and supportive of the region’s resource adequacy needs.

The OMS Transmission Planning Work Group (TPWG) provides this feedback to MISO on its proposed reforms to its Generation Interconnection Queue (GIQ) with a focus on the RERRA exemption. This feedback is from an OMS work group and does not represent a position of the OMS Board of Directors.

The TPWG agrees with MISO that further reforms to the GIQ and related processes are necessary to ensure MISO can adequately manage the volume of prospective interconnection applications and produce realistic network upgrade studies. Despite implementing increased milestone payments, site control requirements, and exit penalties earlier this year, MISO’s 2023 queue cycle still resulted in over 120 GW of GI applications. The sheer size of MISO’s interconnection queue has resulted in unreliable, outdated, and inaccurate network upgrades identified early in the study process. It is simply infeasible to study clusters of resources that when combined approach or exceed MSO’s all-time peak load.

To that end, the TPWG believes that a cap or MW threshold on the amount of resources that may be included in a cluster or study cycle of MISO’s GIQ is a necessary mechanism – at least in the near-term – to ensure MISO can produce realistic network upgrade studies based on a smaller, more manageable queue size. The implementation of a queue cap, however, does not foreclose the need for MISO and stakeholders to continue exploring other enhancements to existing queue processes.

MISO’s queue cap proposal as introduced at the IPWG includes several exemptions. The TPWG appreciates MISO’s inclusion of the RERRA exemption to its proposed queue cap as a necessary acknowledgement of state authority over resource adequacy issues. While the mechanics of implementing the RERRA exemption are largely undefined, the TPWG views the RERRA exemption as an important but limited feature of the cap to ensure that MISO can timely study generation projects needed to meet resource adequacy requirements. However, it is important to emphasize that the details are crucial given the practical and jurisdictional implications the RERRA exemption presents.

Based on internal discussions, the TPWG has many questions and concerns regarding the RERRA exemption and requests that MISO confer with OMS and retail regulators before further developing the proposal. The RERRA exemption was included in MISO’s initial queue cap proposal, which FERC ultimately rejected based in part on a lack of detail around the mechanics, unintended consequences, and open-access concerns the exemptions raised. It is imperative that a RERRA exemption works with existing state processes and that those RERRAs that do not anticipate using the exemption can be shielded from requests from those prospective interconnection customers that might pursue it. Whether that should be reflected in an opt-in or opt-out mechanism should be discussed.

The TPWG also views MISO’s initial proposal to limit this exemption to three per RERRA per study cycle as arbitrary. For one, this limitation does not reflect the fact that some RERRAs oversee millions of customers while others oversee thousands. Some members go further and view any limitations on the exercise of the exemption as an infringement on state jurisdiction over generation siting and resource adequacy decisions. Limiting the number may also force RERRAs to pick between multiple utilities seeking an exemption.

The TPWG reiterates OMS’s long-held position that the MISO queue should help facilitate rather than serve as a barrier to preserving resource adequacy. Currently however, MISO’s queue is oversaturated with projects that are vying to identify the cheapest locations to interconnect, causing cascading dropouts and delays. While the reforms implemented earlier this year will help rectify this problem over time, a backstop solution is needed - at least temporarily - to ensure that MISO can accurately study projects in an efficient and predictable manner. 

A functional interconnection queue is essential for all MISO stakeholders, and the TPWG appreciates MISO’s continued exploration of potential enhancements.

TO: MISO

FROM: The Entergy Operating Companies

SUBJECT: IPWG: Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements (PAC-2023-1)(20240723)

DATE: August 16, 2024

The Entergy Operating Companies ("EOCs") appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements, presented at the July 23, 2024, Interconnection Process Working Group (IPWG) Stakeholder meeting. 

We have previously joined onto comments from the MISO Transmission Owners (TOs) but wanted to also address a couple issues separately through our own feedback comments.

