PAC: ERAS Study Proposal (PAC-2023-1) - MISO may post our comments publicly

GRE Welcomes the opportunity to comment on MISO’s Expediated Resource Adequacy Study. We support MISO and we think that they are moving in the right direction to address a resource adequacy gap with the current generation interconnection queue.

Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

o   The non-refundable and D1 amounts seemed excessive compared to standard interconnection queue, but after review and based on MISO mimicking the Provisional Generator Interconnection Agreement GRE accepts that aspect of the proposal.

Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process? 

o   Projects that entered the queue prior to ERAS design and implementation weren’t offered the option of ERAS but may have a bonafide resource adequacy need for expedited consideration, so the withdrawal fees seem punitive and unwarranted. 

Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

o    GRE supports option 2 at this phase of feedback as it better matches other generation interconnection and MTEP timeline and general cadences.  It also seems like a more realistic timeline given MISO’s other interconnection study workload.

Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider?

o   GRE requests more details on proposed timeline and notices for the future sunsetting of ERAs.  If MISO is stating that the ERA process would end with the queue cycle time reaching one year or less, GRE would like to see a designated off-ramp timeline for ERA established now.  For example, after MISO demonstrates that queue cycle times are down to one year, we would ask for six months advance notice of sunsetting of ERA so LSE’s can adapt project plans and filing practices. 

o   On the issue of ERAS projects having priority to transmission capacity, ERAS projects are needed to support MISO reliability requirements and therefor such use of transmission capacity is reasonable.

MISO has presented the Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) as an alternative to the RERRA exemption that was originally proposed with the queue reforming filings with FERC last year. The goal of the RERRA exemption to the cap filing was to create a process that allows Load Serving Entities (LSEs) to reliably meet the needs of their customers by creating assurances that essential projects can quickly be studied and reach GIA. While Consumers Energy still maintains that this process should not be separate from MISO’s cap proposal, Consumers Energy appreciates MISO’s continued efforts to find a solution to the interconnection queue study delays while still addressing resource adequacy. That said, in its current form, Consumers Energy has concerns over whether submitting a project for study in the ERAS process would actually be better than submitting it through the standard queue process.

The ERAS process is not compatible with how Consumers Energy currently conducts solicitations.

Currently, under Consumers Energy’s competitive solicitation process, projects must apply, or provide proof of intent to apply, by a certain DPP cycle depending on their proposed commercial operation date. This mechanism will need to be adjusted for the ERAS process to account for projects that are eligible, and selected, to move on a faster path. A firm schedule and a clear process for projects selected by a RERRA to move to the ERAS process will be absolutely necessary to have value to utilities relying on this process for resource adequacy needs. Additionally, the conditions of moving from DPP to ERAS will need to be clear, consistent, and firmly scheduled to build solicitations with ERAS option.

The ERAS process should not be arbitrarily sunset after just three years, but must have some tangible end-date requirements to ensure that reliability issues are not still present.

While MISO intends that the ERAS will be available until the queue cycle is reduced to one year and is creating a hard cap on this for the 2028/29 queue cycle to correspond with the delay penalties associated with Order 2023. Consumers Energy appreciates that MISO is working towards this goal—but frankly, it’s irrelevant to whether reliability concerns can be met through the standard queue process by 2028/29. The cap filing expressly contemplates that MISO will have a continued need for the limitation on queue study cycle. If MISO determines, that even after the queue cycle is down to one year it still needs the cap then this process would be sunset by a hard deadline in the tariff and LSEs would be in the exact same issue where they are unable to see the projects needed for resource adequacy get connected in a timely manner.

Rather than an arbitrary three-year sunset provision, MISO should either maintain this process in perpetuity as resource adequacy will continue to be a priority or use language similar to the cap filing and commit only to “conduct a review of its effectiveness with the stakeholders” to determine whether the need for ERAS still exists after three years.  The proposal to sunset after three years is especially problematic given the process changes that will be needed to submit a project through ERAS. The ERAS process is not really compatible with how Consumers Energy currently conducts solicitations. Because of this incompatibility, if Consumers (or other similarly situated LSEs) have to overhaul a number of processes to take advantage of ERAS, if ERAS sunsets after just three years—with no consideration of if it's still a necessary process—then all those internal procedures will likely need to be reverted back creating a significant burden. Accordingly, if MISO determines it cannot continue ERAS as a process that simply runs alongside the standard queue process, it should at least review how effective ERAS has been before the process is sunset.

The two-year COD requirement should be extended by at least one year to better account for any study delays and transmission owner coordination.

The requirement that the Application/COD must be within 2 years of the submission of a project into the ERAS process should be extended by one year. If there are any unforeseen delays to the proposed ERAS timelines, the first year of a project will be largely spent going through the study process, meaning that the COD would be just one year after the study is completed and a GIA reached. Additionally, the Transmission Owner In-Service Date (ISD)/Backfeed milestone is typically 4-6 months ahead of the COD milestone further eating into the allowable time to reach COD. Transmission Owners may be challenged to meet a proposed ISD/Backfeed date required by the ERAS 2-year COD requirement by material procurements or other unforeseen delays. Interconnection Customers should not be required to carry the schedule risk of these types of common coordination issues and delays through the three-year grace period. An additional year – so that projects must have COD within 3 years of application will better accommodate transmission owner coordination for network upgrades and allow for more study and coordination time with transmission providers during the ERAS process when studies inevitably take longer than their posted timeline.

There must be clear criterium for what makes a project one that “supports resource adequacy” and the process to obtain this identification must be straightforward and not prone to delays.

Consumers Energy appreciates that MISO is working with OMS to determine what documentation will be necessary to demonstrate a resource meets the identified resource adequacy need, but encourages MISO to carefully balance between a process that allows for state flexibility and one that only creates additional hurdles and delays for projects to be entered into this process. In short, MISO should work with OMS to create guardrails that help meet the collective goal of getting projects identified as needed for resource adequacy quickly and without overly burdensome processes. For example, MISO should work with OMS to create a process that is more akin to a certificate of need as opposed to a contested hearing. If it is too difficult for an LSE to obtain the necessary certification for a project to be submitted in ERAS it undermines the usefulness of the entire process.

Projects within the 2023 cycle should not be subject to other penalty provisions if they are eligible to transfer to this ERAS process.

Projects currently sitting in DPP 2023 that would qualify for the ERAS process should be permitted to switch without any penalties. If the main driver for ERAS is to ensure that resource adequacy projects can be quickly connected to the grid it is unreasonable to not allow eligible projects to switch over to this new process. DPP 2023 will have only just begun by the time this ERAS process is available, meaning there will be limited delays caused by restudying after any ERAS projects are removed.  Moreover, any limited delay to DPP 2023 would be outweighed by the benefits of having projects needed for resource adequacy quickly connected to the grid.  

MISO should be cautious about tying EPR and ERAS models together as presented in the Option 1 timeline.

Option 1 for the timeline proposes to align the ERAS cycle with the Expedited Project Review (EPR) process, allowing expedited resource projects to be included in latest EPR models. At this time, additional information is needed about how MISO intends to maintain/post EPR models with the pending process revisions. The use of specific MTEP models in EPR studies are subject to the discretion of MISO and the applicable stakeholder Task Force and do not necessarily result in updating the +5 year peak and shoulder MTEP models.  Consumers Energy is concerned that—without additional clarification—tying together models for EPR and ERAS could have unintended consequences on Michigan’s unique MTEP models currently used for EPR studies. If modeling EPR and ERAS projects together creates any changes and/or limitations to the Michigan MTEP models these two studies must be treated separately.

MISO should more clearly present the different model assumptions used for ERAS, DPP, EPR, and MTEP at the December 6 ERAS Workshop.

Many stakeholders were confused/concerned about how ERAS, EPR, and DPP studies are coordinated by the models (Slide 12 from the November 18 Workshop). It would benefit all stakeholders for MISO to more clearly present the model assumptions that are used for each process and how the models do/don’t interact with each other. MISO should also present where models for the various processes are/will be posted for access by stakeholders (Sharefile or Extranet).

IPP Sector Comments Related to MISO’s ERAS Process Proposal

The Independent Power Producer and Exempt Wholesale Generators (IPP) Sector thanks MISO for the opportunity to comment on MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal.  The IPP Sector is opposed to MISO’s ERAS process. The ERAS proposal creates transmission inequity and is inherently discriminatory toward market participants who rely on MISO to ensure a competitive wholesale market exists.  Further, MISO’s reasoning for the ERAS study is unsubstantiated, and ERAS, as MISO is proposing, is more likely to propagate present queue delays rather than bring capacity online sooner than it otherwise would if MISO would focus resources to studying presently queued interconnection requests and future Generation Interconnection Queues (GIQs) more efficiently.

IPPs are Vital to Resource Adequacy and Should not be Excluded from Providing Resource Adequacy

The majority of generation developed and providing power in MISO is merchant built.  Independent, merchant power producers (IPPs) are vital in ensuring MISO’s resource fleet is supplied with efficient, cost-effective generation.  Yet, MISO excludes IPPs from ERAS in favor of a process solely inclusive of Load Serving Entities (LSEs).  Per their business model and purpose, IPPs boast unique and dedicated experience working on generation development projects, with investors, suppliers, vendors, and all aspects of the commercial landscape required to bring generation online in wholesale power markets.  IPPs are institutionally better suited to develop better resources because they are market-driven, assess a large number of diverse resources, and bear the risk of investment decisions.  Therefore, if MISO is looking to add significant capacity in a 3–5-year timeline, IPPs are best positioned and experienced to respond to this need.

The IPP Sector believes the best way to allow IPPs to supply generation capacity throughout the footprint is to dedicate resources to mitigating queue study delays, reducing overall DPP cycle times, and ensuring open access to transmission.  However, should MISO believe ERAS is the only way to achieve MISO’s goals, MISO should ensure that IPPs have equal inclusion and treatment in the ERAS process.

The ERAS process is counter to MISO’s own interconnection policy beliefs and based on a false premise that ERAS projects will be immune to resource development delays.

In MISO’s comments to FERC in response to Generator Interconnection reforms proposed by the Commission, MISO commented that, outside of limited situations of Interconnection Requests related to existing generation not adding new or additional interconnection service, “MISO does not support processing any other Interconnection Request[s] outside of the interconnection queue,” siting potential discriminatory treatment, queue jumping, increased costs on queued Interconnection Requests, and manipulation of any queue exceptions as primary reasons MISO would not support processing Interconnection Requests outside of their annual cluster study process.[1]  The IPP Sector agrees with MISO’s arguments and concerns in those comments.

MISO’s reasoning now for the need for a generator queue exemption is counter to that position at FERC and flawed.  MISO blames the queue backlogs on generator interconnection delays caused by developer-related supply chain bottlenecks, permitting delays, and commercial challenges for projects with signed interconnection agreements.  However, MISO’s own data suggests that generator supply chain issues only account for 8% of development delays, while 58% is attributed to Transmission Owner (TO) study delays and Regulatory process delays.[2]  Coincidentally, MISO is now looking to TOs and Regulatory Processes that account for most of today’s development delays as the most important parties to the ERAS process, believing falsely that the ERAS process would be immune to development delays.  Importantly, supply chain bottlenecks, permitting delays, and commercial challenges affect all generation development and would affect ERAS-eligible LSEs equally. 

MISO’s ERAS solution ignores the root cause of GIQ delays, which is MISO’s lack of resources to study the generator requests it has.  Evidence can be seen amply in MISO’s DPP Schedules that show the significant amount of generation yet to have an opportunity to execute a GIA, and the principal reason for this continually being “MISO delays.”  If MISO addressed this issue, MISO would also address the resource adequacy issue as well.

Moreover, the ERAS proposal undermines MISO’s rationale for their separately proposed GIQ MW cap.  On one hand, with MISO’s advocacy for an interconnection queue cap, MISO argues they must reduce the amount of generation being studied in order to efficiently study those interconnection requests.  On the other hand, MISO is advocating for a separate, additional, and uncapped interconnection study process.  It is concerning that MISO is proposing a MW cap on MISO’s GIQ but is not planning to cap the amount of MWs studied under the ERAS process.  Given GIQ backlogs that exist today, it seems likely that LSEs and state regulatory authorities will widely utilize the ERAS process.  MISO does not have the resources to prevent further interconnection delays being created by the ERAS process.  Therefore, implementing ERAS will likely result in MISO having two backlogged study processes, further exacerbating a principal barrier to resource adequacy in MISO: unreasonably long durations for generation to be studied and interconnected so that resources may provide power to MISO’s footprint.

What the ERAS proposal reasonably communicates is that MISO seeks to limit its internal resources to facilitate the interconnection of some generation resources and not others.  This is the very definition of discriminatory and unduly preferential.

The ERAS process is inherently discriminatory and promotes anti-competitive market manipulation.

By allowing only certain entities and generation broad discretion and unlimited use of a process that goes around the GIQ all other entities and generation must utilize, MISO is promoting and ensuring anti-competitive, discriminatory, and inequitable transmission interconnection practices.  From the IPP Sector perspective, while an independent power producer is likely to have the ability to develop and build a more efficient, cost-effective generator, undoubtedly, the merits of a project will have less value than the embedded relationships an incumbent utility LSE has with its state regulator.  The unfortunate effect of this is that, though MISO is charged with ensuring open access to transmission and a competitive wholesale market, MISO’s ERAS process will detrimentally discriminate against independent power producers and merchant developers who are not incumbent utilities and LSEs.  This anti-competitive approach to resource development will harm consumers by raising the cost of generation and depleting access to better generation.

Even if it is argued that all generation developers continue to have open access to the transmission grid through MISO’s GIQ, this argument underscores a misunderstanding of how open access is meant to ensure resource supply is competitively procured to meet demand.  MISO has indicated that there is a resource adequacy need presently and into the future.  All power producers and developers are attempting to supply that demand.  But MISO’s ERAS process picks winners and losers and tilts the scale of meeting the resource adequacy need to only state-regulated LSEs, depleting generator interconnection queue project viability for power producers who were otherwise responding to market signals.  Those market signals will now be obsolete with the saturation of LSE fast-tracked generation.  The ERAS process goes against FERC policy and precedent, as well as RTO purposes, meant to ensure all generation can compete on a level playing field when interconnecting to the grid.

Reducing this level playing field will subsequently raise the cost of electricity for all MISO consumers.  By creating an avenue for LSEs, who in MISO are primarily vertically integrated Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs), to receive individual and expedited treatment through an opaque, undefined resource adequacy process, these LSEs can conceivably rate base extraordinary costs to build the generation and necessary transmission upgrades to meet the ERAS requirements.  They have no incentive not to.  As vertically integrated IOUs, cost risk is not on the company but on its consumers.  Therefore, the ERAS process permits potential carte blanche for LSE IOUs to build generation and transmission that otherwise could be more efficiently and economically built by IPPs that must be cost-conscious when developing projects.

The ERAS Proposal cedes transmission expansion benefits to ERAS projects and escalate costs for projects in the traditional DPP Cycle.

MISO plans to prioritize ERAS projects and expedite their execution of signed GIAs by studying ERAS projects against the latest MTEP model.  This means that ERAS projects would have priority access to cost mitigating MTEP project transmission capacity without other GIQ projects that have not reached GIA execution being accounted for in those MTEP models.  This bias creates inequity and detrimentally affects queued generation by reducing transmission capacity queued projects otherwise would have had included in their interconnection models but for potential ERAS implementation.

Subsequently, ERAS will also increase transmission upgrade costs for non-ERAS projects.  Since ERAS projects will swallow up existing transmission capacity and MTEP planned upgrades, as well as cause model constraints that do not presently exist in GIQ interconnection models, projects relying on the traditional GIQ will incur greater transmission upgrade costs to now make more room on the system for their projects.

IPP Sector Response to MISO’s Specific Questions

• Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

MISO’s qualification requirements lack significant substance required to fully answer this question.  MISO’s proposal allows for resource adequacy requirements to largely be decided by the state regulatory authority and the process by which that state regulatory authority promotes a project for the ERAS process.  The IPP Sector appreciates each state’s authority over resource adequacy.  However, this undefined process will lead to unequal treatment of generation interconnection projects throughout MISO’s footprint.  Perceivably and likely, one state’s requirements will not be the same as another’s, further creating an unlevel playing field that MISO, as the RTO, is meant to ensure, as discussed above.

Because ERAS will detrimentally affect non-qualifying generation and create a discriminatory environment related to resource development in MISO, MISO should aim to provide transparent, consistent qualification processes and scoring guidance for how a project is determined to meet resource adequacy. 

Additionally, MISO seems not to have contemplated how the ERAS process will work in deregulated areas of MISO’s footprint.  MISO should work to provide information to this extent that achieves similar transparent and consistent qualifications needed in all states.

The IPP Sector urges MISO to implement strict screening requirements to ensure projects not only meet a defined, transparent and consistent footprint wide resource adequacy need metric, but also a strict screening requirement aimed at ensuring ERAS projects will meet their COD.

Further qualifications should be implemented to ensure that ERAS projects are held to the same minimum requirements for eligibility in the GIQ.

• Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

Projects from cycles prior the 2023 cycle should NOT be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process.  MISO’s stated concerns that allowing projects from DPP queue cycles prior to 2023 would trigger restudies of study clusters that have spent significant time and money seeking interconnection is valid.  These restudies would propagate present queue backlogs and significantly harm interconnection requests.

Projects that withdraw from the GIQ should incur withdrawal penalties, as this would create some element of equity within this discriminatory ERAS process.  Presently, if a project currently in the GIQ withdraws from the queue, they are subject to penalties that aid in ensuring remaining queued projects are not as harmed as they otherwise might be by the withdrawal.  This should not change simply because a generator that qualifies for the ERAS process withdraws from the queue to run to greener pastures.  Arguably, the favorable treatment toward the ERAS-qualified generator warrants higher withdrawal penalties.

Additionally, projects taking part in the ERAS process should be subject to withdrawal penalties if they choose to withdraw from the ERAS process.  This would create at least an element of fairness as again; ERAS projects will be utilizing valuable study resources that could otherwise be dedicated to other interconnection requests.  ERAS projects that withdraw would also cause harm to other ERAS proposed projects in the same ERAS cycle.  Implementing withdrawal penalties is in line with MISO’s own advocacy for withdrawal penalties in its recently FERC approved interconnection queue reform, as MISO argues that penalty-free withdrawal fails to capture the harm caused by project withdrawals.[3]

In addition, projects that transfer to ERAS should not be able to raise upgrade costs for other projects waiting in the GIQ.

• Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

The IPP Sector makes no recommendation of which timeline option is better.  However, the IPP Sector is concerned about MISO’s plan for the state regulatory authority process and MISO’s necessary ERAS interconnection studies being simultaneous and parallel.  This presents an opportunity for MISO to waste valuable and limited resources studying a speculative project that ultimately does not come to fruition.  For instance, if MISO kicks off ERAS related studies and allocates the significant resources required to expedite those studies, only for the generator to not receive the necessary state approval, MISO will have dedicated resources that otherwise could be and should be utilized at reducing MISO’s existing GIQ request backlog.  A more sensible approach, should there be an ERAS process, would be for MISO to ensure the state regulatory resource adequacy affirmation process is complete before MISO kicks off ERAS interconnection studies. 

• Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider?

The IPP Sector believes that, should MISO push forward with an ERAS process, in order to achieve the ultimate purpose of that process, MISO should require, subject to penalties, ERAS projects to be commercially operable within no more than 5 years of ERAS study kickoff.  Presently, though MISO’s proposal points to the ERAS projects needing to be commercially operable in the next 3-5 years, the IPP Sector feels MISO should be strong in their Tariff language to require completion of these projects.  Absent such a requirement, an ERAS project would reap the benefits of an expedited queue process but fail to deliver the resource adequacy benefits it was meant to provide, all the while using up transmission space and study resources that could have otherwise been allocated to generation that may have achieved a quicker COD. 

IPP Sector Supports Sunset of ERAS

The IPP Sector supports MISO’s indicated plan to sunset the ERAS process and strongly agrees with MISO’s proposal to memorialize that sunset date for the ERAS process. The IPP Sector feels that sunsetting ERAS by the 2028/29 Planning Year is reasonable but should be considered the latest Planning Year for ending the ERAS process.  While again, the IPP Sector is opposed to the ERAS process and similar, discriminatory external processes that allow only some generation to avoid the GIQ, should MISO implement such a process it should include a firm, non-negotiable end date and ensure the end date in the Tariff.

              More Information Needed Related to Transmission Capacity

The IPP Sector appreciates that MISO seems to be considering interconnection issues that might occur with two, separate but simultaneous interconnection studies being conducted.  The IPP Sector is concerned about the double-counting of transmission headroom and requests more information as to how MISO will ensure that ERAS projects do not reduce interconnection capacity for projects already in the GIQ.

The IPP Sector supports MISO’s indication that ERAS projects will be responsible for upgrades associated with Affected System Studies (AFS).

              MISO would better serve resource adequacy through proposals more likely to succeed in bridging MISO’s supply and demand gap.

If MISO were to take more time to develop a more equitable and beneficial proposal, the IPP Sector could potentially support alternatives to ERAS.  For instance, an open interconnection queue dedicated to projects demonstrating commercial readiness.  Or, more beneficial might be a separate, open interconnection queue dedicated to co-located load and generation.  Studying co-located load and generation in an expedited framework would solve a real and immediate demand need that otherwise would add to MISO’s resource adequacy needs by tying generation to incoming load.  A process like this would conceivably incentivize large loads, which MISO has pointed to as contributing significantly to MISO’s project capacity shortfalls, to bring their own generation.  That generation would offset the load increase caused by the incoming load entity while also minimizing deliverability concerns by being co-located.

Please see above the IPP Sector general comments in opposition of the MISO’s ERAS proposal as an answer to the additional feedback requested

The Coalition of Midwest Power Producers (COMPP) thanks MISO for the opportunity to comment and submits the following comments regarding MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) Proposal which was presented to stakeholders during the November 13^th PAC meeting and Nov. 18^th ERAS Workshop.

COMPP opposes MISO’s proposed ERAS process which is unduly discriminatory and would establish a flawed policy that violates open access principles by completely excluding merchant generators from participation in the ERAS process. Additionally, the current ERAS Proposal contains 1) no limitations or guardrails regarding the size or quantity of state-supported projects that may be submitted under this exemption; 2) no criteria or definition of what constitutes a resource adequacy need; and 3) essentially allows MISO and state utility regulators to pick winners and losers. Winners are the RERRA supported projects in vertically integrated states and losers would be the much-needed merchant generation development projects that are unable to participate in the ERAS process and could be squeezed out of future interconnection queues because ERAS exempted resources make up a significant portion of the queue. 

If MISO believes there is an urgent need for projects to be built more quickly until the current queue process improves, COMPP recommends MISO adopt a pathway that allows merchant generators to participate. That could include an open interconnection queue dedicated to projects demonstrating a high level of commercial readiness, regardless of whether the project comes from an LSE or a competitive power supplier.  

As an aside, COMPP highlights that the current MISO queue has more than 300 GWs of resources seeking to interconnection. With even a 10% commercial success rate, the MISO region would have access to more than 30 GWs of new resources. These resources could be studied with an effective backlog mitigation plan, rather than sitting in the queue for additional time while the limited available resources are dedicated to a new process designed to circumvent the existing interconnection queue.

Invenergy Comments Regarding MISO’s ERAS Proposal

Invenergy appreciates the opportunity to comment on MISO’s proposed Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (“ERAS”) concept and to address the comments posed during its November 18, 2024, workshop. Unfortunately, MISO has neither demonstrated a need for the ERAS proposal nor is its proposal just reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. In fact, as currently crafted the proposal unduly discriminates against market participants that are not part of state approved resource planning processes, undermines open access transmission policies, and permits projects sponsored by Load Serving Entities (“LSE”) and Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (“RRERA”) to queue jump projects already in the interconnection queue. We therefore urge MISO to reconsider or substantially reform its current proposal.

1. MISO Has Not Demonstrated a Need for the ERAS Proposal

Foremost, MISO has not demonstrated a need for its proposal. MISO has hundreds of gigawatts of resources in its interconnection queues, including 83.7 GW of resources that have either executed generator interconnection agreement (“GIA”) or are currently negotiating GIAs. MISO has not provided any analysis demonstrating that these resources are insufficient to meet the region’s resource adequacy needs, or that ERAS proposal—by diverting resources from existing interconnection queues—will not delay already-queued projects from coming online. In fact, MISO has provided no analysis demonstrating that ERAS will address resource adequacy in the quantity and speed at which MISO argues is needed. As MISO readily acknowledges, meeting the current study timelines is challenging. MISO has not shown how adding a parallel interconnection study will not exacerbate this problem.

2. MISO’s Proposal Violates the Federal Power Act

In addition to failing to demonstrate the need for an expedited interconnection queue, MISO’s proposal is unjust and unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory. FERC’s open access principles ensure that all market participants have equal access to compete in wholesale markets.  MISO’s proposal would flout this requirement by permitting LSE and RERRA sponsored market participants to achieve interconnect rights within four months, while all other interconnection customers must wait up to 36 months. Allowing Load Serving Entities to hand-select which resources have priority access to the transmission system runs afoul of the requirement to provide comparable transmission system access and will give LSE and state sponsored resources a competitive advantage.

The ERAS proposal is also inconsistent with FERC precedent that interconnection customers remain unharmed by alternative interconnection processes. MISO recognized as much in its response to Order No. 2023, in which it stated that it “does not support processing any other Interconnection Request outside the interconnection queue as to do so may invite claims of discriminatory treatment” and “increased costs on Interconnection Requests that applied earlier and are processed in the interconnection queue but are now lower queued than an Interconnection Request that met some defined exception being processed outside of the interconnection queue.”[1]  In fact, the Commission just recently rejected this type of special access for RERRA projects in MISO’s recent queue-cap filing. MISO cannot repackage that proposal here and expect a different result.

The ERAS proposal as currently envisioned will also harm projects in the DPP interconnection queue both by potentially increasing network upgrade costs and causing further delays to existing interconnection queues. While MISO asserts that “ERAS projects will not reduce transmission capacity for projects in the queue,” it is unclear how MISO reaches that conclusion when there is only so much available transmission capacity and ERAS projects will be given priority interconnection access. That being the case, MISO must explain how DPP customers will not be saddled with additional network upgrade costs as a result of this proposal. Further, MISO’s stated goal is to reduce the interconnection study timeline to one year. But adding additional resources and studies to an already backlogged system will only slow down all study processes.

MISO’s proposal to allow projects in the 2023 cycle to join ERAS is also impermissibly retroactive. Projects in the 2023 cycle already have queue positions and have made investments based on the existing interconnection rules. Applying a new set of rules now disrupts those settled expectations.

Rather than create a new tariff process, MISO’s existing processes for surplus interconnection, generator replacement, and provisional interconnections can be used to bring additional resource adequacy capacity online as needed. MISO has not explained why these processes are not sufficient to achieve its aims.

3. Responses to MISO’s Questions

While Invenergy disagrees with the ERAS proposal as a whole and recommends that it be reconsidered in light of these legal and substantive concerns, Invenergy comments below on MISO’s specific questions.

Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g., resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process? 

Independent developers can and do provide resource adequacy. The information that has been presented thus far lacks sufficient details and key criteria to be able to address this question, but the available information suggests that criteria will lead to unequal treatment of generation among LSE and RERRA footprints because there are not standardized criteria across MISO.

LSE Process: There are no details on how independent power producers engage and participate in the LSE specific identification process. More details are necessary to adequately gauge how this process will work and its full impact on all parties in the current and future interconnection queues. Market participants and LSEs need guidance and standardization, otherwise allowing LSEs to just submit new projects to ERAS lacks transparency and is rife with gaming opportunities.

State and RERRA Process: There must be a standard joint acknowledgement form, signed by both senior executives of the LSE and RERRA that they are both in agreement on who the LSE’s correct RERRA is. This form should also be vetted by MISO Legal and publicly posted. Experience from MISO’s Load Modifying Resource (“LMR”) registration process is that it is not uncommon for MISO, or the LSE, or the RERRA to not know who the correct RERRA is for the Market Participant and/or LSE attempting to register resources.

To ensure that ERAS projects meet a real need, the RERRA must point at an already approved IRP and/or RFP process to demonstrate the need. In addition, the specific project must be identified (and approved) as addressing the identified need. Each project entering the ERAS program must be linked to a specific identified need.

ERAS Projects must meet capacity resource requirements: Since ERAS is supposed to be a special short-term band aid, ERAS projects should be required to have 100% NRIS deliverability. The bar should be high to ensure harm to other projects are minimized and a 100% NRIS requirement also should ensure the transmission system is being adequately improved. This is a tradeoff. If a generator wants the luxury of bypassing the queue by becoming an ERAS project, the generator should be required to be 100% NRIS deliverable and not rely on NITS to firm up ERIS. LSEs should not be allowed to leverage their NITS to circumvent upgrading the transmission system.

Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

A project exiting the DPP process to enter the ERAS process should be subject to the same penalty structure that exists in the normal queue process. To do differently will only increase the unduly discriminatory treatment of customers in the standard interconnection queue. In addition, we recommend that a project that does not reach commercial operations through the ERAS process also be penalized with a similar and/or comparable penalty structure. The penalties collected should be distributed back to the DPP cluster study the project departed from.

Projects prior to DPP-2023 should not be eligible for ERAS.

Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outlined in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

As noted above, MISO has not shown that it can complete the study process under either timeline or that doing so will not harm other interconnection customers through delays or increased Network Upgrade costs. Assuming MISO is able to demonstrate that there will be no harm to other customers, our preference would be Option 2. Option 2 is a longer process on a quarterly cycle. It is likely to be slightly less disruptive. Option 1 would be aligned with the Expedited Review Process.  Delaying that process could be even more harmful to other interconnection customers.

Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have additional feedback to consider?

MISO’s primary justification for ERAS is to expedite the study process, but as detailed above, ERAS will not resolve current interconnection queue concerns. In the first instance, MISO must do analysis to determine whether there will be harm to other interconnection customers, then if any harm is identified, MISO must mitigate those harms. Further, MISO must perform studies to confirm that ERAS will solve the MISO’s resource adequacy needs in the identified timeframe.

Further, as discussed above, MISO has not demonstrated that there is a need for ERAS. Before moving forward, MISO must support the need with analysis, including a demonstration of insufficient capacity in the bilateral market. For example, there are currently 320 GWs of resources in the interconnection queue, with over 28 GWs of resources negotiating GIAs and 55 MWs of resources that already have GIAs. This significant amount of capacity must be considered in determining whether ERAS is necessary.  In addition, MISO should consider whether LSEs can acquire sufficient additional capacity through the prompt seasonal capacity auction. In the last summer seasonal auction, 4 GW of excess capacity did not clear the auction and could be used to meet short-term resource adequacy shortfalls.

Sunset Date: Should the ERAS proposal progress, there must be a sunset date. This process has been described as a short-term solution; as such, a defined tariff end date must be identified as part of the process.

Affected System Studies: MISO explains that affected system studies will be done after the ERAS process, but that ERAS projects will be responsible for affected system upgrades. Based on this, it is not clear how affected system studies would be incorporated into ERAS.

On the behalf of Nexamp...

• Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

               We agree with MISO’s proposed qualification requirements.

• Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their

current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

               We believe that projects transitioning from the GIQ to the ERAS process should not incur penalties, as they are still applying to MISO to fulfill transmission needs. Additionally, it may be beneficial for MISO to not fully withdraw the project from the GIQ and ongoing studies until the Transmission Owner (TO) accepts the project as potentially meeting its needs. Projects in cycles that have not reached Stage 3 by the closing of the current ERAS queue should be allowed to apply to ERAS, as this may expedite their procurement of the GIA. However, switching queues at Stage 3 or later would be too disruptive for all parties in the DPP queue and MISO, affecting timely interconnection.

• Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this

timeline?

               We support Option 1 because it best lines up with the latest MTEP and EPR models.

• Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have an additional feedback to consider?

               We would like MISO and the TOs to release their resource adequacy needs and potential interconnection locations for projects as soon as possible, ideally before the ERAS queue opens. The needs and locations should be easy to find and view, and an email about the posting to resource developing parties would be ideal. This would allow developers to prepare projects in those areas, increasing the pool of projects and the chances of meeting resource capacity needs.

Additionally, we would like clarification on how the resource capacity proposed with intermittent resources will be calculated for the ERIS resource adequacy cap, as intermittent resources cannot provide their full nameplate capacity consistently.

MISO has presented the Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) as an alternative to the RERRA exemption that was originally proposed with the queue reforming filings with FERC last year. The goal of the RERRA exemption to the cap filing was to create a process that allows Load Serving Entities (LSEs) to reliably meet the needs of their customers by creating assurances that essential projects can quickly be studied and reach GIA. While Consumers Energy still maintains that this process should not be separate from MISO’s cap proposal, Consumers Energy appreciates MISO’s continued efforts to find a solution to the interconnection queue study delays while still addressing resource adequacy. That said, in its current form, Consumers Energy has concerns over whether submitting a project for study in the ERAS process would actually be better than submitting it through the standard queue process.

The ERAS process is not compatible with how Consumers Energy currently conducts solicitations.

Currently, under Consumers Energy’s competitive solicitation process, projects must apply, or provide proof of intent to apply, by a certain DPP cycle depending on their proposed commercial operation date. This mechanism will need to be adjusted for the ERAS process to account for projects that are eligible, and selected, to move on a faster path. A firm schedule and a clear process for projects selected by a RERRA to move to the ERAS process will be absolutely necessary to have value to utilities relying on this process for resource adequacy needs. Additionally, the conditions of moving from DPP to ERAS will need to be clear, consistent, and firmly scheduled to build solicitations with ERAS option.

The ERAS process should not be arbitrarily sunset after just three years, but must have some tangible end-date requirements to ensure that reliability issues are not still present.

While MISO intends that the ERAS will be available until the queue cycle is reduced to one year and is creating a hard cap on this for the 2028/29 queue cycle to correspond with the delay penalties associated with Order 2023. Consumers Energy appreciates that MISO is working towards this goal—but frankly, it’s irrelevant to whether reliability concerns can be met through the standard queue process by 2028/29. The cap filing expressly contemplates that MISO will have a continued need for the limitation on queue study cycle. If MISO determines, that even after the queue cycle is down to one year it still needs the cap then this process would be sunset by a hard deadline in the tariff and LSEs would be in the exact same issue where they are unable to see the projects needed for resource adequacy get connected in a timely manner.

Rather than an arbitrary three-year sunset provision, MISO should either maintain this process in perpetuity as resource adequacy will continue to be a priority or use language similar to the cap filing and commit only to “conduct a review of its effectiveness with the stakeholders” to determine whether the need for ERAS still exists after three years.  The proposal to sunset after three years is especially problematic given the process changes that will be needed to submit a project through ERAS. The ERAS process is not really compatible with how Consumers Energy currently conducts solicitations. Because of this incompatibility, if Consumers (or other similarly situated LSEs) have to overhaul a number of processes to take advantage of ERAS, if ERAS sunsets after just three years—with no consideration of if it's still a necessary process—then all those internal procedures will likely need to be reverted back creating a significant burden. Accordingly, if MISO determines it cannot continue ERAS as a process that simply runs alongside the standard queue process, it should at least review how effective ERAS has been before the process is sunset.

The two-year COD requirement should be extended by at least one year to better account for any study delays and transmission owner coordination.

The requirement that the Application/COD must be within 2 years of the submission of a project into the ERAS process should be extended by one year. If there are any unforeseen delays to the proposed ERAS timelines, the first year of a project will be largely spent going through the study process, meaning that the COD would be just one year after the study is completed and a GIA reached. Additionally, the Transmission Owner In-Service Date (ISD)/Backfeed milestone is typically 4-6 months ahead of the COD milestone further eating into the allowable time to reach COD. Transmission Owners may be challenged to meet a proposed ISD/Backfeed date required by the ERAS 2-year COD requirement by material procurements or other unforeseen delays. Interconnection Customers should not be required to carry the schedule risk of these types of common coordination issues and delays through the three-year grace period. An additional year – so that projects must have COD within 3 years of application will better accommodate transmission owner coordination for network upgrades and allow for more study and coordination time with transmission providers during the ERAS process when studies inevitably take longer than their posted timeline.

There must be clear criterium for what makes a project one that “supports resource adequacy” and the process to obtain this identification must be straightforward and not prone to delays.

Consumers Energy appreciates that MISO is working with OMS to determine what documentation will be necessary to demonstrate a resource meets the identified resource adequacy need, but encourages MISO to carefully balance between a process that allows for state flexibility and one that only creates additional hurdles and delays for projects to be entered into this process. In short, MISO should work with OMS to create guardrails that help meet the collective goal of getting projects identified as needed for resource adequacy quickly and without overly burdensome processes. For example, MISO should work with OMS to create a process that is more akin to a certificate of need as opposed to a contested hearing. If it is too difficult for an LSE to obtain the necessary certification for a project to be submitted in ERAS it undermines the usefulness of the entire process.

Projects within the 2023 cycle should not be subject to other penalty provisions if they are eligible to transfer to this ERAS process.

Projects currently sitting in DPP 2023 that would qualify for the ERAS process should be permitted to switch without any penalties. If the main driver for ERAS is to ensure that resource adequacy projects can be quickly connected to the grid it is unreasonable to not allow eligible projects to switch over to this new process. DPP 2023 will have only just begun by the time this ERAS process is available, meaning there will be limited delays caused by restudying after any ERAS projects are removed.  Moreover, any limited delay to DPP 2023 would be outweighed by the benefits of having projects needed for resource adequacy quickly connected to the grid.  

MISO should be cautious about tying EPR and ERAS models together as presented in the Option 1 timeline.