First and foremost, we wanted to express our support for Duke’s proposal and request for a “fast track” queue process for utilities that have a legal obligation to serve under state law and regulations.   While implementing such a “fast track” process may be controversial, it is fully justified based on certain LSEs’ legal obligation to serve and their role as regulated entities who are ultimately responsible for ensuring resource adequacy in the regions they serve.  While open access and competing policy objectives are likewise important, where they come into conflict with the reliability and resource adequacy of the grid – a matter that can have life or death consequences as seen in recent emergency events in which there was inadequate capacity to serve load across the region – it is reasonable to subordinate them to the more important policy priority of ensuring reliability and resource adequacy.  For these reasons, Entergy strongly supports the “fast track” process concept and urges MISO to adopt one.  Ultimately, if MISO’s queue process becomes an impediment to states and LSEs meeting their resource adequacy imperatives, MISO has failed to achieve a fundamental component of its mission and purpose.

In addition, the EOCs offer these comments related to Savion’s Volumetric Price Escalation (VPE) proposal. This proposal significantly impacts large entities -- typically utilities and developers -- who submit large renewable portfolios into the DPP-queue on an annual basis. While the intention is valid to eliminate speculative projects that come into the queue and to level the playing field for smaller developers, it simply misses the mark in those respects. First, most if not all large renewable developers are well-funded, and simply escalating their M2 payments will only increase the costs passed on to end-use customers like utilities and load through PPAs and other mechanisms. Second, many of the renewable developers who submit large portfolios into the queue aren’t renewable developers but rather utilities (LSEs) with an obligation to serve. These projects aren’t speculative in nature, aren’t “queue crashing,” and typically are proposed not only to serve new load but also to fulfill clean energy goals of the customer, the utility, and/or the state. Proposing to escalate the M2 payments for these entities simply adds cost to the respective projects and doesn’t provide any corresponding value in regard to minimizing either speculation or “queue crashing,” and as a result these additional costs aren’t just and reasonable.

In addition, all projects submitted into the queue are somewhat speculative in nature. Even though many entities feel confident about a project at a particular POI, they have limited visibility on the actual system upgrades that will be triggered through the MISO study process.  In addition, the process itself is already long enough, and adding a new requirement for MISO to create a new process that will require extensive research to review every single organization and their associated “family tree” will only serve to make the process even more unreasonably lengthy. This would only add more complexity, not to mention additional time, energy, and resources. The focus and goal related to the GI queue should remain the same: to identify proposals that simplify and streamline the GI queue process. This VPE proposal doesn't do that; instead, it adds unnecessary complexity, is cumbersome, and again misses the mark.  Therefore, the EOCs oppose the VPE concept as proposed and likewise oppose escalating M2 payments.

ENGIE NA appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on MISO’s queue cap proposal.

ENGIE NA continues to strongly oppose a hard  GI queue cap. MISO’s revised proposal suffers from most of the same challenges as the prior proposal which include:

• Artificially limiting competition -  The proposed  queue cap that will accept projects based on timestamp received will not ensure more commercially viable projects move through the queue but rather will incent interconnection customers to rush the opening of the application window to ensure projects make it in under the cap.

• RERRA exemptions that will allow a competitive advantage for utilities versus independent energy producers. MISO has not justified three exemptions per RERRA which could result in large volumes of MWs entering the queue and bypassing the queue cap. Any queue gating mechanism proposed must treat all interconnection customers equally and offer no exemptions.

•  A queue cap set based on retroactive data (2021 queue cycle) when MISO was last able to timely process the queue rather than forward looking requirements. Market drivers for clean energy have changed significantly since 2021 considering the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, state clean energy policies within the MISO region and increased data center demand.

• Rolling projects that exceed the cap in one queue cycle into the subsequent queue cycle and potentially filling up future queues for multiple years. This creates tremendous uncertainty for interconnection customers and requires M2 payments to be tied up for an uncertain amount of time especially considering queue processing delays. Each queue cycle must start fresh.

ENGIE NA supports adoption of the VPE proposal  as proposed by Savion/Shell in lieu of a hard queue cap and encourages MISO to further consider the adoption of this alternative.  The VPE proposal  would provide many benefits over a hard queue cap which include interconnection customer self-regulation and incentives to prioritize the best projects. Most of all, the VPE proposal allows all interconnection customers to participate on a level playing field.