Option 1 for the timeline proposes to align the ERAS cycle with the Expedited Project Review (EPR) process, allowing expedited resource projects to be included in latest EPR models. At this time, additional information is needed about how MISO intends to maintain/post EPR models with the pending process revisions. The use of specific MTEP models in EPR studies are subject to the discretion of MISO and the applicable stakeholder Task Force and do not necessarily result in updating the +5 year peak and shoulder MTEP models.  Consumers Energy is concerned that—without additional clarification—tying together models for EPR and ERAS could have unintended consequences on Michigan’s unique MTEP models currently used for EPR studies. If modeling EPR and ERAS projects together creates any changes and/or limitations to the Michigan MTEP models these two studies must be treated separately.

MISO should more clearly present the different model assumptions used for ERAS, DPP, EPR, and MTEP at the December 6 ERAS Workshop.

Many stakeholders were confused/concerned about how ERAS, EPR, and DPP studies are coordinated by the models (Slide 12 from the November 18 Workshop). It would benefit all stakeholders for MISO to more clearly present the model assumptions that are used for each process and how the models do/don’t interact with each other. MISO should also present where models for the various processes are/will be posted for access by stakeholders (Sharefile or Extranet).

The TDU Sector appreciates that MISO is looking to address the need for the timely study and addition of new generation.  While there are details and concerns to address, the Sector overall believes there is merit in pursuing the Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) concept in the stakeholder process.  The sector consists of Load Serving Entities with resource adequacy obligations.  To meet these requirements and maintain reliability, getting the right resources connected in the right locations at the right time is critical.  The ERAS concept, if designed well, has the potential to help accomplish this.  The Sector again thanks MISO for taking on this issue; individual sector members plan to provide their own specific comments and questions on the proposal.

Pine Gate Renewables appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on the MISO Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal.  Generally, Pine Gate shares the concerns raised by SEIA, the IPP Sector, SREA, and CGA regarding harm to DPP clusters, undue discrimination against IPPs, and the inefficient redirection of resources.  If the problem stems from late-stage and post-GIA delays, MISO should prioritize developing new policies that reduce bottlenecks for these projects.

Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

If this process is approved, Pine Gate agrees that only exceptionally ready projects should be eligible for ERAS.  The higher D1, M2, and site control requirements to enter the process, along with the GIA and JTIQ security needed only a few months after application submission, deter typical requests from entering the process.  We support MISO raising D1 to acquire additional resources to process ERAS projects, instead of diverting resources from DPP.  State/RERRA approval is also essential to demonstrate a resource adequacy need. Projects that are approved, but later fail to be ready on time and/or pay inefficient interconnection costs, need to be held accountable to ratepayers.

Pine Gate supports including sunset provisions in the tariff and believes that ERAS can sunset before the 2028/29 cycle.  We expect MISO will be able to process new clusters more quickly starting with DPP-2025, assuming that the queue cap is approved. Hence, the gating item will be issuing GIAs to MISO’s largest cluster before the recent reforms were implemented (DPP-2022), which should happen before 2028.

Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

Projects in cycles prior to 2023-DPP should not be eligible to enter the ERAS process.  First, projects in DPP-2021 and earlier are expected to receive their GIAs (September 2025 at the latest) before the first ERAS project (November/December 2025). Second, we share MISO’s concern that late-stage withdrawals will cause restudies and cascading delays.  Any process that delays reaching the one-year study process is counterproductive.  

Pine Gate would appreciate if MISO can walk through more implementation details on transfers in the next workshop. For the 2023-DPP, will projects be allowed to transfer during a study phase, or will they have to wait until a decision point?  According to the most recent DPP schedule, and assuming a June 2025 effective date, ERAS could become effective right after DP1 completion.  For 2025-DPP, we’d like to know if MISO plans to allow projects to transfer before the cap is officially set.  Allowing projects to transfer after the official queue cluster has been announced would harm the next requests in the queue that didn’t make the cap but would have otherwise.

We strongly support that current-queued projects transferring to the ERAS process should be subject to withdrawal penalties.  As MISO had iterated several times while developing the automatic withdrawal penalties, a withdrawal harms other customers in the cluster by triggering delays and restudies.  Withdrawals in this instance are no different.  We also believe that ERAS projects should be subject to a withdrawal penalty in the event its withdrawal harms other ERAS projects being studied in the same cycle.

Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider?

Pine Gate remains concerned that ERAS projects will take planned headroom, particularly LRTP capacity, away from DPP projects.  MISO should ensure that LRTP projects will not be included in the MTEP baseline cases used to evaluate ERAS projects if the year in which the LRTP project is scheduled to be placed in service is not synched with the MTEP planning horizon year being modeled. Moreover, we would like MISO to confirm that LRTP projects can't be used as mitigation for constraints introduced by ERAS projects if the MTEP planning year in which the constraint was identified does not synch up with the in-service date of the LRTP project.  We look forward to MISO presenting more details on how the parallel processes will overlap at the December workshop.

Solar Energy Industries Association feedback on MISO's ERAS Proposal

The Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) thanks MISO for the opportunity to provide feedback on MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) Process.  SEIA is deeply concerned with MISO’s ERAS proposal, and opposes the proposal, as it is inherently discriminatory, establishes transmission access inequity, and promotes anti-competitive generation development in MISO.  Additionally, MISO ERAS proposal is based on false premises while also being the most discriminatory way to address a real resource adequacy concern that could otherwise be solved with alternative proposals that more equitably and efficiently address MISO’s capacity needs.

MISO’s reasoning for a separate ERAS process is flawed. 

MISO is basing their ERAS proposal on an incorrect, implicit assumption that LSE eligible ERAS projects are immune from supply chain issues and other development delays.  MISO blames the queue backlogs on generator interconnection delays caused by developer related supply chain bottlenecks, permitting delays, and commercial challenges for projects with signed interconnection agreements.  However, MISO has more generators in the queue stuck in delayed studies without signed GIAs than those with signed GIAs waiting to build.  Furthermore, MISO’s own data suggests that generator supply chain issues only account for 8% of development delays, while 40% of delays are attributed to Transmission Owner supply chain issues and 18% of delays are attributed to regulatory process delays.[1]  Though these two primary reasons account for over half of the MISO queue delays, MISO is now looking to TOs and Regulatory Processes in the ERAS process, believing falsely that a system with only LSEs/TOs and their state regulators would be immune to development delays.  Importantly, supply chain bottlenecks, permitting delays, and commercial challenges affect all generation development, and would affect ERAS eligible LSEs equally. 

Furthermore, queue jumping risks moving less mature projects in front of more mature projects, slowing down time to market. Projects typically advance development work in conjunction with their queue status, and projects that have been waiting in the queue for longer and are approaching movement through the queue will have done more development work than projects suddenly vaulted ahead of them. Queue jumping risks deprioritizing projects with UCAP that could energize sooner for less mature, slower-to-market projects. MISO’s proposal does not sufficiently ensure that projects selected for ERAS are more mature than the projects already in the queue.  

Moreover, the ERAS proposal undermines MISO’s rationale for their separately proposed GIQ MW cap.  On one hand, with MISO’s advocacy for an interconnection queue cap, MISO is stating that they must reduce the amount of generation being studied in order to efficiently study those interconnection requests.  On the other hand, MISO is advocating now for a separate, uncapped and additional interconnection study process.  It is concerning that MISO is proposing a MW cap on MISO’s GIQ but is not planning to cap the amount of MWs studied under the ERAS process.  Given queue backlogs that exist today, it seems likely that LSEs and state regulatory authorities will widely utilize the ERAS process.  MISO does not have the resources to prevent further interconnection delays being created by the ERAS proposal, nor has MISO provided any information confirming that an ERAS queue will not pull from resources that would otherwise be dedicated to the GIQ. Therefore, implementing ERAS will likely result in MISO having two backlogged study processes, further exacerbating a principal barrier to resource adequacy in MISO: unreasonably long durations for interconnecting generation to interconnect and provide power to MISO’s footprint.

Additionally, the ERAS proposal fails to address the underlying concerns that led to FERC’s objections against the RERRA exemption in the first cap filing, namely that the RERRA exemption would have adverse impacts on previously queued projects. It merely repackages the exemption under a different framework, perpetuating the same issues of inequity and prioritization without adequate safeguards or justification. As currently structured, ERAS is only available to projects supported by RERRAs, effectively creating a parallel interconnection path that circumvents the standard queue process. This separate pathway provides these projects with access to GIA without adequate regard for the status of previously queued projects in the conventional DPP cycle. By elevating RERRA-supported projects in this way, ERAS prioritizes these projects over others, including those that have already invested time and resources navigating the conventional interconnection process. This unfairly grants RERRA projects priority access to limited transmission headroom, replicating the same discriminatory effects as the original RERRA exemption. The ERAS proposal will unduly consume headroom from DPP 2024 projects and cause further delays in the DPP 2021 and 2022 cycles. 

MISO’s ERAS proposal does not offer a solution that addresses the leading causes for interconnection study delays, nor does it support the idea that ERAS projects won’t be similarly delayed.  Instead, the ERAS process is an avenue for MISO to limit its attention to all interconnection requests in favor of interconnection projects MISO is choosing to favor with unsound logic.  

The ERAS proposal is inherently discriminatory, establishes transmission access inequity, and promotes anti-competitive generation development in MISO.

MISO is proposing queue jumping for select generation interconnection projects.  What’s worse is that such queue jumping will not be allowed based on merit, but solely on the entrenched incumbency of the entity proposing to build the generator.  MISO’s ERAS process will allow LSEs unlimited use of an interconnection process meant to avoid the GIQ that all other market participants must use.  Inherently, this is unjust and unduly discriminatory toward independent power producers (IPPs).

MISO’s ERAS proposal would create a two-tiered interconnection system that heavily favors in both priority and financial benefit state regulated LSEs.  MISO offers no protections for developers or consumers.  The ERAS proposal establishes a process only for LSEs that would allow them preferential access to previously planned transmission upgrades and provide a mandate to be studied before and faster than all other generation development.  LSEs will have first and unlimited access to available transmission capacity in MISO.  This will cause harm to presently queued generation and future interconnection requests by limiting the transmission capacity available to all other generation sources, much of which has been developed in latest MTEP cycles and anticipated to benefit generation currently and planned in the GIQ.  Of particular concern to SEIA is the fact that, though MISO’s Long-Range Transmission Planning (LRTP) portfolios were developed to create transmission capacity that serves all future generation, ERAS projects will now jump ahead of all GIQ projects in their ability to benefit from LRTP Tranche 1 and 2.1.  By allowing LSEs to swallow up transmission capacity, MISO’s proposal is ensuring that transmission access is limited, and network upgrade costs will be higher for merchant generation.

MISO’s ERAS proposal will also lead to the double counting of existing transmission capacity. Under the proposed process, MISO will allocate transmission capacity to DPP 2022, 2023 and ERAS projects. This is a risk because ERAS projects are studied on base models that use transmission quantities without including DPP 2022 and DPP 2023 projects (See Figure 1 below). As MISO mentioned in their November 18^th ERAS workshop, the latest MTEP model will be the base case for ERAS projects. However, this model will not account for DPP 2022 and 2023 projects until these projects have signed GIAs, which will not happen until after the first cycle of ERAS projects receive their expedited GIAs. This risks creating constraints that will need to be reconciled through costly and time-consuming true ups in subsequent MTEP cycles. 

If MISO chooses to move forward with the ERAS process, they should not launch this process until after the projects in the DPP 2022 and 2023 projects reach GIA. 

MISO would better serve Resource Adequacy by including IPPs and focusing on studying all generation presently in the GIQ.

IPPs are well versed in all aspects of generation development, as the IPP business model relies on their ability to develop efficient, cost-effective, and high-performing generation resources.  IPPs are better positioned to develop superior resources because they operate in a market-driven environment, evaluate a wide range of resources, and assume the risks associated with investment decisions. Therefore, IPPs are uniquely qualified and capable of adding significant capacity within the 3–5-year timeframe MISO needs.  If MISO is creating a process to fast-track generation outside of the GIQ, MISO would serve resource adequacy more by ensuring IPPs are able to take part and utilize their skillsets and experience to efficiently and cost-effectively add generation to MISO’s resource fleet.

In fact, MISO has over 300 GW of generation attempting to interconnect to its footprint, indicating that developers have been attempting to answer MISO’s resource adequacy market signals for several years.  Hundreds of GWs would be coming online within the next two years if MISO and TOs were capable of studying interconnection requests in the Tariff prescribed year timeframe.  IPPs are limited by MISO’s inability to effectively and efficiently study their projects, not the other way around.  Instead of discriminating against IPPs, MISO should prioritize studying the projects presently awaiting interconnection to the MISO transmission network.

If pursued, MISO should require that the ERAS process use competitive procurement techniques. Specifically, LSE project selections should be substantively reviewed via a public process and approved by an independent entity. This will limit the opportunity for undue discrimination by LSEs and ensure that all resources, including IPPs, are evaluated fairly and given equal opportunity to participate in the ERAS process. In general, competitive solicitation processes are those that are open, fair, and employ the services of an independent third party that applies standardized evaluation criteria to choose amongst various options. This safeguard will ensure that the ERAS process will not be used to unfairly favor the LSE’s own projects, and would more closely align the ERAS proposal with Order No. 2023. 

Alternatives to ERAS would better solve for Resource Adequacy and be fair.

If MISO is set on developing a process separate from its GIQ, MISO should take more time to properly develop a proposal that utilizes all tools and market participants in generation development that more efficiently solves MISO’s supply and demand needs.  This should start with ensuring that any process for interconnecting generation be open to all market participants and based on the merits and benefits of the resource.

One alternative, more equitable, effective, and cost-efficient proposal would be to operate a separate, open interconnection queue for certain co-located load and generation arrangements, such as co-location arrangements that can be completely islanded from the grid or use minimal grid services. Studying co-located load and generation in an expedited framework would solve for a real and immediate demand need (the incoming load entity) by tying the load to incoming capacity. Otherwise, incoming load, which is capable of independently interconnecting quicker than generation, will only add to MISO’s resource adequacy needs.  A process for generation co-located to load to be studied independently and more efficiently would incentivize large loads to bring their own generation, offsetting their load increase and thereby solving for load growth and capacity needs in one interconnection request. Further, MISO should co-optimize the load study process and the interconnection study process to ensure that resources are coming online in where they will be best suited to serve the new load.

Specific Questions posed by MISO:

1. Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

Because MISO is opting to leave much of the resource adequacy qualifications to the states, it is difficult to assess whether the ERAS qualification requirements are supportable.  However, SEIA believes the following should be considered within any qualifications for the ERAS process.

First, ERAS should not be limited to only LSEs.  MISO’s stated goal to expedite additions of capacity resources onto the system would be better accomplished by including all generation developers, especially IPPs.  SEIA does not support a qualification for ERAS inclusion being simply that the generation is proposed by an LSE.

SEIA supports stringent and strong entry requirements to discourage abuse of the ERAS process and to ensure ERAS projects are as commercially viable and ready as possible.  SEIA believes MISO should include project readiness criteria such as, but not limited to, between 30 to 50 percent complete engineering designs, master service agreements related to long-lead time equipment, information related to planned fuel procurement strategies, site control, confirmation of permit application submission, etc., which should be confirmed through a 3^rd party, binding attestation or certification process so as to provide the information to MISO without further reducing MISO Staff resources.

Furthermore, and importantly, SEIA recommends that MISO require ERAS projects to be commercially operable within no more than 5 years from ERAS study kickoff.  This requirement should be enforced by penalties assessed on the generator.  This would ensure that MISO’s ultimate purpose of bringing capacity online in MISO in an expedited framework is actually served by the ERAS process, incentivize only well developed, commercially ready projects from entering the ERAS queue, and ensure that LSEs do not utilize the ERAS proposal to receive expedited state approval and a MISO EGIA but then not feel pressured by any committed COD date.

2. Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

SEIA recommends barring GIQ transfers to the ERAS process.  If MISO is determined to allow DPP23 projects to transfer to ERAS, SEIA opposes allowing projects in cycles prior to DPP23 from transferring out of the GIQ and into ERAS.  

Unfortunately, SEIA points out that MISO has no real ability to prevent GIQ projects from transferring to the ERAS process.  Even if MISO limits transfers to projects only in DPP2023, MISO is limited in their ability to prevent a project in a previous study cycle from simply withdrawing from the queue, taking the hit of withdrawal penalties, and then going through the steps necessary to qualify/apply for the ERAS process.  Even with a ban on transfers, which SEIA recommends, the project developer could easily change their project name, the MW amount, etc. to “disguise” the project as a new interconnection request.  This is an element that greatly concerns SEIA with having a separate queue like the ERAS proposal. 

That said, SEIA recommends MISO do everything they can to bar GIQ project transfers, especially from project cycles prior to the DPP2023 cycle, as allowing projects that have been in the queue for so long to withdraw would trigger restudies that would exacerbate the very queue backlog that has led MISO to this position.  Additionally, MISO should create a requirement that any project transferring from the GIQ to the ERAS project not be allowed to raise network upgrade costs for GIQ projects.

Projects that withdraw from the GIQ to enter the ERAS process should incur withdrawal penalties as would any other projects withdrawing from the queue.  Arguably, because of the benefit ERAS qualified projects would be receiving, higher withdrawal penalties should be allocated to them to mitigate the harm they will cause on other queued projects not only by leaving the queue, but the harm to other interconnection requests caused by those ERAS projects reducing transmission capacity available to GIQ projects that have been waiting to interconnect. For these same reasons, MISO could also consider more stringent requirements and fees for all projects trying to enter the ERAS process.

3. Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

SEIA has no preference for Option 1 or Option 2.  However, SEIA does recommend MISO not kick off ERAS studies until the state process for confirming the prospective generation is necessary for resource adequacy. Presently, MISO proposes that the state processes run parallel to the ERAS process.[2]  In order to ensure that resources are not spent studying generation that does not yet have a confirmed, state approval, SEIA recommends only kicking off ERAS studies after the state process has completed.  Additional concern exists with a simultaneous pathway, as states could be pressured or manipulated by an LSE who receives an EGIA or is in EGIA negotiations before the state has made their own decision as to the necessity or willingness to, for instance, rate base a generation project.  

4. Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider? 

While SEIA ultimately supports MISO’s inclusion of a sunset date in its eventual Tariff filing, an element that could make the ERAS proposal more palatable would be if ERAS was not recurring.  SEIA instead recommends MISO operate the ERAS process as a one-time tool to identify and interconnect the generation MISO is looking for.  Practically, this would look like operating an ERAS queue once in 2025-26 but then closing it and ending the program.  This would serve to incent more ERAS eligible capacity earlier, thus answering the capacity shortfall sooner.  Additionally, this would allow MISO to potentially accomplish its goal of fast-tracking ERAS capacity additions, but then subsequently return its resource focus on GIQ projects.

Should MISO move forward with a proposal for recurring ERAS queues, SEIA strongly supports a sunset date sooner rather than later and for that sunset process and timeline to be established in the Tariff.

Please see above general comments and recommendations as “additional feedback” requested in this question.

New Leaf Energy Comments on MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) Proposal - Feedback on November 13, 2024 PAC and November 18, 2024 ERAS Workshop Presentations

November 27, 2024

New Leaf Energy, Inc. (“New Leaf”) appreciates the opportunity to provide the following comments on MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) Proposal as presented at the November 13, 2024 PAC meeting and November 18, 2024 ERAS Workshop. New Leaf acknowledges our support and agreement with feedback submitted to this issue by the Solar Energy Industries Association (“SEIA”), Clean Grid Alliance (“CGA”), and Advanced Energy United (“AEU”). 

New Leaf is an independent developer of energy storage and solar generation with over 12GW of utility-scale solar and storage systems under development across the country. Formerly the development arm of Borrego Solar Systems, New Leaf has also developed and deployed over 1 GW of distribution-interconnected solar and storage resources. New Leaf is a MISO member and interconnection customer and is developing new solar PV and battery storage systems in the MISO footprint that will participate in MISO-administered markets.

MISO should not proceed with the ERAS proposal due to its discriminatory nature and the undue burdens it places on existing queued projects. The proposal offers an unfair advantage to projects selected by LSEs and states, enabling them to progress to the GIA stage far more quickly than projects that have been waiting in the queue for years. There is no compelling evidence or justification to suggest that ERAS projects provide greater resource adequacy benefits than existing queued projects. MISO should not rely solely on the claims of LSEs, many of which develop their own generation projects, creating a clear conflict of interest. 

New Leaf, with over 2,500 MW of solar and storage in the MISO queue, made significant investments based on the expectation that our projects would help meet LSEs' capacity needs. There is no reason why ERAS projects should be prioritized over ours or other queued projects. Many projects currently in the queue are designed to meet the needs of LSEs, and they include storage and hybrid solar-plus-storage projects that are near the end of the queue and poised to contribute to resolving resource adequacy shortages.

ERAS projects will benefit from the newest MTEP studies and transmission upgrades, while other queued projects are stuck using outdated models. Furthermore, if ERAS projects are studied in a smaller group (relative to DPP cluster sizes), they may avoid upgrades that would have been required if studied in the original DPP cluster, creating an unfair advantage. 

MISO should prohibit any currently queued projects from being able to withdraw and transfer to ERAS. However, even with a prohibition in place, the clear benefits of ERAS relative to the DPP process creates a perverse incentive for projects to withdraw and re-enter the queue under new names, undermining the stability of the queue and delaying the interconnection process. This will result in additional restudies, increased costs, and a strain on MISO's resources, which are needed to support projects with signed GIAs that are ready to help address resource adequacy issues.

MISO should focus on clearing the backlog of currently queued projects before implementing ERAS. While recent queue reforms and improvements to the process, such as stricter site control and the implementation of automation, will expedite the queue, MISO’s response that the problem lies with older, clogged clusters highlights that the real issue is not the speed of the process but the bottlenecks at the end stages. Addressing these existing challenges should be MISO's priority.

The barriers preventing projects with signed GIAs from reaching COD, such as supply chain delays and regulatory hurdles, will also affect ERAS projects. There is no evidence to suggest that ERAS projects will be immune to these same challenges. Additionally, MISO already has fast-track processes in place, including surplus interconnection, generator replacement, and provisional GIA options, which should be fully utilized before creating a new and potentially problematic interconnection pathway.

MISO should leave the authority in the hands of the states to determine which resources should access the ERAS process (including their resource adequacy benefits) because it upholds the fundamental principle of state sovereignty in managing their energy futures. If ERAS were to be approved, States would be best positioned to assess their own resource needs and priorities, as they are directly involved in the policy processes that shape their energy strategies. Just as states have the authority to approve specific energy projects within their borders, they should also retain the power to determine which resources are necessary for ensuring resource adequacy. Removing this authority from the states would undermine their ability to make decisions that align with their unique energy goals and statewide policies, potentially disregarding the preferences of local stakeholders and jeopardizing state-level resource adequacy. By maintaining this deference to the states, MISO can ensure that state-led initiatives and policies are respected, fostering a collaborative and equitable approach to resource planning while promoting the energy mix that best suits each state's needs and values.

The ERAS proposal also requires stricter eligibility criteria. Projects should be required to complete the CPCN process and secure necessary state approvals before being admitted into ERAS, rather than allowing the state and MISO processes to occur simultaneously. There should also be a prohibition on transferring currently queued projects to ERAS, as this would only cause further delays and uncertainty. 

MISO's proposal notes that ERAS projects may benefit currently queued projects but mitigating network upgrades that might otherwise be (or are already) assigned to currently queued projects. While this seems correct in theory given the ERAS projects will be jumping ahead of currently queued projects, in practice this seems unlikely given that ERAS and DPP clusters will be using totally different models to identify upgrade needs. MISO should either acknowledge this shortcoming or describe in more detail how this benefit will be realized.

Finally, ERAS projects should face a greater penalty for withdrawal or cancellation. A non-refundable $100,000 application fee is insufficient to deter projects from withdrawing and re-entering the queue, which would harm other projects in the DPP process. To mitigate this, ERAS projects should be subject to the same withdrawal penalties as DPP projects to ensure fairness and minimize disruptions to the queue.

Entergy Feedback submitted to the requisite subject matter experts. Feedback is for public view. 

Before we can answer the questions posed by MISO in the November 18th workshop, we need to fully understand the details of the ERAS proposal. To ensure uniformity on how generators are studied prior to interconnection, how do the proposed ERAS analyses compare with the existing DPP analyses?

• What are the differences in how the models are built?
  • Where do assumptions vary for generation, load, and transmission between the two model sets?
• How will the analyses differ between ERAS and DPP?
  • Will the same monitored element and contingency sets be used?
  • How will NRIS studies be performed in ERAS?

We hope that MISO can use these initial questions at the next stakeholder workshop to expound on the proposed analyses and how they are comparable or different from the existing DPP process.

Pattern’s Feedback to MISO ERAS Proposal

While Pattern Energy appreciates the consideration of ERAS, we are not entirely certain of its necessity at this time. However, if MISO decides to proceed with implementing a parallel queue process, we kindly suggest ensuring that it is equitable and non-discriminatory. Additionally, we would respectfully recommend designing the process to maximize its efficiency in bringing as many resources online as swiftly as possible.

Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

Additional Qualifications/Criterion

The qualification requirements in the MISO ERAS proposal currently is likely to favor certain types of energy projects over others, particularly those based on natural gas, coal, and nuclear power, rather than objectively solving for the fastest way to address resource adequacy  To address this imbalance, we propose an alternative approach that would solve for fast resource adequacy from all energy project types, leveraging the many shovel ready projects being developed in the MISO geographic footprint which could collectively address resource adequacy stated needs.

Eligibility 1 (As proposed by MISO):

• State Support towards RA
• LSE submits new projects that need to be commercially operable in the next 3-5 years

OR

Eligibility 2 (Additional Alternate Criterion ):

• $24,000/MW (Non-Refundable)
• LSE and project developers with a proven track record in developing, financing, constructing and operating assets in the United States can submit new projects
• Project must meet resource adequacy need published by MISO and OMS

Proposed Alternative

• Our suggestion involves modifying the $24,000/MW posting requirement.
• The posting would become non-refundable once a project enters the ERAS study process. This non-refundability clause would only apply if the project hasn't already secured state support.

Benefits of the Proposed Alternate Criterion

• This modification would continue to support state-recognized projects
• Encourage well-prepared projects capable of construction within 3-5 years

Project Constructability Criteria

Project developers should demonstrate a proven track record in developing, financing, constructing, and operating assets within the United States. This requirement is crucial as ERAS (Energy Resource Aggregation System) is designed to address reliability needs, and a strong history of project execution is essential to ensure successful project completion.

Site Control Requirement

The site control requirements should encompass the following:

• Generation Site: 100% control of the entire area designated for the generation facility.
• Interconnection Facilities: 50% control site control associated with the interconnection facilities.

Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

• Withdrawal penalties should be applicable exclusively when a project withdraws from the ERAS queue. However, if the project successfully reaches Commercial Operation Date (COD), no withdrawal penalties should be imposed.

Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

Option 1: EPR will allow the utilization of new proposed and approved transmission projects.

Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have an additional feedback to consider?

Affected System Studies

Affected system studies can sometimes create bottlenecks in the overall study process. To address this:

• Work through the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) to implement an expedited review of ERAS projects within one year of tendering the Generator Interconnection Agreement (GIA), prior to the project's FNTP.
• Explore potential reciprocity agreements with other Transmission Operators that are engaging stakeholders due to short-term resource shortfalls.

Affected System Upgrade Costs

• MISO's presentation on FERC Order 2023 mentions the reimbursement of affected system costs. Pattern is seeking clarification on this matter.

Affected System Contingent Facilities

Remove operational restrictions due to affected system constraints identified in long-term planning studies. This language should be codified in the GIA/JOA.

Milestone Flexibility

Introduce a Liquidated Damage Clause to provide flexibility in adjusting milestones when unforeseen circumstances arise. This approach aligns with standard industry practices commonly implemented in off-take agreements. It's important to note that failing to meet a specific milestone should not serve as grounds for terminating the Generator Interconnection Agreement (GIA), provided the project demonstrates significant progress towards completion.

Existing projects in the queue will be eligible for transfer to ERAS, with consideration given to both the project's needs and the potential impact on the queue

• Projects currently in the 2023 cycle can transfer into the ERAS process
  • Should they be responsible to pay the Automatic Withdrawal Penalty and be subject to other penalty provisions?
    • Withdrawal penalties should be applicable exclusively when a project withdraws from the ERAS queue. However, if the project successfully reaches Commercial Operation Date (COD), no withdrawal penalties should be imposed.
• Should projects in later cycles (e.g., 2022 cycle) be eligible to withdrawal from their cycle and enter the ERAS process?
  • Dropouts after Decision Point 2 result in unscheduled Phase 3 restudies, thereby contributing to main driver of ongoing queue delays
    • Projects initiated in 2022 may have made substantial developmental progress compared to those from 2023. Consequently, these earlier projects have a higher likelihood of achieving Commercial Operation Date (COD) within a 5-year timeframe. To reflect this advanced status, additional financial deposits may be considered for these projects to enter ERAS.
    • ERAS queue should be restricted to projects that meet specific timing criteria. Specifically, projects should only be permitted to enter the ERAS queue if the 2022 cycle projects have not yet progressed to DPP Phase 3 of the study process at the time of ERAS application submission.

Extension of ERAS to Merchant Transmission Projects

Merchant Transmission Projects would unlock additional resource to be integrated into the grid. Some of these resources may reside within the geographical footprint of MISO or may reside outside of MISO based on the Wind and Solar conditions, thereby assisting to alleviate short term resource adequacy needs within MISO footprint. Pattern Encourages MISO to consider processing Merchant Transmission Projects to be studied through the ERAS process.   

Availability of MTEP Power flow Models

Pattern Encourages MISO to publish the MTEP models that would be used to evaluate ERAS resources, there by giving the project developers to make informed decision on the viability of the project prior to submitting an ERAS application.

Comments of the Southern Renewable Energy Association

SREA provides the following comments regarding MISO’s intent to provide a fast lane process for interconnection requests that would assist in meeting resource adequacy needs driven by load additions, resource retirements, or other expected system needs leading to a reserve margin gap in respective states throughout MISO. As a trade association whose members are participating in MISO’s interconnection queue, it is crucial to us that any proposal to create a parallel process, is not resulting in de facto discrimination against renewable energy, hybrid or battery energy storage systems that can fulfill resource adequacy requirements. Also, that any proposal MISO brings forth for consideration at FERC does not inherently raise the cost of developing generation by creating greater exposure to network upgrades due to impacts of a parallel process on the regular MISO queue. SREA wants to make clear, as an organization advocating in state level regulatory proceedings, that we fully recognize the authority of states to make important resource adequacy decisions to ensure reliability of the bulk electric system, and the need for expediency - we have consistently argued for transmission as a solution in MISO South for this reason. But we advise that any proposal for a parallel fastlane process should properly consider the tradeoffs, have necessary guardrails, and above all consider the need for the process. 

Is ERAS Necessary?

With respect to additional feedback requested by MISO at Question #4, SREA has questions about the overall necessity of the ERAS process. MISO currently has nearly 320GW’s of resources active in the interconnection queue, with 28.7GW’s of resources that are currently in GIA negotiations according to MISO’s most recent September DPP Study Cycle Schedule [1]. This is in addition to the often cited 55GW of resources [2] that have already signed GIA’s. Per MISO’s September 19th Open Board Meeting Presentation: 

• 10.4GW’s of that total are waiting on transmission owner supply chain issues

• 4.6GW’s are awaiting regulatory processes

• An additional 2.86 w/o PPA’s, 2GW’s awaiting generation supply chain issues, 2GW’s experiencing financial issues and 3.9GW’s marked ‘Other’

• 29GW’s, a sizable amount of capacity, do not have any identified cause behind the delay in construction or commercial operation. 

What’s documented by MISO is 28.7GW’s of resources in GIA negotiations, in addition to 55GW’s of resources that already have GIA’s. This adds up to 83.7GW of resources - roughly 65% of MISO’s peak load. Given this sizable amount of capacity, it begs the question whether MISO should focus on what is needed to deploy these 83.7GW’s of capacity over the next 3 years, versus the implementation of the ERAS process through the sunset period in 2028. For example, if 10.4GW’s of resources (or more) are awaiting transmission owner supply chain issues - a resource clearing ERAS could conceivably be facing the same root cause for delay while also causing harm to the queue discussed below. 

MISO should be transparent and clear-eyed about the value of a fast-lane in comparison with enabling resources that have already obtained a GIA or are in negotiations for a GIA. Especially if there are harms to the regular MISO queue and a potential erosion to open access rules under FERC Order 2003 that have been the mainstay of a competitive interconnection process.

Question 1 

Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

SREA explicitly does not endorse the ERAS proposal from MISO, but in response to this question, and speaking in a hypothetical scenario in which ERAS is implemented, we suggest strict readiness requirements beyond what MISO has suggested: 

1. Resource Adequacy requirements should encourage the deployment of resources that provide resource adequacy attributes, in addition to capacity. 

Reasoning - As recognized by MISO’s own research and efforts in the IPWG to encourage Grid Forming capabilities in Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), MISO should screen ERAS applications for important, needed attributes. MISO should maintain their role as ‘resource agnostic’, and not curb the deployment of grid-scale commercially ready BESS or hybrid solar plus BESS technology that is currently being deployed in other markets at a pace of GW’s per year. 

2. With respect to state regulatory processes regarding resource applications, MISO should require a state approval for a resource application to enter into the ERAS process.
   Reasoning - Generation applications can change in state or other RERRA (City Council of New Orleans) processes. If a state application underway requests 1,000MW’s of interconnection service, but only 500MW’s is approved by regulators, then the interconnection study is incorrect, and has resulted in effectively a queue dropout of 500MW’s that may create restudies and further muddling of results. Similarly, if the full 1000MW’s are not approved at the state level, then MISO has wasted time studying MW’s that will not materialize and will trigger restudies. If ERAS is intended to bring high certainty MW’s online to meet resource adequacy needs, then state approved MW’s provide perhaps the highest level of certainty. 

        3. Commercial Readiness and Study Deposits should be higher than what is required for the regular queue. 

Reasoning - The entry requirements for the ERAS proposal are not sufficiently high enough to discourage abuse of the process. A higher application fee and M2 Milestone and site control requirements are important first steps to ensure only ready projects enter this queue. However, given the aggressive construction timeline required to meet resource adequacy needs, SREA suggests that MISO include additional project readiness criteria. These include: 

• 30-50% engineering designs, 

• procurement or MSAs of long-lead time equipment

• information of fuel procurement (i.e. access to pipeline), 

• permit application submission, etc. 

These requirements could be submitted through attestation or third party certification (i.e. engineering designed certified by an accredited engineer) to reduce staff processing time

4. Alternately, in lieu of higher Commercial Readiness and Study Deposit requirements, ERAS submissions should be responsible for any Network Upgrades identified in their study area, and Affected System Upgrades in their study area. 

Reasoning - For the benefit of participating in a fast lane, and to avoid any harm inflicted upon late stage projects in a study group in the regular queue, responsibility should be shifted to ERAS participants for already identified system overloads. 

5. COD extensions should not be allowed for ERAS projects.  

Reasoning - If the resource adequacy need presents itself within 3 years, then the resource needs to be present in that time frame.   

Question 2

Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

1. Withdrawal Penalties should be incurred if a state approval requirement is not instituted for submission to the ERAS process. The withdrawal penalty should be distributed to regular queue participants in late stages of the DPP. 

Reasoning - Restudies create delays, and withdrawals from the ERAS process can present the need for restudies and further delays. Projects in late stages have committed time and money to participating in the queue and should receive payments to offset any delays experienced by ERAS withdrawals.   

2. ERAS participants should pay withdrawal penalties if they withdraw from the regular queue, and ERAS projects should be subject to withdrawal penalties. At least 50-100% of M2 should be at risk. 

Reasoning - The regular queue would face similar penalties for withdrawing. ERAS projects do cause harm to the system by taking up staff/consulting resources, and any collected penalties could go towards    increasing resources to process the queue or offsetting network upgrades.

Question 3 

Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outlined in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline? 

1. SREA does not support either option at this time. 

Reasoning - SREA requests that MISO provide an explanation of how the two options impact market participants and any tradeoffs for choosing one option over the other. 

Question 4

Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider?

1. MISO should require that ERAS projects pay for existing Network Upgrades in the study areas in which Network Upgrades have already been triggered.

Reasoning - Transmission capacity is not infinite for participants in the MTEP process, as evidenced by Expedited Project Requests, and the regular interconnection queue. ERAS studies could create significant impacts on DPP models that could result in further delays for the regular MISO queue. 

        2. Merchant HVDC Transmission Projects Inclusion 

Reasoning: Merchant HVDC Transmission Projects can be an important part of the resource adequacy puzzle, unlocking resources within the geographical footprint of MISO or external to the footprint. This can ensure resource adequacy from resources outside of LRZ’s experiencing tight conditions, while others are not, and leverage low cost resources like wind and solar when conditions are favorable. We encourage MISO to permit Merchant HVDC Transmission Projects to be studied through the ERAS process.

3. Provide Access to MTEP Powerflow Models

Reasoning: We encourage MISO to publish MTEP models used to evaluate ERAS submittals. This would allow project developers to have important information that could allow informed decisions to be made on the viability of a project to be submitted in the ERAS process. 

Conclusion

SREA does not support the ERAS proposal from MISO because we continue to advocate that with respect to the interconnection queue, MISO should focus on fixing internal processes, increased coordination and communication between Transmission Owners and Interconnection Customers, as well as improved pre-queue transparency. 