MISO’s recent queue reforms have already resulted in a significant reduction in application volumes in the 2023 DPP cycle as compared to the 2022 DPP cycle. A hard queue cap is not needed especially when other options are available that would allow MISO to mitigate queue volumes while avoiding anti-competitive concerns.  ENGIE NA encourages MISO to consider a more  progressive approach to queue gating that will avoid the same challenges identified by stakeholders and FERC in the prior proposal.

Any queue gating mechanism proposed by MISO should include a maximum three-year sunset provision in the tariff to require MISO to revisit the efficacy of whatever proposal is ultimately adopted.

Generator Interconnection Queue Improvements (PAC-2023-1)

EDF Renewables (EDFR) is grateful for the opportunity to offer comments on the proposed revised cap refiling approach, where MISO is planning on making updates to the “Queue Cap package” that was previously filed and rejected by FERC in docket ER24-341. EDFR supports the principle of the cap proposal to manage queue volume, but cautions MISO to avoid including provisions (such as the RERRA exemptions) that the Commission has already raised concern over. We want MISO to file a proposal that is likely to be accepted, and in its current state that is questionable.

EDFR is a firm believer that simpler is better, noting we agree it is easier said than done. While we do not prefer there be a cap on the queue cycle capacity, EDFR has been and is a strong proponent of a functional study process that offers reasonable and tangible signals for expectations of cost and future operation in a timely manner (i.e., on or near on schedule).

In its present state generation interconnection in MISO is not working. Although MISO has developed reasonable approaches and processes, albeit with room for improvement, the backlog of unfinished study cycles combined with the challenges experienced by projects with executed GIAs becoming operational assets calls for immediate action.

Again, EDFR does not prefer or want a queue cycle cap, but we understand and appreciate why MISO sees it as a need - like how EDFR embraced the need and reasoning behind the increase in site control, financial commitments, and forfeiture risk. EDFR again sees the value in conceding, but we must start getting more from our concessions. Together we need to get on schedule, get studies done faster, figure out approaches that are more timely and offer more certain information to make decisions. There needs to be commitment from the Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), Transmission Owners (TOs), and Interconnection Customers (ICs) to come to a consensus that everyone can live with and doesn’t just penalize one party. This situation is not as impossible as it feels.       

EDFR agrees that there is engineering and process value in a GI cycle cap at this juncture. We think the approach is warranted and the filing should be streamlined and proposed in such a manner for a higher probability of success, responsive to FERCs past rejection without prejudice. To that end, EDFR can accommodate and tolerate what MISO has offered but for MISO’s proposed modifications to the RERRA exemptions that put the filing at higher risk, in our opinion. MISO should not put itself in the position of explaining why there should be 1 or 2 or 3 exemptions. Our position is that there should be no exemption.

Provisional Generator Interconnection Agreements (PGIA) are nondiscriminatory and available to any and all entities that have a project that ‘will’ be built and operational, allowing for commercial operation sooner where need dictates. This option is available to EDFR just as it is to a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority. If the concern is getting in and through the queue, the PGIA answers the “through.”

Getting into the queue may be more difficult with a cap but we see no need, nor has it been shown that there is need, for an exemption to the queue rules for a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority. It should be expected and possible for MISO to work through their backlog and that the process will be accessible and become more expedient.  Where that fails, Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority may, like is available to all, seek a Tariff waiver where they can justify the need to circumvent the developed process. EDFR believes the inclusion of exemptions is neither simple nor is it more likely to be successful at FERC.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment. EDFR looks forward to continuing to work with MISO toward our mutual success. To solve this problem, we need to work together, as a team, with all parties making a good faith effort.

Temujin Roach, Sr. Director Transmission Policy

Clean Grid Alliance Comments on MISO’s Queue Cap Proposal
August 16, 2024

Clean Grid Alliance appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on the highly impactful and important topic of a queue cap. 

MISO’s earlier efforts at queue reform aimed at limiting the number of projects entering the MISO queue in any single DPP cycle have been successful (2023 DPP size at queue entry is down by 1/3 from the 2022 DPP and the 2023 cycle is expected to drop even further prior to “Study Kick Off”). Therefore a queue cap is not necessary at this time. 