We have advocated for this since the proposal of MISO’s MW Cap proposal and Commercial Readiness reforms, and we are concerned about the ERAS proposal’s impact to the currently dysfunctional interconnection queue. Our view, broadly, is that MISO is pursuing too many reforms which could only increase the challenges of transmission planning for a variety of drivers. Providing a carveout for ERAS projects will further undermine efforts to improve the interconnection process by creating an exemption to the MW Cap proposed. This is not a desirable outcome, and will likely compound delays. 

Furthermore, we are concerned that MISO is undermining the competitive development of resources by favoring Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) over Independent Power Producers (IPPs) through a process envisioned in their ERAS proposal. This happens first through lost opportunity through an inability to participate in the ERAS process and is extended to participants in the regular queue when they could be harmed by impacts on the DPP by ERAS projects that are allowed to jump the regular queue. Limiting the pool of MW’s needed for resource adequacy to only those offered by IOU’s in an expedited process could lead to significant consumer impacts. 

To the degree that MISO proceeds with this proposal, we request that MISO provide more  opportunities for stakeholder input before filing a tariff revision at FERC, in addition to the proposals we have provided in response to MISO questions. We also re-state that MISO should not tip the scales toward particular resource types at a time when GW’s of BESS resources [3] are being deployed every year outside of MISO. 

[1] https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20240903%20IPWG%20Item%2003b%20DPP%20Study%20Schedule%20Update644793.pdf

[2] https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20240919%20Board%20of%20Directors%20Item%2008%20Reliability%20Imperative%20Update647828.pdf

[3] https://go.woodmac.com/l/131501/2024-09-23/33437v/131501/1727771261F0WmvZHa/US_ESM_Q3_2024_executive_summary.pdf

DTE appreciates MISO’s efforts in developing a process that will expedite projects that are required to maintain resource adequacy.  The 2024 OMS-MISO survey results highlight the urgency in resource adequacy and how important it is to add new resources to the generation fleet.  When you couple an inefficient queue process with future plant retirements and large spot-load additions, it is evident that MISO must focus on securing a sufficient supply of resources.  DTE supports MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) process in concept, as it aims to address future concerns with resource adequacy.  In response to the questions that MISO included in its feedback request please see below:

1. Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

DTE strongly urges MISO and OMS to include Load Serving Entities (LSE) in the development of the qualification requirements that would include some flexibility to adapt at the state level. 

An example of why flexibility is needed can be found in Michigan, where the proposed ERAS qualification requirement to have an approved Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) poses challenges. IRPs, which are litigated cases with a one-year statutory review period, are only required every 5 years from the final order of the last IRP, leaving room for regulatory lag. Having an approved IRP in place for resources to enter the ERAS process may be workable in cases where the company has an approved IRP and request for proposals (RFP) are focused on executing plans.  However, this process won’t work in cases where an LSE is conducting an RFP to consider resources to propose in a future IRP.  When seeking cost pre-approval for large assets in an IRP in Michigan, a high threshold for cost certainty is needed; in these cases, a company would likely seek projects in an RFP to evaluate and propose in the future IRP. A key element of a solicitation would likely be to understand project milestones, including site control, engineering, etc. to ensure companies have some level of cost certainty to evaluate proposals. Queue status is a good indicator of project status. Should projects needed for resource adequacy be unable to enter the queue, they face a potential disadvantage in the competitive solicitation and risk overall project delays should they have to wait for the IRP to be approved to submit a project through ERAS.

2. Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

DTE is not supportive of a withdrawal penalty.  This would negatively impact any renewable project that would be transitioned and increase cost to customers.

3. Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

DTE prefers Option 2

4. Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have an additional feedback to consider?

DTE would encourage MISO to consider extending or eliminating the sunset of the proposed ERAS process beyond the 2028/29 date.  The 2024 OMS-MISO survey results forecast a deficit of 14.4 GW in the 2029/30 planning year.  It is not certain that the planning uncertainties LSEs are managing during this time will be resolved by the proposed sunset period (e.g., high capacity factor customer load growth, state policy changes, generation and transmission project delays, etc.).  The ERAS process should remain through this time frame.  MISO is proposing the ERAS process be in place until the queue cycle has been reduced to one year, yet it is uncertain if queue cycle times will be reduced to one year by 2028/29 and if they will be reduced on an ongoing basis thereafter.         

These comments are submitted on behalf of the Louisiana Commission Staff and the Mississippi Public Service Commission  (State Commissions) in response to the ERAS Study Proposal Feedback Request  (PAC-2023-1) due 11/27/2024.  

1. The State Commissions generally support a mutually acceptable ERAS-type proposal, but continue to support a RERRA exemption, and they continue to oppose a queue cap proposal that is not connected with and conditioned upon a RERRA exemption and/or a mutually agreed upon ERAS process being adopted as a single proposal.  The State Commissions believe that any sunset on the ERAS should be tied to a sunset on the Queue Cap:  Either there should be no sunsets on either or they should be tied to one another.

2. The State Commissions recommend a broad range of options to meet the ERAS eligibility requirements that are flexible enough to accommodate the needs all RERRAs and States related to the demonstration of resource adequacy needs.

3. The State Commissions oppose any MW cap on the ERAS generation amounts.

4. The State Commissions do not recommend additional conditions for entering the ERAS process, and they oppose withdrawal penalties for qualifying projects that transition from the existing Generator Interconnection Queue.

5. The State Commissions can work with Option 1 or 2 for the ERAs timeline, but they prefer Option 1.

6. The State Commissions oppose the proposed sunset of the ERAS process.  If ERAS is no longer needed in the future because it can be demonstrated by MISO that the queue is being timely processed for at least three consecutive years, MISO could file together a proposal to jointly end the queue cap and ERAS process.

Cleco Power appreciates the opportunity to comment on MISO’s ERAS proposal.

Cleco Power is supportive of MISO’s ERAS proposal. This will ensure that LSE’s are able to serve new load and maintain resource adequacy requirements. MISO and the states will need to make sure that different state jurisdictions and policies do not hinder one another regarding the RERRA sign-offs. The qualifications to meet the resource adequacy needs for ERAS seem to reasonable and would hopefully prevent spec projects.

Projects that transition to the ERAS from the GIQ should not be penalized for qualifying projects.

We can support either option but lean more towards option 1.

Alliant Energy provides the following comments in response to the Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) Workshop.  Alliant Energy strongly agrees with the need for the ERAS process and appreciates MISO efforts to move the concept forward.  There is a current and growing need to efficiently study and interconnect resources needed to meet resource adequacy requirements.  Alliant Energy sees changing resource adequacy requirements, large load growth potential, retiring resources and continued delays in the regular queue process as all key drivers of the need for ERAS.  To help ensure a continued high level of reliability in the MISO footprint, MISO should continue forward with the ERAS concept in the stakeholder process and file at FERC as soon as practical.

Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

The qualification requirements outlined in the workshop presentation are reasonable.  The process should be flexible with how RERRA support can be demonstrated for a project given the variety of RERRA processes and requirements in MISO.  The requirement that a project is under review by a RERRA will provide an appropriate guardrail for the process to be only used by needed projects and will support the timely study of a project.

Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

Projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process should not incur withdrawal penalties as the projects are not ultimately dropping out of the interconnection process and will still be responsible for network upgrades.  Also, projects in the 2022 cycle should also be eligible for the ERAS process given that cycle is still in an early phase and the cycle is likely to take years to complete.  If a project in the 2022 cycle is needed for reliability MISO should support its timely study and interconnection by allowing it to transition to the ERAS process.

Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

Option 1 provides a better matching of expedited projects and is Alliant Energy’s preferred path.

Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have an additional feedback to consider?

The current proposal has a process sunset date of 2028/2029.  Rather than having a firm end date, MISO should re-evaluate the process in 2028/2029 and be open to extending the process into the future.  There exists much uncertainty with how the timeliness of the regular queue process will improve and as well with how resource adequacy needs may grow.  There could be a need for an ongoing ERAS process with these uncertainties and MISO’s proposal to cap the number of applications that can be submitted into each queue cycle.  Load Serving Entities in MISO who are responsible for resource adequacy requirements must have a way to make sure projects needed for reliability can be studied and interconnected in a timely manner.

Alliant Energy again thanks MISO for taking on this important initiative.

MISO Expedited Resource Adequacy Study Proposal (PAC-2023-1)
NextEra Energy Resources Feedback
Due November 27, 2024

NextEra Energy Resources (NextEra) appreciates the opportunity to comment on MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal, as initially presented at the Planning Advisory Committee (PAC) meeting on November 13, and as a more substantive presentation at the ERAS Workshop on November 18.  NextEra appreciates that MISO is seeking solutions to its backlogged queue.  However, NextEra has serious concerns about addressing this issue through a proposal that discriminates against certain entities and is likely to have significant negative impacts on projects in the existing queue.     

Below are our initial comments on the ERAS proposal:

·   The ERAS queue is unduly discriminatory as currently proposed.  

o   A queue that allows only Load Serving Entities (LSEs) to submit projects is unduly discriminatory, anti-competitive, and inconsistent with FERC’s open access principles.  This approach excludes independent developers, the industry sector best positioned to get projects online.  Members of MISO’s Independent Power Producer (IPP) Sector have owned, operated, developed or supported more than 100 GW of generation capacity across the footprint.  IPPs are likely to have similarly situated projects as LSEs (or even more commercially ready projects), but will be summarily excluded from participation in the ERAs queue.  It's also speculative to assume that IPPs will participate in ERAS through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with LSEs, given that LSEs will be incentivized to self-build and most LSEs do not sign PPAs until projects are further along in the queue, usually after DP2 when there is more interconnection certainty. 

o   In addition, the ERAS proposal is likely to result in discrimination regarding resource type due to the absence of transparent, objective criteria defining the characteristics of qualifying projects.  Instead, the proposal defers the selection of projects to Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authorities (RERRA) with minimal criteria for selection.  This is highly likely to result in discriminatory treatment by resource type, depending on the preferences of the RERRA entities, and undermines the fairness of the process.  

o   Finally, while MISO is proposing a higher D1 non-refundable fee, ERAS projects would not be subject to withdrawal penalties.  This discriminates against projects in the existing queue by imposing substantially higher financial exposure than ERAS projects despite their lower priority.

·       ERAS could have significant negative impacts on the existing queue. 

o   MISO’s latest DPP status report shows that the queues are bogged down and significantly delayed, with nearly 60% of those delays coded as “MISO Delay.” The creation of a new process diverts MISO’s limited resources from addressing the existing backlog, likely exacerbating delays for current projects and leading to inefficiencies in resource allocation and utilization.  It’s highly unlikely that MISO staff will be able to develop new queue processes, implement those processes, and produce timely results, while simultaneously moving the current queue forward without additional delays. MISO has not explained how it will address the practical realities of staffing limitations to achieve these results.   

o   In addition, MISO has not shown that expedited projects coming out of ERAS will not drive up congestion and network upgrade costs for projects in the existing queue.  MISO has also not shown whether network upgrade costs for projects coming out of ERAS will be comparable to costs to projects in the existing queue, or if they will benefit from lower costs.  MISO must not favor ERAS projects at the expense of projects in the existing queue.  

o   Furthermore, allowing projects from prior cycles to switch to the ERAS queue disrupts those prior cycles due to withdrawals, causing further delays. 

·       MISO should focus on fixing its current queue instead of creating a new queue that will require substantial resources.  MISO’s current queue contains approximately 300 GW of requests.  Assuming a conservative 10% success rate (i.e., projects get to COD), which is lower than current queue realization rates, ~31 GW of resources would come on-line in the next three-to-five years.  As proposed, projects in ERAS must have a COD within two years of submission into the queue and would have additional 3-year grace period as allowed by the pro forma GIA.  A significant number of projects currently in the queue will be on-line before projects moving through ERAS.  MISO should prioritize improving and streamlining the current interconnection queue processes before implementing new, resource-intensive initiatives.  Enhancements to the existing queue system will benefit all stakeholders and lead to more efficient project deployment.

NextEra urges MISO not to pursue its ERAS proposal and focus on fixing its existing queue.  However, if MISO elects to move forward with a version of its proposal, NextEra provides the additional comments below:

·       The ERAS queue should not be exclusive to LSEs and should allow the best projects to be selected.  MISO has proposed that projects using the ERAS process may only be submitted by LSEs, excluding any other participants in this queue process.  This is discriminatory and neglects other projects that will come online during the desired timeframe and contribute to resource adequacy.  By only allowing LSEs to participate, MISO will be ignoring projects sponsored by IPPs that may be more shovel ready and likely to be built.  Restricting the ERAS process to LSEs also stifles competition and innovation by excluding IPPs and other potential market participants who often drive technological advancements and cost reductions.  MISO should instead open its ERAS queue to non-LSEs and focus on getting the best projects into its expedited track.  Opening the ERAS process to all project developers will foster a more competitive, innovative market environment, leading to better outcomes for reliability and cost effectiveness. 

·       The ERAS queue should allow submission of co-located generation and new loads, including by IPPs.  Rising load forecasts are being driven by large load additions, and there are benefits to bringing new generation resources on the system that are co-located with new loads.  Generation resources dedicated to serving new loads help to alleviate forecasted load growth and reduce concerns about resource adequacy shortfalls.  IPPs that commit to serve new loads at the same point of interconnection should be permitted to enter the ERAS queue.  MISO could require a demonstration of contractual arrangements between the IPP and the new load for qualification.  Projects designated to serve a specific load are not at greater risk of dropping out of the ERAS queue than other projects, so should not require additional assurances. These projects should be subject to the same criteria and obligations as other ERAS projects.

·       MISO should establish strong, objective entry criteria for qualification, including more stringent requirements than for projects in the existing queue.  MISO’s current proposal has limited criteria for entry into the ERAS queue, as the proposal largely leaves the selection to the discretion to the RERRA entity.  For example, use of the OMS proposal, which requires the project to be in a state Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), does not create strong enough criteria to ensure project readiness.  

o   Instead, MISO should establish strong objective entry criteria that establishes the requirements for access to the ERAS queue.  This could be based on a variety of factors, including project readiness criteria such as screening for offtake agreements, permit approvals, purchase orders, and construction agreements.  This would allow for selection of projects in a more transparent manner.

o   ERAS projects should also meet more stringent requirements than projects in the existing queue to ensure that they are truly shovel ready and will be completed within the desired timeline.  MISO has already proposed a 100% site control requirement and increased D1 non-refundable application fee, but MISO should also increase other milestone and study deposits.  Without enhanced entry criteria, it will be difficult for MISO to demonstrate to FERC that ERAS projects are not similarly situated with projects in the existing queue so as to justify preferential access to interconnection service. 

·       MISO should impose consequences for withdrawal from the ERAS queue. MISO has proposed that ERAS projects will not incur withdrawal penalties like projects in the existing queue. During the Nov. 18 Workshop MISO stated that the rationale for no financial withdrawal penalties is that, unlike cluster studies, there are no other projects for which to offset network upgrade costs. Additionally, MISO stated that the expectation for projects entering the ERAS queue is to get projects into service, so MISO does not expect withdrawals. 

o   While ERAS is not designed as a cluster study method, consequences should exist for project dropouts.  ERAS projects will receive substantial advantages over the existing queue and should be subject to higher financial withdrawal penalties to deter projects that will not reach COD.  If MISO does not impose withdrawal penalties on ERAS projects, this would be highly discriminatory against projects in the existing queue that will have both higher financial exposure and lower priority. 

o   In addition, MISO should consider additional non-financial penalties, such as barring a project sponsor from re-entering the ERAS process for 12-18 months from the time of the withdrawal.   Reliance on potential political ramifications of advancing projects that do not get into service is speculative and does not serve as a sufficient deterrent. 

o   Furthermore, MISO should not allow projects withdrawing from ERAS to re-enter their existing queue cycle.

·       MISO should take steps to ensure that renewables and storage resources are represented in the ERAS queue and ERAS is not used as a vehicle to discriminate by resource type. 

o   The current proposal lacks sufficient guardrails to prevent ERAS from being used in a discriminatory manner to favor certain classes of resources, such as natural gas resources.  Because the proposal lacks objective criteria, RERRA entities have the ability to select resources based on their preferred resource class rather than on project readiness or contribution to reliability.  Standalone storage and renewables paired with storage have the ability to contribute significantly to reliability while supporting clean energy goals.   As discussed above, MISO should establish objective criteria and ensure that these resources are eligible on a non-discriminatory basis for interconnection through ERAS.  

o   In addition, storage resources are often added to an existing generation resource through the surplus process.  When this is the case, MISO should allow the combined project, i.e. the original resource and the surplus storage resource, to be submitted as a project.  This is necessary to appropriately reflect the reliability contribution of the combined resource.

·       MISO should not allow projects that have passed DP2 to transition to ERAS.  Allowing projects that have passed DP2 to switch into the expedited queue will lead to withdrawals that will create further delays due to restudies.  This will magnify the negative effects on existing projects and create further discrepancy in treatment between ERAS projects and projects in the existing queue.  This could also create gaming opportunities to seek more favorable treatment in the ERAS queue.

·       MISO should ensure that Available Transmission Capacity (ATC) is not double counted. MISO has maintained that the ERAS method for studying projects by using the MTEP models does not double count the ATC that is being evaluated in the existing generation interconnection queue.  MISO has not provided sufficient details around the two methodologies to compare how the ATC is being accounted for in the two study processes. MISO should demonstrate how the models do not double count the same ATC or otherwise disadvantage existing queue positions’ access to transmission system capacity relative to later-queued ERAS projects.

·       MISO should clarify assumption of network upgrade costs and affected systems risk by ERAS projects. MISO stated during the Nov. 18 Workshop that projects submitted into the ERAS process would be subject to all upgrade costs that result from Affected Systems Studies, even if unknown at the time of GIA execution.  MISO should make that obligation explicit in the tariff language.  MISO should also provide clear and transparent guidelines on the allocation of network upgrade costs. ERAS projects should not benefit from lower costs at the expense of projects in the existing queue, and cost allocation should be equitable and based on objective criteria.  MISO should explicitly outline in the tariff the framework for ERAS projects to assume network upgrade cost responsibility in a manner that is comparable to non-ERAS projects. MISO should also provide clear processes for updating and communicating these costs to project sponsors.

·       ERAS should be limited to a one-time process.  MISO is currently proposing to sunset ERAS by the 2028/2029 cycle.  While the proposal should have a firm sunset date, the current date is too far in the future.  This proposal is intended to be applied on a short-term basis to address near-term resource adequacy needs.  If MISO moves forward with ERAS, MISO should only apply it on a one-time basis to minimize disruption to the existing queue.  

·       Regular Reporting and Stakeholder Engagement:  MISO should provide regular and transparent reports to stakeholders on the status of the ERAS queue, including project progress, interconnection timelines, and identified challenges.  MISO should also submit periodic informational filings to FERC.

NextEra appreciates MISO’s consideration of these comments and the opportunity to engage with MISO and stakeholders as this proposal develops.

The Arkansas Public Service Commission welcomes MISO’s efforts to accommodate state reliability needs and receptivity to comments regarding its ERAS proposal, including MISO’s commitment to act with the OMS to determine the documentation a RERRA could provide to MISO identifying that a project is needed for maintaining resource adequacy.  The Arkansas Public Service Commission encourages MISO to continue that outreach and posits that a simple attestation by the RERRA would be sufficient for a project to be recognized by the RERRA as supporting resource adequacy, if the language is sufficiently tailored.

The Arkansas Public Service Commission encourages MISO to not automatically sunset the ERAS proposal when the queue reaches one year but continue the ERAS process until such time as MISO’s proposed Generation Interconnection Queue Cap, if approved by FERC, is sunset as well. The Arkansas Public Service Commission believes that the ERAS process is tailored sufficiently to minimize projects which would be included and would not present an undue burden on the Generation Interconnection Queue study process. Therefore, in the interests in maintaining options for RERRAs to meet their resource adequacy needs, the Arkansas Public Service Commission would recommend that MISO not sunset ERAS.  If the Queue becomes sufficiently expedient, it may not be necessary for ERAS to be utilized, but the future is never certain, and maintaining ERAS, even if unused, allows a safety valve which may be needed in the future.     

The Arkansas Public Service Commission is also sympathetic to the idea of a limit on the number of projects an LSE can place through the ERAS process.  However, were MISO to impose such a cap, it should be based on each LSE, such as some percentage of that LSE’s prior year’s peak load so that each LSE remained able to respond to resource adequacy needs in their territory.  A defined cap would also be helpful for the RERRAs to determine which projects, if any, would be necessary for resource adequacy.  

The Arkansas Public Service Commission shares concerns about gaming transmission constraints as well.  There should not be a scenario where an LSE uses the ERAS process to avoid paying necessary transmission upgrade costs, and increase interconnection costs to others. This could frustrate other LSE’s attempts to interconnect generation, which may simply lead to more projects being placed into the ERAS process.

Regarding exit fees, the Arkansas Public Service Commission does not believe that ERAS projects should face exit fees were they to drop out of the Generation Interconnection Queue if they are truly needed for Resource Adequacy, which is a requirement to be in the ERAS process.  If a project initially does not meet the requirements to be in ERAS, then later does meet the requirements, it should be allowed to move into ERAS without penalty as such penalty would likely be incurred only because of the Generation Interconnection Queue delays.  Further, penalizing LSEs from engaging in ERAS  if they meet the requirements could be detrimental to the maintenance of resource adequacy.

Alternatively, if MISO maintains its belief that exit fees are warranted, the Arkansas Public Service Commission would propose that exit fees should only be incurred for LSEs moving from the Generation Interconnection Queue to ERAS if those LSEs could have gone through ERAS program and chose not to do so. If an LSE has a project in the Generation Interconnection Queue prior to the ERAS program being approved by FERC, then it could not have entered the ERAS program had it met the requirements to do so and therefore should not be penalized for acting in the best interest of their retail customers via the only methods available at the time.

The Arkansas Public Service Commission does not believe that the ERAS will be used often and does not believe that it should be used often.  It is a process of last resort, but one that is greatly needed in the event that FERC approves MISO’s upcoming Generation Interconnection Queue Cap filing. The Arkansas Public Service Commission appreciate’ s MISO’s acceptance of its feedback and looks forward to working toward a more refined proposal.

Cordelio appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on MISO’s Expediated Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) process. Cordelio has significant concerns with this proposal, which we find to be discriminatory by threatening open access, which will harm projects currently in the queue. Essentially, this change would comprise a discriminatory mid-stream rule change, undermining the circumstances under which project sponsors submitted their original filings. Additionally, Cordelio is concerned that this proposal will fail to achieve MISO’s resource adequacy goals. Cordelio encourages MISO to work with stakeholders to develop policies that will support resource adequacy without threatening open access.

ERAS is unjust to projects in the current queue

MISO’s proposal will confer significant benefits on ERAS projects (and, accordingly, will impose a significant detriment on all other projects). ERAS projects would effectively be “jumping the queue”, will not be subject to withdrawal penalties, and will be entitled to preferred access to transmission capacity. Additionally, these projects will consume MISO staff and technology resources away from projects that have been in the queue for years, which continue to sit behind significant delays.

The ERAS proposal would give MISO the authority to decide which projects are granted, and which are denied these benefits. This type of power over commercial outcomes appears to us to be an overstep of MISO’s authority.

ERAS will not solve resource adequacy concerns

MISO predicates the ERAS process on imminent resource adequacy needs. However, MISO provides insufficient details on the scope, location, and timing of the resource adequacy needs it seeks to address. Cordelio is concerned that, contrary to intention, MISO’s ERAS proposal will exacerbate resource adequacy concerns. Projects in the current GI queue are capable of meeting resource adequacy needs as much as any hypothetical ERAS project. Currently queued projects are already facing MISO delays, Transmission Owner delays, and supply chain issues. The ERAS proposal does not address any of these issues. ERAS projects will be as likely to be delayed by these factors as current GI projects. However, creating multiple, separate queues will only exacerbate the restudy delays that characterize the existing queue, leading to worse outcomes for both queues, and in particular for the non-ERAS projects.

Cordelio Responses to MISO Questions

1. Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

No, Cordelio does not agree with the qualification requirements for ERAS projects, as detailed below.

The resource adequacy need is poorly defined

MISO did not share any information about the resource adequacy need it is trying to address in materials for the ERAS workshop. Cordelio requests that in future presentations, MISO share a detailed analysis of the projected resource adequacy need including the following: timeline, location of need, and amount of shortfall.

Any attempt to create a second, advantaged queue for resource adequacy needs a clear definition of the gap that is being filled. If MISO were to start an ERAS process, the process should define the need in each capacity zone and only allow that specific amount of capacity to be studied. Additionally, any project admitted to ERAS should also have the obligation to prove that they are the only project capable of meeting the identified need (and likewise, that no other project in the queue could meet that defined need). This requirement would also serve as a capping mechanism, similar to MISO’s current proposal to cap the GI queue.

ERAS projects should be subject to withdrawal penalties

ERAS projects should be subject to greater financial commitments and penalties than GI queue projects. We believe that this would be appropriate since these same projects are being granted significant benefits through preferred and expedited access to interconnection. MISO has also proposed that ERAS project be immune from withdrawal penalties, which seems in opposition to FERC’s mandate for withdrawal penalties in Order 2023-A.

Cordelio requests that MISO share a side-by-side comparison of proposed financial commitments, at-risk payments, and penalties for both ERA and GI projects.

2.) Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

Allowing projects to move from one queue to another will only create more restudies, delays, and chaos in the queue. The issue of projects transferring from one queue to another highlights one of the many reason ERAS is unjust and will exacerbate queue delays for almost all projects currently in the queue.  

3.) Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

Cordelio does not have a strong opinion on Option 1 or Option 2.

4.) Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have an additional feedback to consider?

Cordelio recommends that MISO withdraw the ERAs proposal.

The Arkansas Public Service Commission welcomes MISO’s efforts to accommodate state reliability needs and receptivity to comments regarding its ERAS proposal, including MISO’s commitment to act with the OMS to determine the documentation a RERRA could provide to MISO identifying that a project is needed for maintaining resource adequacy.  The Arkansas Public Service Commission encourages MISO to continue that outreach and posits that a simple attestation by the RERRA would be sufficient for a project to be recognized by the RERRA as supporting resource adequacy, if the language is sufficiently tailored.

The Arkansas Public Service Commission encourages MISO to not automatically sunset the ERAS proposal when the queue reaches one year but continue the ERAS process until such time as MISO’s proposed Generation Interconnection Queue Cap, if approved by FERC, is sunset as well. The Arkansas Public Service Commission believes that the ERAS process is tailored sufficiently to minimize projects which would be included and would not present an undue burden on the Generation Interconnection Queue study process. Therefore, in the interests in maintaining options for RERRAs to meet their resource adequacy needs, the Arkansas Public Service Commission would recommend that MISO not sunset ERAS.  If the Queue becomes sufficiently expedient, it may not be necessary for ERAS to be utilized, but the future is never certain, and maintaining ERAS, even if unused, allows a safety valve which may be needed in the future.     

The Arkansas Public Service Commission is also sympathetic to the idea of a limit on the number of projects an LSE can place through the ERAS process.  However, were MISO to impose such a cap, it should be based on each LSE, such as some percentage of that LSE’s prior year’s peak load so that each LSE remained able to respond to resource adequacy needs in their territory.  A defined cap would also be helpful for the RERRAs to determine which projects, if any, would be necessary for resource adequacy.  

The Arkansas Public Service Commission shares concerns about gaming transmission constraints as well.  There should not be a scenario where an LSE uses the ERAS process to avoid paying necessary transmission upgrade costs, and increase interconnection costs to others. This could frustrate other LSE’s attempts to interconnect generation, which may simply lead to more projects being placed into the ERAS process.

Regarding exit fees, the Arkansas Public Service Commission does not believe that ERAS projects should face exit fees were they to drop out of the Generation Interconnection Queue if they are truly needed for Resource Adequacy, which is a requirement to be in the ERAS process.  If a project initially does not meet the requirements to be in ERAS, then later does meet the requirements, it should be allowed to move into ERAS without penalty as such penalty would likely be incurred only because of the Generation Interconnection Queue delays.  Further, penalizing LSEs from engaging in ERAS  if they meet the requirements could be detrimental to the maintenance of resource adequacy.

Alternatively, if MISO maintains its belief that exit fees are warranted, the Arkansas Public Service Commission would propose that exit fees should only be incurred for LSEs moving from the Generation Interconnection Queue to ERAS if those LSEs could have gone through ERAS program and chose not to do so. If an LSE has a project in the Generation Interconnection Queue prior to the ERAS program being approved by FERC, then it could not have entered the ERAS program had it met the requirements to do so and therefore should not be penalized for acting in the best interest of their retail customers via the only methods available at the time.

The Arkansas Public Service Commission does not believe that the ERAS will be used often and does not believe that it should be used often.  It is a process of last resort, but one that is greatly needed in the event that FERC approves MISO’s upcoming Generation Interconnection Queue Cap filing. The Arkansas Public Service Commission appreciate’ s MISO’s acceptance of its feedback and looks forward to working toward a more refined proposal.

The OMS Transmission Planning Work Group (TPWG) provides this feedback to MISO on its ERAS proposal as discussed at the PAC and ERAS Workshop. This feedback is from an OMS work group and does not represent a position of the OMS Board of Directors.

The TPWG appreciates MISO’s efforts to develop an accelerated generation interconnection study process intended to meet the emergent resource adequacy needs of the footprint. However, several work group members have significant concerns and questions about the practical and legal implications of the proposal and stress that any final process must work with state processes. To ensure compatibility, we support further exploration of the ERAS framework in close consultation with OMS members, LSEs, and other Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authorities in the MISO footprint.

Slide 4 of MISO’s ERAS Workshop presentation states that ERAS will include a sunset date in the Tariff to ensure “the process ceases no later than [the] 2028/29 queue cycle.” The TPWG believes this provision is misguided and that the ERAS process should not automatically sunset on an arbitrary timeline. Rather, MISO should demonstrate for at least two queue cycles that interconnection requests can be processed in one year before ERAS can be determined to be no longer necessary.

Finally, the TPWG appreciates MISO’s inclusion of this work group’s RERRA exemption strawman in helping determine which interconnection requests qualify for the ERAS process. That said, we recommend that MISO not be overly prescriptive in its description of what constitutes a state’s or a RERRA’s resource adequacy need. That process should largely be left to each state or RERRA to dictate.

OMS will continue to monitor the evolution of the ERAS proposal through the OMS Resource Adequacy Committee and the OMS Transmission Planning Work Group and expects to provide more detailed feedback once the ERAS proposal is more fully developed and states have had more time to work through the implications of this proposal.

The Environmental Sector appreciates the opportunity to respond to MISO’s feedback request concerning its proposed Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) under PAC-2023-1. MISO outlined four questions in its feedback request, which we respond to in turn. Below we provide a shorter summary of our feedback, followed by comments regarding the lack of need for ERAS in the first place, and finally answers to MISO’s specific questions. 

Summary:

• MISO has not shown the need for a separate ERAS study to interconnect new capacity resources.

  • There is already a large amount of signed GIAs for new generation that could be used as capacity resources.

  • OMS Survey results suggest enough new capacity could reach GIA via MISO’s standard interconnection process.

  • MISO typically assumes approximately 20% of the MW in the interconnection queue reach GIA, which would mean over 20 GW of storage and storage hybrids would likely be available from the applications currently in MISO’s queue.

  • Recent and future changes in economics and energy policy may reduce retirements to the point where ERAS would not be needed.

• If MISO moves forward with ERAS, tighter application criteria are necessary. Specifically, ERAS projects should have the following (a non-exclusive list):

• A clear showing to meet resource adequacy need

• 100% site control

• A minimum amount of engineering design work complete

• Procurement agreements for long-lead time equipment

• Fuel contracts to ensure fuel availability at the time of COD

• CPCN when required (no delay allowed for process to obtain CPCN or similar); and

• Prior submission of any necessary permit applications for their projects.

• If MISO moves forward with ERAS, protections for existing interconnection customers are necessary.

  • ERAS projects should not be eligible for the three-year extension provided to standard interconnection queue projects. We suggest the required application/GIA COD be within 2 years with only a 1-year grace period after that.

  • Any extension of COD allowed should come with significant financial penalties.

  • ERAS projects should face the same or higher financial risks and penalties.

  • Any resource that withdraws from either the ERAS study or an existing queue cycle should be subject to MISO tariff defined withdrawal penalties.

  • If MISO decides to allow ERAS projects to withdraw without penalties, it should also allow all interconnection projects in any queue cycle the option to pay $100,000 upfront in lieu of withdrawal penalties.

  • If projects are allowed to withdraw from an existing interconnection cycle, projects should be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process regardless of which cycle such a project is in.

  • MISO must ensure that ERAS projects do not cause increased interconnection costs or delays for interconnection customers in its standard process.

  • ERAS should not favor generation projects developed and owned by Investor Owned Utilities.

  • If approved, MISO should limit ERAS to a single study cycle.

Need for ERAS

While MISO’s fourth question includes “any additional feedback,” the Environmental Sector believes that MISO and stakeholders need to first determine whether an interconnection queue bypass is even needed to meet MISO’s resource adequacy requirements through the end of this decade; and if something is needed, what other options exist besides ERAS. While we agree that more projects need to find a faster path to interconnection (see our prior stakeholder feedback regarding the interconnection queue cap proposal), we believe that MISO’s analysis leading to its conclusion that we need ERAS should fall under greater scrutiny–a step that MISO has glossed over in this current effort.

As such, we start with a few questions and comments:

• To what extent is MISO’s ERAS proposal founded in the results of the most recent OMS-MISO Survey? To the extent that MISO’s ERAS proposal is indeed founded at least in part by the results of the most recent OMS-MISO Survey, MISO should update that analysis in the following ways: 

  • The 2021 data should be treated as an outlier because of COVID, and thus should not be included in analysis used to estimate future trends. 

  • The June 20, 2024 OMS-MISO Survey Results presentation indicated that 2023 numbers were not ready, but such numbers most certainly are ready today. We request that MISO and OMS update the analysis used for ERAS with 2023 data. 

  • Irrespective of past accredited capacity additions, the sharp increase in new interconnecting storage resources can be a potential positive inflection point if embraced by MISO.

  • In contrast to the 2024 OMS-MISO Survey Results, S&P Global anticipated the net addition of 11GW of capacity additions for 2024. This is far in excess of the 2.3GW average cited in the OMS-MISO Survey, and almost double MISO’s alternative value of 6.1GW per year. If the S&P Global analysis even partially holds true, this would represent a significant shift in the amount of new capacity that could likely meet MISO’s resource adequacy needs over the next several years.

• There are currently more than 319GW of active projects in the interconnection queue. Assuming 20 percent of these achieve a signed GIA, this additional capacity should be enough to address MISO’s resource adequacy needs. Please explain why these projects can’t meet MISO’s perceived resource adequacy challenges in light of our comments related to the OMS-MISO Survey above.

• Of that 319GW of active projects, there are currently more than 59GW of storage and another 66GW of storage-hybrid projects in the interconnection queue. Of this more than 116GW total, 66GW requested to interconnect by 2026. Assuming only 20 percent of those projects meet completion, one could infer that more than 13.2 GW of storage and storage-hybrid projects could be online by 2026. Storage and storage-hybrid projects have the type of flexibility and accreditation needed to meet MISO’s accreditation needs by the end of this decade (we recognize that hybrid resources are accredited with the non-storage resource type that is part of the hybrid, but because of the presence of storage in these hybrids, hybrids will substantially outperform other non-hybrid resources in their respective assigned classes). In light of all this, please explain the need for ERAS. 

• There are over 55GW of generation projects with signed GIAs that can also contribute to meeting MISO’s resource adequacy needs.

• In terms of addressing capacity lost from retirements, MISO’s Generator Replacement and Surplus Interconnection processes offer solutions already in place for quick interconnection of new capacity.

• MISO is at a high risk of forgoing less costly and more creative solutions to meet new growth by not engaging more with stakeholders on actual policy mechanisms that MISO can use to meet its future resource adequacy needs. For example, it would be more effective for MISO to develop a “bring your own generation” model for new large load additions. If done properly, this could allow large loads to connect even faster.

• In addition, we urge MISO, its states, and member utilities to consider potential changes in energy policy and update their generator retirement assumptions relative to resource adequacy planning. A reduction in planned retirements prior to 2028/2029 when MISO expects to have its interconnection process on track to complete cycles annually further shows the lack of need for this short-term ERAS process. 

In light of the above remarks on the need for ERAS, we generally do not support pursuing the ERAS process at this time. And to the extent that MISO believes something like ERAS is necessary, we believe that MISO is being too quick to reach its own solution without exploring other ideas from the stakeholder community. Should MISO continue to pursue an ERAS solution, our answers to the following questions suggest improvements to MISO’s proposal that we believe are necessary before it is filed with FERC. In particular, these improvements would reduce impacts on existing interconnection customers, and make it more likely that MISO’s proposal could meet the Commission’s just and reasonable standard.

Question 1: Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

• Across the board, there should be strict readiness requirements for any project utilizing ERAS, with such requirements exceeding those necessary for the regular interconnection queue study process. For example, ERAS projects should have 100% site control at the time of application, a minimum amount of engineering design work complete, procurement agreements for long-lead time equipment, fuel contracts to ensure fuel availability at the time of COD, and submission of any necessary permit applications for their projects.

• ERAS projects should not be eligible for the three-year extension provided to standard interconnection queue projects. The point of ERAS is to get projects online quickly, and if a project can’t do it within three years then it is defeating the purpose of ERAS. Moreover, if ERAS projects are getting the “privilege” of skipping the queue, they shouldn’t get the additional privilege of extensions.