Similar to MISO’s earlier failed attempt at implementing a queue cap, the current proposal ignores the root cause of the problems plaguing the queue: cost and schedule uncertainty due to factors within the control of MISO transmission owners and beyond the control of MISO or generation interconnection customers. While MISO has stated that smaller queue sizes will reduce this uncertainty, past smaller queue sizes have not proven this to be true. Without a meaningful indication before entering the queue of what it will cost and how long it will take to interconnect, MISO’s proposal locks in years of smaller queue study cycles with no control over the causes of delays and uncertainties, and no assurance MISO will be able to process

timely queue cycles.

While CGA opposes MISO’s queue cap, if MISO chooses to proceed with this misguided effort, it must modify its proposal to mitigate the worst harms, as noted below: 

1. Eliminate exemptions: Among other reasons, FERC rejected MISO’s prior queue cap over concerns that the unbounded nature of the exemptions undermined MISO’s stated intent of ensuring a feasible dispatch in the study model. MISO’s proposed exemptions continue to suffer from the same fatal flaw and merely create unduly discriminatory opportunities for queue jumping. Three exemptions per RERRA is arbitrary and could lead to tens of GWs above the queue cap, which will then create the modelling challenges MISO claims it is trying to avoid.  No blanket exemption per RERRA entity should be allowed. Furthermore, if MISO were able to effectively address the uncertainty and delays introduced by its transmission owners who perform the constraint mitigation and facilities studies assessments (predominantly setting the queue pace and Network Upgrade costs) there would not have been a need for the recent queue reform effort.  
   
   
2. Establish a cap based in market demand for new generation, not based on backward-looking capabilities: Setting the cap at 50% of load ignores the market demand for new generation. MISO staff explained at the July 23^rdIPWG that it chose 50% of peak load to approximate queue volume in 2021, when MISO was last able to timely process Phase 1 study results (but not other Phases). This represents demand prior to the Inflation Reduction Act, and prior to the rapid expansion of new load in the form of data centers. If MISO proceeds with a cap, it must evaluate the market demand for new load and generation looking forward, not backward. 
   
   
3. It is important that the cap be backfilled just prior to Study kick off, given the significant number of projects that withdraw prior to study kick off. Alternately, MISO could add say 15% more MW to the cap initially, to account for a 15% drop prior to study kick off. (15% may not be the number, MISO will need to calculate the number from the 2023 DPP cycle once study kick off has passed) 
   
   
4. Projects should not immediately roll over to the next cycle if they are outside the current cap. Each cycle should start fresh, else multiple queue cycles could fill up at once with an artificial rush to get projects in, due to the concern that projects could “miss the boat” for years. This would also tie up significant M2 payments for an uncertain amount of time, particularly since MISO has not followed a regular study cadence for the past two cycles.
   
   
5. While we do not support roll over as noted above, if MISO chooses to proceeds with it, projects should be required to re-validate site control. 
   
   
6. Include a 3-year sunset provision in the Tariff that would require MISO to revisit the efficacy of the MW cap with stakeholders. Unlike MISO’s proposal for an informational report to FERC, a sunset provision would hold MISO accountable to credibly revisit with stakeholders the need for a queue cap.
   
   
7. Finally, at the next IPWG, we would appreciate seeing data on the current Peak load in MWs for each MISO region based on the 2024 MTEP model to better understand how the proposal limits the queue in the near term. 
   
   

In summary, a queue cap is unnecessary due to the earlier reforms that will have a significant impact beginning with “Study Kick-Off” in the 2023 DPP cycle (expected early 2025), and have already reduced the queue entry size by 1/3. This earlier reform has proven to be effective, and now it is up to MISO to address the inefficiencies in its queue process, that cause even small study cycles 4-5 years to complete, and are responsible for the 2022 DPP cycle being very large due to low throughput.  However, if MISO feels a short-term stopgap is necessary while the full impact of its earlier queue reform takes effect, there are multiple non-discriminatory proposals and options that can be explored that do not involve a cap (much less a cap with exemptions).