  • We suggest the required application/GIA COD be within 2 years of the submission and Section 2.3.1 of the pro forma GIA, with only a 1-year grace period after that.

  • During the workshop, MISO stated that its standard GIA allows for a three-year extension and this is why they had to offer it to ERAS projects too. MISO will have to file tariff adjustments to implement ERAS, and a minor adjustment to eliminate the option for ERAS projects to request an extension of their COD would be a minor additional change to make.

  • If FERC legal requirements prohibit MISO from prohibiting extensions for ERAS projects, then MISO should implement strict readiness requirements and penalties (perhaps on a daily basis) for any delay beyond one year from the original COD. 

• Regarding penalties, MISO indicated that it doesn’t know where it would distribute any penalty receipts, thus it is very reluctant to include them in ERAS. We believe existing interconnection customers will be harmed and funds from ERAS project penalties could be directed to existing and prospective interconnection queues. We ask that MISO look creatively at who is harmed from both the ERAS program as a whole, and from the consequences of an ERAS project either dropping out or interconnecting late. The same logic that applies to increasing penalties for projects under ER24-340 applies here, so we question why the incentive provided by financial penalties to avoid withdrawals or to enter the queue in the first place is not seriously under consideration here. 

• For projects required to obtain a CPCN or similar, eligibility for ERAS should be contingent on obtaining a CPCN or similar under the timeframe required by ERAS. If a state commission or other regulatory body sees a project as needing to take the ERAS track, then it should be able to expedite any CPCN or similar process to the extent that may be necessary. An ERAS project should not be permitted to delay its interconnection because of a state CPCN or similar process, which would defeat the purpose of ERAS to meet perceived resource adequacy needs by the end of the decade.

• For states that do not have a CPCN or similar process, it is not clear what MISO will require from such states to ensure that a proposed ERAS project is necessary. 

  • Moreover, in FERC’s January 19, 2024 rejection on MISO’s initial queue cap filing (ER24-340, 341) FERC noted (para. 174):

    • “proposed GIP section 4.1.2.1 does not contain an attestation requirement (much less one tied to fulfilling a state reliability or policy need), and would require merely that the RERRA ‘request[ ] in writing that Transmission Provider include such project in such DPP cluster study.’ That text does not require that the RERRA’s attestation for a particular interconnection request be tied to state reliability or policy needs. Thus, as proposed by MISO, there is potential for interconnection requests exempted pursuant to GIP section 4.1.2.1 to enter the queue cycle beyond the cap based on a mere ‘request’ by the RERRA, and without any offsetting benefit to resource adequacy or reliability.”

  • MISO should thus ensure that any certification by a state that a project should proceed under ERAS be accompanied by a clear showing of that project’s need to ensure resource adequacy in order to meet accreditation requirements. 

• We appreciate that MISO has not placed a cap on the number of projects per LSE that could be eligible for the ERAS program as this opens up the possibility for a more distributed approach to meeting resource adequacy needs. How will MISO consider a portfolio of projects (e.g. a portfolio acting together as a virtual power plant) that might be proposed under ERAS to meet a state’s perceived resource adequacy needs? In such a case, how would MISO treat any effects such a portfolio under ERAS might have on projects existing in the regular interconnection queue? How would MISO treat only the partial completion of such a portfolio?

Question 2: Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

• We do not agree with MISO that ERAS projects should not be subject to automatic withdrawal penalties. This would not result in comparable treatment between parties in the ERAS interconnection study, and those in MISO’s standard interconnection study process. Any resource that withdraws from either the ERAS study or an existing queue cycle, should be subject to MISO tariff defined withdrawal penalties.

• If MISO decides to allow ERAS projects to withdraw without penalties, it should also allow all interconnection projects in any queue cycle the option to pay $100,000 upfront in lieu of withdrawal penalties.

• If projects are allowed to withdraw from an existing interconnection cycle, projects should be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process irregardless of which cycle such a project is in, 2023 and earlier.

• Consistent with the above, ERAS projects should not be permitted to extend their interconnection timeline without serious penalties that will incentivize timely interconnection. 

Question 3: Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outlined in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline? 

• If approved, we urge MISO to limit ERAS to a single study cycle to address any limited and immediate need for new capacity.  Limiting to one ERAS cycle will also provide incentive for MISO and its Transmission Owners to improve existing interconnection process timelines going forward.  

  • If that direction is not filed, we absolutely support MISO’s inclusion of a sunset date that corresponds with MISO’s Order 2023 obligations. ERAS should not be a reason for requesting any extension of MISO’s Order 2023 obligations, and we hope MISO will commit to this in writing when making any possible ERAS filing at FERC.

  • And between Option 1 and Option 2, the Environmental Sector does not have a preference or opinion regarding this question at this time.

Question 4: Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider?

• Please provide more clarity on who you expect to be the RERRA for RA purposes in all MISO states. 

• How will MISO ensure that projects that are in the interconnection queue are not harmed by ERAS projects? If an ERAS project requires network upgrades, how will such costs be allocated? If an ERAS project absorbs available capability on the network, triggering upgrades for projects already in MISO’s regular interconnection queue, how will those affected projects already in the queue be compensated for the cost they incur that would not have occurred but for the ERAS projects?

• Has MISO undertaken an analysis on what kind of impact ERAS would have on its human resources? To the extent that MISO is counting on Juicebox to relieve some of its staffing constraints with respect to interconnection queue delays, how much of that relief will be eaten up by ERAS?

• During the ERAS workshop, we requested that MISO provide a comparison of financial amounts at risk for ERAS compared to the current interconnection queue. Please provide such a comparison. Please also provide a side-by-side comparison of the costs, timeline, and any other material aspects between a project in a normal interconnection queue cycle and a project under the ERAS program. 

• How does ERAS not favor projects developed and owned by Investor Owned Utilities over the same type of projects developed and owned by other entities? What is the justification for only allowing LSEs to submit ERAS projects?  How does ERAS comply with FERC’s open access transmission tariff? 

NG Renewables appreciates the opportunity to comment on this issue and offers the following feedback on the new ERAs proposal. First, the ERAS proposal lacks metrics to ensure resource adequacy that it purports to incent. Second, the ERAS proposal is discriminatory in its eligibility. Finally, the ERAS proposal is an ineffective way to achieve the goal of improving the queue process.

First, we note that providing metrics for resource adequacy is one of the express obligations and services that an RTO provides, and MISO does so through setting a planning reserve margin and accrediting resources so that they can provide zonal resource credits (ZRCs) to the region. This methodology and approach are extensively vetted through the stakeholder process and by FERC. NG Renewables fears that this proposal causes MISO to deviate from this well-established process and delegates their resource adequacy obligation it to a different entity with few to no MISO guardrails. The proposed state qualification of reliability resources is a new and therefore highly unclear process and would likely be highly variable from state to state if approved. This lack of transparency and consistency is unacceptable. If MISO pursues queue priority for certain resources, it should be through a set of transparent, stakeholder approved criteria. MISO should not forfeit its obligation to ensure resource adequacy via vetted standards and metrics.

Additionally, from a more granular methodology perspective, the ERAs proposal alleges that there are specific resources that are more critical than others to mitigate the resource adequacy issues in MISO. However, there is no evidence or metrics to show that resources currently in the standard queue would not be comparable or preferable to resources that might be designated to be fast-tracked through the ERAs process. Without this evidence, MISO may unintentionally allow prioritization of one resource over another when they could be essentially the same from a resource adequacy perspective.

Second, the ERAs process is discriminatory, as it offers significantly lower risk for a significantly higher benefit. MISO noted that ERAs projects may not face withdrawal penalties (as resources in the standard queue currently do). This creates an adverse incentive for projects with a lower risk tolerance (more “speculative” projects) to enter the ERAs queue because they will receive the benefit of preferable treatment. The tradeoff MISO proposes is that only “shovel ready” projects that will come online in the next 3-5 years will be eligible. However, MISO has provided no standards that will ensure that these projects will in fact come online in a timely manner. The ERAs queue could therefore be flooded with projects that have a longer timeline to COD, and therefore, a higher risk of failing to materialize given all the hurdles (permitting, procurement, etc.) that still must be met. For a separate queue with preferential treatment, MISO should implement both the same standards that apply to generators in the standard interconnection queue, as well as a robust series of additional requirements that ensure the resource will come online in a timely manner and that will raise the financial commitment and risk tolerance necessary to proceed. Such requirements might include total site control and Tx site control, no option for financial commitment alternatives to site control, significantly higher deposits, removal of the COD extension grace period. However, all of this would be highly complex to implement, and NG Renewables notes that these resources could easily come online more quickly using the existing, approved PGIA process.

Additionally, NG Renewables contends that the ERAs proposal is inherently discriminatory in its eligibility. In its current form, LSEs are the only entity allowed to submit projects into this queue. If the intent is to bring reliable resources online quickly, then this proposal excludes submissions from the entities most well-seated to construct projects quickly: independent developers.

Third, the ERAs proposal is excessively complicated and will retract from MISOs goal of improving queue studies and processing interconnection requests more quickly. The ERAs process is effectively an additional queue process, studied in parallel to the conventional queue. Taking on an additional queue cycle is, at face value, something that MISO has repeatedly noted would be currently difficult to impossible to handle given their resource constraints. We are confused as to why this is seemingly no longer the case. In addition to the initial difficulty of conducting two studies at once, there are queue priority issues that come into question. If two sets of generators are being studied, generators from both groups may take up the same transmission headroom that exists on the system at that time. This double counting issue could lead to facilities being severely overloaded, which seems counter to system reliability. MISO has noted that neither of these groups will be accountable for this overloading, but suggested in the November 18^th workshop that the following ERAs group would pick up the tab for upgrades caused by this double counting. This neither makes intuitive sense, nor follows well established but-for cost causation principles. If this is not the case, and the two parallel studies are forced to contend with who will be liable to paying for the same transmission upgrade, or different upgrades intended to resolve the same constraint, there is no clear way that the cost allocation would be resolved. Additionally, it would also render the standard 3-phase DPP queue moot, as the upgrade cost estimates provided at each stage would be fundamentally incomplete.

Finally, NG Renewables offers some logistical feedback on the ERAS proposal.

The time limit on the ERAs proposal is appropriate, but it is unclear whether this limit is an estimated phase-out date or a hard cap on the length of the ERAS program. The latter (a hard limit) should be applied if ERAs is pursued, which, given the above concerns NG Renewables believes MISO should not.

NG Renewables will also note that MISO is attempting to create an entirely new parallel queue process in close to 1 month with the period for stakeholder feedback pushed over the holiday season. This does not feel like adequate due diligence and feedback for such a substantive change.

In summary, the ERAs process looks to provide a select few projects a preferable fast track, without ensuring that these projects will come online in a timely manner or provide superior resource adequacy value by any MISO-measured metric. The proposal, in fact, sets the stage for extreme added complexity, significant delays in both queues, and undue discrimination against hundreds of reliable resources.

ERAS effectively achieves the same result as the RERRA exemption, which was rejected by FERC as discriminatory, with minimal changes. While NG Renewables intimately understands MISOs queue delays and can empathize with the difficulty of remedying the backlog, this proposal is still inappropriate in that it explicitly enables discriminatory queue jumping.  ERAs allows a vague and unvetted class of resources to be prioritized rather than working on what MISO has previous stated as their goal: improving the queue process overall. The ERAs proposal would create a brand-new private highway to grid connection for LSEs, while neglecting existing roads riddled with potholes for the majority of interconnection customers.  

NG Renewables believes that the MISO ERAS proposal is fundamentally flawed, and rather than try to incrementally iterate on ERAS, MISO should pursue an entirely different solution. NG Renewables would suggest iterating on the existing vetted PGIA process or establishing queue priority through a comprehensive set of vetted criteria, as NG Renewables has suggested to staff and before FERC.

REVISED

CGA appreciates the opportunity to comment on MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal.

1. The ERAS proposal is unjustified in terms of near-term resource adequacy (RA) needs.  There isn’t evidence of an urgent need to deviate from just and reasonable existing interconnection queue processes.  Further, the current queue processes are working better and better under recent reforms.    

• MISO has not demonstrated an urgent need for a drastic change in interconnection policies and processes like MISO proposes.  The interconnection rate highlighted in the 2024 MISO-OMS RA Survey creates false alarm.
  • Although the 2.3 GW average annual interconnection rate for 2020-22 was highlighted in the 2024 MISO-OMS RA Survey and has been used as a cause for concern, that sample time period includes 2021, a year heavily affected by Covid and supply chain problems, but omits 2023, a year with improved interconnection.  So, the rate is understated because the effects of the recent queue process improvements have not yet been realized, or quantified, because it is too early to do so. 
  • Less than a week ago, MISO testified to a much higher expected annual interconnection rate (14.3 GW) as being sufficient to maintain resource adequacy.  (See FERC Docket No. ER25-507.)  Indeed, as MISO explained in that testimony, “from 2025 to 2042 and adding to the existing active Interconnection Requests already in the queue…MISO believes there will be adequate throughput … to meet our future Resource Adequacy needs even with a queue cap of 50% of the non-coincidental peak load.”   
  • Given expectations for interconnection rates to rise going forward even with a queue cap, the hastily proposed and ill-conceived ERAS proposal isn’t needed in the first place.  In fact, without the unnecessary proposed queue cap, MISO might be able to achieve even higher annual interconnection rates.  Further, if MISO were to delay thermal retirements through SSR requirements, then there would be even less need for the proposed ERAS processes.

• MISO has not shown why improving the queue to address RA needs wouldn’t be more effective.  
• If, conservatively speaking, only 10% of the interconnection queue got to GIA and in service, then more than 31GW would be added.
• MISO has made significant changes to the queue process that will clearly speed things up. This includes the stricter site control and financial commitments imposed in the recent queue reform, Order 2023 compliance, the recently proposed MW cap, and the implementation of automation software that MISO says will dramatically reduce the queue process timelines.
• When asked why these improvements are not enough to address the impending RA shortages during the November 18^th workshop, MISO said the problem is that older clusters are clogged and delayed. This answer clearly shows that the problem is not a “slow” queue process in general, it’s the issues that are facing projects at the end of the process. Therefore, MISO should focus their efforts on those problems first and foremost before implementing a whole new path to interconnection that is problematic in ways explained above.
• MISO should review existing tools and processes at its disposal before jumping blindly into ERAS. For example, MISO has Provisional GIA and Annual Studies processes that can be utilized for projects that LSEs or states deem necessary for Resource Adequacy.
• With the large amount of projects in the queue, LSEs should be able to find projects that could meet their “resource adequacy” needs. There are projects at every stage, with many achieving COD soon.

• If, for the sake of argument, there are looming RA shortfalls, then MISO should address those shortfalls through other approaches that are just and reasonable and non-discriminatory.  
  • The ERAS proposal doesn’t satisfy those standards, so (even in the absence of RA shortfalls) MISO should instead focus on unsticking signed GIA projects, facilitating surplus interconnection, removing barriers to storage interconnection, among other worthwhile reforms.  
  • Creating an entirely new queue process that conflicts with the existing queue process would only serve to slow down the interconnection queue and perversely worsen the RA situation.  Moreover, restricting generator and storage access to the grid through the interconnection queue would be unjust and unreasonable, while creating a preferred class of ERAS projects would be unduly discriminatory against queued projects.

2. The ERAS proposal would be ineffective.  There are no guardrails to ensure new ERAS generation can address RA shortfalls on the timeline needed.
   
   

• MISO has noted that one of the primary causes for the queue delays is MISO’s lack of resources to study the generator requests.  If MISO addressed this issue, they would also address the RA issues.  This is going to cause more work for MISO and TO and other RTOs when they already struggle to meet interconnection timelines.
• The ERAS processes will be complicated and could fail.  That would harm RA directly and would cause delays in the interconnection queue that would harm RA even more.   
• There are no assurances that ERAS will help ensure that Local Clearing Requirements are met.
• There are no assurances that the RDTL (or SRPBC) will allow ERAS projects to help RA on a regional level.
• Queued energy storage projects should have a viable path in ERAS due to quicker COD timelines, NRIS coverage, and high capacity accreditation – all of which are good for RA.  But that won’t matter if MISO doesn’t improve energy storage interconnection studies and processes.  Thus, the ERAS proposal won’t be as effective as it should be because MISO is not addressing the root problems with storage interconnection. 
  • The harm from not addressing those core problems is a significant opportunity cost of MISO diverting resources and attention to work on the ERAS proposal.  That’s because the ongoing root problems with storage interconnections create unjust and unreasonable barriers to (capacity) market entry for storage.  Thus, the ERAS proposal would (additionally) unduly discriminate against storage.
• MISO has completely failed to demonstrate how a separate and new queue process will overcome any of the hurdles being faced in the DPP queue that are slowing down generation.  How will ERAS overcome the lack of equipment or lack of construction labor? Without an answer, a new parallel queue only makes the problem worse.
• It could be more effective for MISO to develop a “bring your own generation” model for new load additions. If done properly, this could ensure that large load is able to interconnect faster over time.  For example, if the generator does not seek any new interconnection or transmission Service and any generation will offset the Load that is seeking to interconnect, then the arrangement would pose little or no additional threat to grid reliability. 

• If MISO and LSEs feel that there won’t be enough generation online in time to meet resource adequacy needs, why not push the LSEs to make deals with generators through PGIAs?

3. The ERAS proposal is unduly discriminatory.  The proposal would create a new parallel queue process that will disadvantage and harm existing interconnection customers (ICs) directly and indirectly (including in ways that harm wholesale market competition) without adequate justification.  That would unjustly and unreasonably deviate from decades of transmission open access and wholesale market reform policies focused on non-discriminatory treatment of wholesale competitors, including the use of common interconnection rules. 

• For the same reasons that FERC found some interconnection processes unjust and unreasonable in Order 2023, the ERAS proposal is likewise unjust and unreasonable.  In particular:
  • The ERAS approach would not allow all interconnection customers to interconnect to the transmission system in a reliable, efficient, transparent, and timely manner;
  • The ERAS proposal would worsen interconnection queue backlogs, create even longer development timelines, and increase uncertainty for existing interconnection customers regarding the cost and timing of interconnecting to the transmission system; and
  • By creating a separate path for only certain preference projects, the ERAS approach would stifle competition in the wholesale electric markets.

• The GIQ will likely continue to be delayed while (some) ERAS projects could move at a rapid pace and use up transmission capacity that otherwise would have been available for queued projects.
• ERAS projects would receive something very, very valuable. Their shares of interconnection costs should reflect that and be much higher. Some of those costs should go to address MISO’s queue issues for all IC customers, including increased staffing and better software.

• Projects in cycles prior to 2023 cycle should not be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle because projects in the oldest queue cycles (ex. DPP 2018-2020) would be furthest along in development, but this would trigger restudies and cause further delays in the already backlogged queue.  While the earliest GIA executions as of November 2024 are estimated at March 2026, MISO has already indicated ”MISO delays,” for all DPP 2023 regions.

• ERAS will increase costs for ICs on top of costs that will increase from recent reforms. 

• • Even if MISO prohibits currently queued projects from transferring to ERAS, there is nothing stopping a project from withdrawing and resubmitting as a new project in order to enter ERAS and skip over their previous queue position. These withdrawals will cause additional restudies and impose new network upgrade costs on projects that remain in DPP clusters.  
  • These projects will then utilize MISO and transmission owner resources to complete the interconnection process, taking away said resources from projects who have signed GIAs and are ready to come online and help address the resource adequacy issues that ERAS is trying to fix.

• It’s  unclear why the ERAS process is limited to LSEs. This raises the same concerns as inclusion of a RERRA exemption in the queue cap, which MISO dropped from its proposal (FERC Docket ER25-507). 
• IPPs can address RA needs, too.  Letting LSEs choose preferred resources (when all types of resoruces can be used to meet RA requirements) would allow for unduly discriminatory treatment of independent capacity suppliers.
• While MISO claims that ERAS will not harm DPP projects nor take up any additional headroom, MISO may be overlooking the potential for ERAS projects to create new congestion and curtailment of DPP projects.  MISO should address the unfairness of this.

• Projects that transfer to ERAS process should not raise Network Upgrade costs for other projects in the Queue. 
• ERAS projects should be responsible for AFS upgrades.  Allowing ERAS queue customers to avoid AFS network upgrades that they cause while forcing DPP customers to maintain cost responsibility is unduly discriminatory.
• DPP customers face both costs and delays as they await AFS study results. Allowing a subset of preference class of queue customers to avoid these AFS-related costs and delays is discriminatory as it allows reliable, timely, efficient, and transparency access to the grid only for certain customers but not all customers as required under open access.

• MISO should seek to minimize further delays in clearing the queue backlog and processing subsequent queues. Dropouts at any point in the process inherently cause harm to other customers (unless proven otherwise by the harm calculation). Any resource that withdrawals from the queue should be subject to current withdrawal penalties, including automatic withdrawal penalties for cluster 2023 and beyond.

• We do not support LSEs having the ability to submit brand new projects not currently in any MISO study cycle.  That would beblatant queue jumping. 
• It seems like ERAS is a way for LSEs to skirt around the interconnection process to get away from paying for network upgrades (NUs).  If there are only one or a handful of ERAS projects being studied, then it is unlikely for them to see large NU requirements.  They also get the benefit of Tranche 1 and probably soon-to-be-approved Tranche 2.1 being in the base case, providing ERAS projects much more headroom on the system negating need for NUs.  Meanwhile, those queue projects stuck in DPP are using dated base cases where updates are prohibited under retroactive ratemaking. ERAS creates an entirely new process to skirt these issues, which is unduly discriminatory.
• MISO has already filed for a queue cap that MISO claims is needed to reduce study timelines.  Assuming FERC approval, MISO should give that a shot before trying to shake things up even more.

• If the ERAS proposal were to move forward against good judgement and contrary to what’s just and reasonable, leaving the authority in the hands of the states to determine which resources should access this fast lane would be an extremely important feature of the proposal.  
• Further, if the proposal proceeds, then MISO should not look to establish an RA threshold using DLOL or any other measure of capacity accreditation. Doing so likely would prevent any state with policy preferences towards renewables and storage to ensure such projects are able to participate in ERAS. 
• Ignoring important issues regarding state authority over RA and the role of MISO as a regional resource planner, imposing restrictions on what states can consider or endorse for ERAS treatment would unduly discriminate against clean energy resource classes that, e.g., fare better under accreditation methods that account for RA contribution under a variety of grid conditions.   

4. The ERAS proposal is inefficient.  The ongoing availability of the ERAS process would create disincentives for MISO and Transmission Owners to improve the existing interconnection queue processes.  This would create the potential for unduly discriminatory and preferential treatment, further contradicting long-established open access and other non-discriminatory market-based policies aimed at ensuring RA and reliability.

• While MISO claims that ERAS will not harm DPP projects nor take up any additional headroom, MISO may be overlooking the potential for ERAS projects to create new congestion and curtailment of DPP projects.  MISO should address the inefficiency of this.
• Two queue processes will create uncertainty while one can work fine.  Two queues necessarily would create additional uncertainty and additional delay compared to status quo.  ERAS will not improve the current backlog situation and will only slow generation down even further as MISO tries to reconcile two separate and conflicting queues, all while unduly harming those in the DPP.
• Creating a parallel process would only complicate the interconnection issues. Further, once a program is implemented, it is difficult to get rid of.
• Maintaining the current process is the most just and reasonable and non-discriminatory to all generators, and it gives MISO more motivation to pursue DPP efficiency.
• As noted above, if MISO and LSEs feel that there won’t be enough generation online in time to meet resource adequacy needs, why not push the LSEs to make deals with generators through PGIAs?  An RFP could be held, LSEs could run their own power flow studies to determine expected NU cost, then put their money where their mouth is to pursue a deal through a PGIA.
• Entry requirements for this process are not sufficiently high to discourage abuse of ERAS. The higher application fee and M2 Milestone and site control are important first steps to ensure only ready projects enter this queue. However, given the aggressive construction timeline required to meet this, MISO should include additional project readiness criteria – e.g., 30-50% engineering designs, procurement or MSAs of long-lead time equipment, information of fuel procurement (i.e. access to pipeline), permit application submission, etc.
• This proposal could undermine market competitiveness that would lead to increased costs for ratepayers. OMS and other relevant RERRA entities should require a demonstration that the LSE has done an evaluation or an RFP for projects with executed GIAs or even in Phase 3 and can demonstrate that none of these projects could fulfill the need identified by the state/utility IRP, such that an ERAS resource is required.
• ERAS projects that jump to the front of projects in the queue to pay for existing Network Upgrades in the study areas in which Network Upgrades have already been triggered.
• MISO is already stretched too thin to manage current workloads.  MISO needs to show how adoption of the ERAS will not consume MISO engineering staff and/or consulting staff time that could have been applied to the DPP.

• By allowing conditional GIAs, the ERAS proposal undercuts the justification for fast-tracking the associated projects, because conditional GIAs aren’t “ready to go.”

5. The ERAS proposal is unclear.  MISO should clarify all aspects of its proposal.  Seemingly small unaddressed details could create unintended consequences that harm RA.

• MISO should show how an ERAS project and a representative project from each queue cycle would be assigned costs at each stage of the respective processes. 
• How will MISO ensure that the interconnection costs are the same for ERAS and queue projects?  
• ERAS projects don’t have withdrawal penalties but IC projects do, which is a significant difference in risk between these projects.

• Need more detail on what is meant to have ”state recognition of the project” needed for resource adequacy. 

•  Are LSEs the only entities eligible for this process?  Would MISO consider joint ventures where an IPP partnered with an LSE to build a resource that met the criteria?  The restriction of ERAS to LSEs would be unduly discriminatory towards developers and IPPs.  Further that would unreasonably restrict competition.
• Are there any restrictions on transferring EGIAs to another party once they have been executed?
• Is any of the M2 payment at risk, or will it all be returned if the entity does not execute the EGIA?
• Has MISO done any analysis on how many projects/MWs they and the TOs could process in the 3-4 month timeline. Would these be the same staff and consulting resources used to process the DPP, and if so, would this undermine MISO’s goal to get the DPP down to its tariff defined timeline?
• What would happen if any regulatory approval needed for generation construction is denied after the EGIA was executed?

Regarding the specific questions MISO posed for feedback, CGA offers the following responses for consideration:

Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?

• How the ERAS process will work in deregulated areas of MISO’s footprint needs much further attention.
• MISO should apply strict and familiar metrics to define a consistent footprint wide resource adequacy need and ensure ERAS projects will meet their COD.
• At least 50% of the $24,0000 per MW security requirement should be non-refundable. Since projects entering ERAS are supposedly late stage projects with high confidence of reaching COD within 5 years, such financial commitment should be expected.

Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?

• Projects should NOT be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process, at least without incurring substantial withdrawal penalties to be paid toward shared network upgrades (in recognition of the harm caused by the withdrawal to other customers in the same cluster).
• ERAS projects should be exposed to significantly larger withdrawal penalties than now exist in the DPP study process.
• Projects should not be given ERAS treatment unless studies have confirmed that queued GI requests are not harmed.  Queued projects must be made financially whole if they incur any additional interconnection costs due to ERAS projects. 

Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outline in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

MISO should require RERRA approval of a project before giving the project ERAS treatment. 

Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider?

• ERAS projects should be required to be commercially operable at most in the ERAS time horizon.  MISO’s tariff language should go beyond this requirement and should also include requirements that ERAS projects demonstrate how they can meet the claimed COD.
• If ERAS proceeds, then CGA supports a sunsetting ERAS no more than 1-2 years out.
• MISO should provide more information regarding the allocation of transmission capacity between ERAS and queue projects.
• CGA supports MISO’s indication that ERAS projects will be responsible for upgrades associated with Affected System Studies (AFS).  MISO should not add any caveats later.
• Projects entering ERAS that are expected to be included in the JTIQ Participation Group should be required upon ERAS application to sign the JTIQ Commitment Group funding agreement prior to kick-off of their individual ERAS.
• There should be transparency regarding who enters the ERAS, and clear explanations provided by ERAS participants who fail to execute the EGIA. These matters should be made part of the public record.
• Projects that enter the ERAS should not be allowed a second bite at the apple. In other words, if an ERAS participant drops out of the ERAS they should not be allowed to enter a later ERAS.
• MISO should establish clear ERAS regional MW thresholds. For example, if a zone needs 1,000 MW to shore up resource adequacy, then ERAS applications totaling more than 1,000 MW should not be allowed in that same zone.

I’m happy to discuss.

David Sapper

dsapper@ces-ltd.com

Advanced Energy United appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments in response to the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (MISO) request for stakeholder feedback[1] on its proposed Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS)[2] process following the November 13, 2024 Planning Advisory Committee and November 18, 2024 ERAS Workshop.

Advanced Energy United is a national association of businesses making the energy we use secure, clean, and affordable. Advanced Energy United is the only industry association in the United States that represents the full range of advanced energy technologies and services, both grid-scale and distributed. Advanced energy includes energy efficiency, demand response, energy storage, wind, solar, hydro, nuclear, electric vehicles, and more. The comments expressed in this submission represent the position of Advanced Energy United but may not represent the views of any particular member. 

As we have noted in our previous feedback request responses, MISO’s interconnection queue has been wrought with challenges including delays, projects withdrawals, and uncertainty. We acknowledge the importance of reforming these processes to be more efficient and allow the capacity needed to meet the region’s growing load. MISO’s objective should be the timely addition of new UCAP. Any new process should not jeopardize the existing UCAP in prior queue cycles. After rejecting the original cap filing, FERC had directed[3] MISO to ensure that any similar cap proposal contains provisions to ensure they will not be a barrier to meeting resource adequacy needs. Rejection of exemptions for Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (RERRA) under the cap and a separation of the cap filing from resource adequacy concerns has led MISO to create the ERAS process. ERAS intends to create a mechanism for speeding up interconnection for projects needed for resource adequacy; however, in its current form, ERAS will end up as queue-jumping process, providing some resources with unfair opportunities to circumvent both the proposed interconnection queue cap as well as the queue itself.

Additionally, the ERAS proposal fails to address the underlying concerns that led to FERC’s objections against the RERRA exemption in the first cap filing. It merely repackages the exemption under a different framework, perpetuating the same issues of inequity and prioritization without adequate safeguards or justification. Similar to other recent reforms, it also ignores the root causes of queue delays and fails to consider that ERAS projects could also experience delays. As currently structured, ERAS is only available to projects supported by RERRAs, effectively creating a parallel interconnection path that circumvents the standard queue process. This separate pathway provides these projects with access to GIA without adequate regard for the status of previously queued projects in the conventional Definitive Planning Process (DPP) cycle. By elevating RERRA-supported projects in this way, ERAS prioritizes these projects over others, including those that have already invested time and resources navigating the conventional interconnection process. This unfairly grants RERRA projects priority access to limited transmission headroom, replicating the same discriminatory effects as the original RERRA exemption. Furthermore, queue jumping risks moving less mature projects in front of more mature projects, slowing down time to market. Projects typically advance development work in conjunction with their queue status, and projects that have been waiting the queue for longer and are approaching movement through the queue will have done more development work than projects suddenly vaulted ahead of them. Queue jumping risks deprioritizing projects with UCAP that could energize sooner for less mature, slower-to-market projects. MISO has not done enough to ensure that the projects selected for ERAS are more mature than the projects already in the queue.

• Do you agree with the qualification requirements (e.g. resource adequacy requirements, financial obligations) as outlined in the presentation, and do you believe other conditions for qualification should be considered to enter the ERAS process?
  • Any process allowing a limited set of projects to jump ahead in a special interconnection queue should be thoroughly assessed for how it treats all resources. MISO must ensure such provisions are not unjust and unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, and cannot violate the principles of equity and open access. A queue that allows only LSEs to submit projects could potentially be inconsistent with FERC’s open access principles.
  • MISO has also failed to substantiate the overall RA need. MISO should provide additional data and analysis to demonstrate expected shortfalls in order to justify using resource adequacy concerns to allow queue jumping. Without a clear demonstration of region-wide capacity shortfalls, the purported justification for an expedited interconnection process like ERAS is unfounded. MISO has not proven the need to deviate from the current queue process.
  • The prioritization element of the ERAS proposal creates risk of undue discrimination and preferential treatment. To the extent that MISO includes prioritization criteria, MISO should ensure that such criteria are resource neutral, giving preference to projects that support resource adequacy needs while also considering system constraints. Criteria could include the impact of the projects on the system, ensuring projects moving forward will be those capable of providing the most resource adequacy and energy for the grid given existing and planned transmission capabilities.
• Should projects that withdraw from the GIQ to transition to the ERAS process incur withdrawal penalties, and should projects in cycles prior to the 2023 cycle be eligible to withdraw from their current cycle and enter the ERAS process?
  • A project should not get to withdraw for free. If a project wants to leave an ongoing cluster, it should pay the associated price of withdrawal. Additionally, MISO should implement increased requirements to enter the ERAS process given the benefit ERAS projects will receive and the harm that ERAS will impose on previously queued projects.
  • In the November 18^th workshop, MISO highlighted concerns about frequent restudies causing extreme delays in the DPP 2021 and DPP 2022 cycles. Ideally, there would be punitive withdrawal penalties that would limit attrition in these older cycles—the reality is that there are not. Rather than implementing a new process that will only encourage further attrition from older queue cycles, MISO should devote its time and resources to quickly interconnecting already queued projects.
  • If MISO is to implement ERAS and allow prior queued projects to withdraw from their queue and join the ERAS process, this will increase attrition in older queue cycles, further exacerbating the problem. According to MISO’s most recent cap filing with FERC, the 2022 cycle, which has not reached DP1, already has a 14% withdrawal rate. Furthermore, in that filing, MISO highlights the concerns when projects withdraw from the queue and the harm caused by absorbing costs of those withdrawals. MISO should understand that in implementing the ERAS process, they will make their DPP 2021 and 2022 cycles more inefficient than they are at present and will have to continue to restudy these cycles as projects withdraw and join ERAS.

Do you support Option 1 or Option 2 for the ERAS timeline as outlined in the presentation, and the ability to complete all necessary studies and coordination with MISO and the TOs within this timeline?

• • MISO should include projects from the DPP 2022 and 2023 cycles in the MTEP base case in order more accurately represent the future system. Given the current timeline of DPP cycles with the planned ERAS process, 2022 and 2023 would be excluded from the ERAS base case. Without these, MISO may face inaccurate study results as well as additional restudies. Available transmission is impacted by the inclusion or exclusion of these projects and MISO must be cautious to avoid double counting capacity for different sets of projects. The double-counting of transmission capacity risks creating unaddressed constraints and misaligned upgrades, which would need to be reconciled through costly and time-consuming true-ups in subsequent MTEP cycles.  Ultimately, the costs to correct misallocated transmission capacity will fall upon the ratepayers.
• Are there other timeline requirements to consider and do you have any additional feedback to consider?
  • Support having a sunset/end provision for this baked into the tariff by 2028/29 or earlier if the queue cycle is reduced to one year. MISO should specify that ERAS process will conclude by the sunset in tariff, or when the queue process reaches one year — whichever comes first.
  • How will staffing and labor be impacted by this additional queue process? Will having this separate process ultimately slow down the “regular” queue if staff have to prioritize review and study for projects within this process? Will they have to pause the “regular” queue, causing further backlogs? Slide 3 of the ERAS Introduction presentation[4] explains how MISO is working towards a one-year queue cycle from its current 3-4 year process. It acknowledged that an exemption to the queue cap would not change the study timeline but how will ERAS contribute to that goal? MISO should consider how having this separate, parallel process may harm existing queue participants, in terms of causing delays due to staffing limitations as well as creating additional congestion constraints that could trigger additional restudies and further delays and costs.
  • MISO should require that the ERAS process uses competitive procurement techniques. Specifically, LSE project selections should be substantively reviewed via a public process and approved by an independent entity. This will limit the opportunity for undue discrimination by LSEs and ensure that all resources, including IPPs, are evaluated fairly and given equal opportunity to participate in the ERAS process. In general, competitive solicitation processes are those that are open, fair, and employ the services of an independent third party that applies standardized evaluation criteria to choose amongst various options. This safeguard will ensure that the ERAS process will not be used to unfairly favor the LSE’s own projects and would more closely align the ERAS process with FERC precedent.[5]
  • MISO should consider bolder interconnection reforms to develop a more efficient and cost-effective approach to queue management, such as creating an entry-fee framework to provide upfront cost certainty, opportunities to expedite the interconnection, and optimizing study processes.

               Finally, Advanced Energy United notes that the ERAS proposal and related MISO cap proposal offer piecemeal stop-gap solutions that are insufficiently justified. MISO has already filed its cap proposal, and staff have stated that although this ERAS relates to the interconnection queue and is an offshoot from the cap discussions, it is a separate process and should therefore have its own filing. However, MISO’s desire to comply with the FERC directive to ensure resource adequacy as part of the Order responding to the original cap filing[6]  ties the ERAS proposal directly to the cap proposal. Cap aside, and although MISO intends for this to be a short-term process, MISO also needs to ensure thoughtful stakeholder conversation to vet other possibilities and again fails at considering more durable and long-term interconnection solutions. If there are resource adequacy shortfalls, MISO should seek to remedy them through just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory reforms. At a minimum, MISO should present more analysis to stakeholders as to why the ERA proposal is optimal, and why other proposals to incent the construction of additional capacity would be insufficient. The current ERAS process could unfairly give preference to certain projects at the expense of others already in the queue. MISO should pursue more impactful solutions to reform the interconnection processes.

Advanced Energy United appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments and looks forward to continuing to work with MISO to explore options to further improve the generator interconnection process in MISO. Please reach out to Lisa Barrett with any questions.

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa Barrett

202.380.1950 x3177

lbarrett@advancedenergyunited.org